THE NEW REPUBLIC

A Journal of Opinion

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Mr. Churchill Reports

Winston Churchill was in his best vein in his world-wide radio broadcast on February 9. He certainly ranks as one of the two greatest orators in the world today; President Roosevelt excels in delivery, but Mr. Churchill has a prose style that is very nearly unequaled in this generation. Although he warned the British people that an invasion attempt in the immediate future is probable, he had more good news to give than in his previous reports on the war. The British campaign in Africa is magnificent; so is that of the Greeks in Albania. While Germany can still drop three or four tons of bombs to Britain's one, he expects that situation soon to be reversed. With the winter two-thirds gone, the fears of epidemics in British air-raid shelters have proved unfounded.

The RAF has unquestioned control of the daylight air over England. Ninety German dive bombers have just been destroyed in the Mediterranean area. Despite the two savage attacks on the aircraft-carrier Illustrious she was able to go to Alexandria under her own power at the respectable speed of twenty-three knots. Only a few hours before he spoke, the British navy, with great audacity, had penetrated past all the Italian defenses to the head of the Gulf of Genoa, and poured 300 tons of high explosives into military objectives in Genoa itself.

For Americans, the most interesting thing in Mr. Churchill's speech was his reassurance that England does not expect our soldiers to take part in the war this year, next year or ever. In saying this he was of course indulging in prophecy, and any prophet can be mistaken. Nevertheless, there is sound sense in his argument, which was echoed by Mr. Willkie on his return home. If we can give Great Britain enough military supplies, quickly enough, the war can be won and the threat of a totalitarian world forever dissolved, without the sacrifice of American lives.

Pétain Still Resists

A heavy cloud of censorship hangs over France. We are allowed to know the important formal steps, but not the still more important things that lie behind them. A bad hitch has occurred in Hitler's plans to put Laval in charge. Pétain continues his dogged resistance; Admiral Jean Darlan is now Foreign Minister, in the place of Flandin, and Vice Premier as well. Admiral Darlan is no friend of England, but no friend of Hitler either. There is of course no reason why the Germans could not occupy the whole of France tomorrow, throw out the Pétain government and reduce the country to another Poland. Why don't they? It is because of fear of the French fleet and the French army under Weygand in North Africa. If either or both of these forces should decide to come to England's aid, it would be an extremely serious matter. The danger of this is much increased by the brilliant British successes in North Africa and the prospect that Italy may collapse in another few months. Partly because of the stubbornness of Pétain with these powerful weapons in his hands, Hitler's famous timetable is

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now completely out of date. He had better throw it away and write another—if he can.

Mr. Willkie Comes Home

Since we have in the past criticized Mr. Willkie so often and so sharply, we feel we owe him the statement that at present he seems to us to be behaving extraordinarily well. The acclaim with which he was received in England—based partly, as our Washington correspondent points out in this issue, on the mistaken supposition that the leader of the opposition has a post in this country similar to that of the Loyal Opposition leader in England—did not go to his head. He seems to have withstood the almost irresistible temptation of Americans abroad in time of stress to make promises on behalf of his country which cannot possibly be fulfilled. From the beginning, Mr. Willkie has shown courage on the issue of all-out aid to Britain. He defied the leading forces in his party when opportunism would have told him to go along with them or, at the very least, to be silent. In these past few weeks he has shown a stature far greater than he displayed as a more or less impromptu presidential candidate on an improvised platform.

What Bengazi Means

The fall of Bengazi is a triumph of many kinds. Apart from the military value of yet another base near the Italian boot, this swift, successful movement must bring many "invisible" profits to the British. It has shown that British forces, well armed and coördinated, can operate with a speed and efficiency that could not be bettered by the Nazis. With the other triumphs in Africa, it has wrecked the carefully developed theory of British inability to do more than hang on under the blows of the enemy. It will strike hard at Italian morale, while boosting the spirits of Britain's sympathizers and the waverers who had formerly seen no grounds for showing their sympathy. It was not a British victory in any narrow sense; it was also a victory for the British Commonwealth, especially Australia, with the aid of free troops from the conquered countries of Europe. As such it will bring heart to persons in the widest possible spheres of influence. It cannot fail to impress the French under Weygand in Tunis, or the French in their homeland. To the Greeks it brings the hope of additional British support being diverted to Albania. To the Mohammedan world it is a fatal blow to the man who hailed himself as "Protector of Islam." To America it is added proof that aid to Britain is not, as some of our appeasers say it is, sentimental devotion to a hopeless cause.

Leisurely Republicans

The action of the Republicans in Congress during the debate on the lease-lend bill has certainly not been up to the standard we have the right to expect in the course of a national emergency. Although the administration accepted amendments covering every point where the bill might conceivably have conferred too sweeping powers, the Republicans have not been satisfied. They have demanded further amendments of a crippling character; they have summoned as witnesses certain individuals who have not earned the right to appear on such an occasion; they have moved with leisure, as though they had all the time in the world. Since the need for haste is so desperately pressing, the opponents of the bill are in a position to blackmail its supporters; we hope history will not have to record that the war was lost because they refused to wake up to the emergency.

Anti-Democrats in the USA

If the debate in Congress on the lease-lend bill has been bad, that outside its halls has been a good deal worse. In Boston, at a hearing of the state legislature on a resolution to memorialize Congress against the bill, an ominous threat was made. One opponent said that if America went any farther on the road to war there are 20,000,000 Germans here who will take things into their own hands, and 30,000,000 Irish who will join them. Along the same line was the statement of a New York City politician in Washington who declared that the metropolis is already a battleground of intense emotions and that if the bill is passed there will be revolutionary clashes in the streets.

Talk of this kind is nonsense, even though in the present state of emotion it may be dangerous nonsense. The number of people in this country who sympathize with the totalitarian states is far smaller than these prophets of doom believe, and the last thing they want is to call attention to themselves by any conspicuous public display of their attitude. Already it is reported that many Italo-Americans are disgusted with Mussolini's showing in Africa and are willing to throw him overboard. If Italy entirely collapsed, the number who would suddenly change their tune in favor of democracy would be tremendously increased. The same thing is true of most of Hitler's friends over here. If England survives and Germany is defeated, the Nazi movement in the United States will shrivel. The only time it would become dangerous would be if England were to fall.

Wanted Economic Coöperation

The United States is now coöperating with Great Britain to a tremendous extent; when the lease-lend bill becomes law, as it undoubtedly will, this coöperation will become even greater. It is extraordinary, however, that so little is heard about joint economic effort. We do not refer now to long-range plans looking to the time after the war, such as those recently discussed in The New Republic, but to immediate day-to-day matters. The British are much concerned about leaks in

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the blockade of Germany because of sales of goods by the United States and other countries to supposedly neutral nations such as Russia. They would like to stop these leaks, and one step toward doing so would be to establish a blockade station in this hemisphere, probably in the Caribbean. There are other problems: the liquidation of British-owned American securities, fitting together British and American purchases of both military and non-military goods here and elsewhere, and plans for husbanding the declining amount of merchant shipping that is available.

Under these circumstances, it is hard to understand why the two countries have not, long before this, exchanged economic missions. There should be a group of American experts in London, working with a British committee, and a British group in Washington cooperating in the same way. In some respects, the economic side of the war is even more important than its military one. For the United States to follow the course we suggest would not endanger our neutral status—assuming that we have any left—any more than, or as much as, what we are doing in a military way; and it might greatly aid Britain's war effort.

Batista of Cuba

At least for the time being, Batista, the Cuban dictator, has apparently outridden the storms that threatened him. His chief opponents have fled to the United States for safety, and however serious the threat may have been, there is no evidence that he can be unseated in the visible future. American opinion in regard to Batista has had a curious history. He began life as an army sergeant and came to power purely as a dictator of the familiar Latin American type. During his first years in office he was about as brutal as his sort usually is. Then the American Communists suddenly made friends with him and, in their press and any other periodicals they could reach, his praises were sung. If he has really turned democratic in any degree, we are not aware of concrete evidence of it. Elections take place in Cuba, but we have no proof that they differ from elections in most parts of Latin America. The most disturbing fact about Batista recently is that he has been praised as a good democrat by Dr. Joseph Thorning, the American Catholic who has such an uncanny skill at getting his name into the papers. The only other person whom we remember as being praised by Dr. Thorning is Franco of Spain, whose virtues this gentleman has been hymning for years. On a basis of the evidence we strongly doubt whether Dr. Thorning is competent to recognize a democrat when he sees one.

The Old Order Begins to Crack

A little daylight seems to be penetrating one of the blackest spots in the Americal political situation. In many Southern states, an annual poll tax of a few dollars is demanded from each citizen, and he is not allowed to vote if he has not paid it. The sum is small, but so are many Southern incomes. Careful investigations have proved that in hundreds of thousands of cases, the tax prevents citizens from participating in elections. In thousands more, the tax is paid for the individual by some politician, who thus buys a vote. The situation both violates the spirit of the United States Constitution and helps to perpetuate machine politics on the lowest level.

Now comes the news that in two Southern states, Virginia and Tennessee, there seems an excellent chance that the poll tax may either be repealed this year or dissociated from the franchise. Virginia and Tennessee are two of the most advanced Southern states, and it is not surprising that they should take the lead in a reform of this kind. Yet if it is successful in these two commonwealths, it is pretty sure to move farther south. The old order is not broken; but it is certainly beginning to crack.

News Notes of a Week

Japanese sources in Shanghai said again that bombing had knocked out so many bridges on the precipitous Burma Road that its usefulness to China was practically ended. Japanese airmen have been trying to hit those bridges for a long while and probably are succeeding. . . . A Quislingist told a group of Norwegians in Drammen that he was their master. They lynched him. . . . The Soviet press featured stories of American efforts to provoke aggression by Germany and Japan against the USSR, as negotiations for a Japanese-Russian trade treaty opened. . . . Frederick T. Birchall, New York Times correspondent, reported that 500,000 Poles have been deported to Siberia under conditions of intense suffering. . . . A new technique in staging a "protest" riot was tried in Rome. Hundreds of soldiers were sent to guard the United States Embassy from riotous students, but the students didn't riot in fact didn't even gather. . . . The New York Times reported that the Spanish press expected Algeria, Tunisia and French Morocco to go over to General De Gaulle if Germany occupied all France.

Mr. Justice Black's predecessor on the Supreme Court, the ultra-conservative Willis Van Devanter, died. . . . The Feather Industries of America, Inc., agreed to cease using wild-bird plumage on hats. . . . The Ford Motor Company continued to refuse to accept any defense contract which required it to abide by federal and state labor laws. . . . The sum of $1,800,000,000 has been appropriated for 400 major construction jobs as part of the defense program. The Defense Housing Coördinator wants $156,750,000 for houses and trailers for workers on defense. . . . The American Youth Congress apparently followed the Communist line almost exactly, and denounced American efforts "to prolong the war in Europe" for selfish imperialist reasons.

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To You—On Your Freedom

WE INCLUDE in this issue of The New Republic a special section on the defense program. It is, we believe, one of the most important that we have published, not because of its own merits but because of the urgency of the issue which it attempts to face.

There are, as our special section shows, many dangers in our present defense program; dangers inherent in the incompetence of some high officials in the War and Navy Departments, and the reactionary bias of the industrialists. These failings have resulted in immediate threats to our security, in the shortage of basic materials, the lack of adequate expansion, the persistence of price rises and war profiteering, the disregard of federal legislation, the drift in labor policy. These many problems resolve into a major issue—will our defense program be the instrument for defending our progressive democracy, or will its final result be to turn America away from her promise, and to return to power forces which historically are responsible for the fascist tyranny which threatens us today?

It is not only our own future which will be determined by this issue; it is the future of all peoples. For, in a larger sense, the basic world struggle of which we are a part is a struggle between world fascism and a world democracy weakened because it is torn between its past and its promise. It is certain that America will play a major part in this struggle. It will remain a disconnected and confused conflict between nations, or it will be transformed into a unified, truly anti-fascist endeavor, according to the spirit which we bring to it.

Many facts cloud this issue. Some forces of our past —in industry—are so afraid now that the outcome of this war may be truly anti-fascist that they seek to compromise with fascism. Some forces in labor are so sure it will not be that they have allied themselves on the same side. We agree that American liberals must not start a program they cannot finish. We agree that we must not permit reaction to win on this side of the water while we are trying to prevent its complete victory on the other.

Liberals who have given up hope make that result more certain. Liberals who acquiesce in retreat in the name of defense, who follow a policy of democracy yesterday and democracy tomorrow but no democracy today, make the same result more certain. They forget that freedom is not a violet to be kept in a closed book, but a weapon to be used. They forget that like other weapons it grows rusty in disuse.

The first line of defense in a democratic nation is democracy itself—the energy of a free and self-governing people. Our task today is to mobilize that resource—to put every man to work for our progressive democracy with a job as definite as a machinist's at his lathe. This mobilization demands of each of us that he find his place and give his ability.

We believe that our task in The New Republic is to give you the facts about our present situation, its dangers and its opportunities. That is why we have written this supplement. But we believe that any effort now, if it is to succeed, must be systematic and sustained. This supplement is one of a series of the same general type which began in The New Republic nearly two years ago and will be continued in the future. We have organized the Committee for Democratic Defense to follow our action through. Outstanding liberals, representing farm, labor, consumer and other interests are serving on this committee. In their name we ask you to do what you can to spread this supplement, and to coöperate with the Committee. If you want more material, write to us. If you will send to us the facts about the impact of defense in your community we shall make full use of them. If you can initiate local action around this program we shall help you in every way that we can.

We write this to you—on our common freedom. It is in danger. We need your help as you need ours. It may be our last chance.

As the Chartists said one hundred years ago: "We are at one, and we will keep to each other."

The Shape of the War

THE LINES of the winter campaigns have been well developed; we are for the moment in a lull before the expected fury of the spring. It is a favorable opportunity to take stock of what has happened so far and try to peer into the future. In order to do this to good purpose it is necessary, not merely to speculate on this or that detail, or even to guess what is in Hitler's mind, but to see the war as a whole.

The overt activities of the winter can be interpreted in no way except as an immense improvement in the position of Britain and her allies. Late last summer she was in desperate straits and was saved by the heroism and skill of the RAF. It not only prevented any possible immediate invasion, but strengthened the morale of the home population for the cruel air bombardment which was to follow. Germany had expected Britain to give in within a few weeks; so had Mussolini, the Vichy government and probably the Soviet Union and lesser non-belligerents. But before long it became evident that if she were to be conquered, fuller preparations and more time would be required.

Then followed Mussolini's rash campaigns and the amazingly successful counter-offensives against them. The Greeks not only thrust back his invasion but drove the Fascists to the Adriatic. The armies of the British in Africa virtually destroyed Graziani's supposedly strong force with activities in Libya and East Africa which, aided by continued naval supremacy in the Mediterranean, must before long wipe out the Italian

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African Empire and end all threat to Suez. With the bombardment of Genoa, an assault on Italy herself begins to appear feasible; the occupation of Sicily is a strategic possibility.

The meaning of these events is portentous for the Axis. Italy has been converted from an asset of Hitler into a liability. She must be not only sustained but also possibly held in line by superior power. The German General Staff must reckon seriously with the possibility of what it has always feared—a simultaneous war on two fronts. It has diverted large forces to the southward and eastward; it has in this region lost the initiative, at least for the time being. These events will not be of permanent significance if Britain loses at home, but if she does not, important results may follow.

In the Far East, China continues to hold out while Japan has made little headway. Her threats to us, made to keep us from aiding Britain, since she knows her conquests would crumble if the Axis were defeated, merely stiffened our attitude. She continues to penetrate southward, with increase of influence in Indo-China and Thailand, but our fleet is still in the Pacific and she dares not undertake a major provocation. We have gone further in cutting off her military supplies, have given additional aid to China and are about to proffer more. Again everything hangs on the possibility of Britain's defeat at home. Japan, in fear that this may not occur, shows signs of desiring to appease us.

Behind the scenes, the war has been waged in terms of preparation for the great spring offensive against Britain. In both Germany and England factories have been roaring, troops have been trained and equipment prepared. Winston Churchill is probably correct in saying that as a result of this race, Britain is relatively better off in the air and on land than last summer. Meanwhile she retains control of the sea, though her sea-borne traffic has been increasingly harassed.

But the main competition has been that between Hitler's organization of the occupied territories and mobilization in the United States for aid to Britain. Both nations have encountered difficulties; both have gone a long way in overcoming them. Hitler has found the Vichy government unexpectedly stubborn; he still does not control the French navy or Mediterranean bases. Sabotage elsewhere has somewhat hindered him. British bombing has done an uncertain amount of damage. There is no doubt, however, that his preparations are gigantic and thorough. American aid was slow in getting started and still is far too small. Yet every month marks an acceleration. Hitler knows that the longer he waits, the less chance he will have. With the passage of the lease-lend bill, our potential for war production will begin to have, not only substantial material results, but an incalculable effect on morale and expectations in the whole world. A cloud no bigger than a man's hand portends a flood of weapons in 1942 and later. Again everything depends on whether Britain can survive the next three months.

If—as we cannot bring ourselves to believe—Hitler can invade and subdue the British Isles, there will be no use in speculating any more about this war. It will be over, and we shall have to think about the next one, a war in which almost certainly we should be a principal combatant. But it is worth visualizing the possible consequences of Hitler's failure.

That would be a real turning of the tide. Neither Hitler nor his generals nor the German people will believe that, having failed on this occasion, they can succeed on a future one, against far heavier odds. Their loss of confidence will certainly affect both friend and foe. It will reverberate in France, in Russia, in Japan, in the conquered regions, in the Balkans, in America. The strategic offensive will pass to the Allies, and their strength will accumulate like a rolling snowball. Foreseeing this, Hitler will undoubtedly offer to negotiate a peace, but if the offer is rejected he will have to fight on defensively, and against increasing forces. Neither his temperament nor that of the Nazis can stand up against this type of pressure. No nation can fight well after it becomes hopeless of victory.

It is too early to predict just how the strategy would develop. But the improved Allied position in the Mediterranean and the Near East would then count heavily. Turkey and others might join the hostilities. The French navy and the French colonial armies in Africa and Syria would probably go into action against Germany. The British Isles, strengthened by a swelling stream of munitions from us, and occupying an interior position, could make forays in a half-dozen directions, while Hitler's great army would be busy defending a far-extended territory. Eventual air supremacy, not merely over Britain, but over the Continent as well, would pass to the Allies. The struggle would still be fierce and perhaps long continued, but there would be less and less doubt about the outcome. Under circumstances like these, a power like that of the German dictator can crumble even more rapidly that it was built, vanishing completely in the dust of its ruins.

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Food for Britain

THE FOOD SITUATION in Britain is of interest more for its possibilities than its actualities. Actually, up till now, rationing has been on the whole nothing more than a minor nuisance. The meagerness of the tea ration has been a real hardship for some in the lower-income groups; the acute shortage of lemons and onions has been extremely inconvenient; cream is only a luxury, nostalgically regretted as a symbol of happy and abundant peacetime days; the stocks of confectionery are growing low; bananas and grapes are going to be unobtainable, and apples scarce (luckily none of these is rich in vitamins); meat is to be slightly cut. But articles like bread, flour and potatoes are unrationed and cheap, and there is no shortage of any staple article of diet. Indeed the only rations which have been entirely taken up are those of tea and margarine. Though the sugar ration is less than half of pre-war consumption, it is not all used (96 percent); and only 80 percent of meat and butter have been taken up.

It is true that the recent increase in the tonnage sunk by submarines is disturbing; but, unless there is a further considerable increase, even this, with the large reserves held in the country, cannot be called serious. Nor, though it is unpleasant maybe, can the 12½-percent increase in the cost of foodstuffs since the outbreak of war.

But the war bids fair to effect a radical change in the nation's food. The feeding of Britain is being treated as a scientific problem; and the government is tackling it positively and with initiative, instead of merely regulatively, with a little palliative action here and there.

It is only fair to the last war to recall that it was not possible to be fully scientific about food in 1914. The first vitamin was not brought to light till 1911, and it was only in the last decade that, with the discovery of all the main protective foodstuffs, a quantitative dietary standard could be established, against which the shortcomings of any country or group could be measured.

The upshot was the alarming demonstration that large fractions of the people, even of the most prosperous countries—more than one-quarter in the U. S.A., getting on for a half in Britain—were in some degree malnourished. As vitamin and mineral deficiency leads to a deficiency of physical and mental energy and to a lowered resistance to infectious disease, it can cause a potent weakening of a country's war effort; and with this in mind, radical measures have been planned and, to a certain degree, executed.

Deficiency of protective food substances in modern industrial countries springs almost wholly from two sets of causes—first, the absence of the substances themselves in staple articles of food; and second, poverty—since most protective foods are relatively expensive. The lack of vitamins and essential minerals in staple foods may be due either to the undue purification of the food, as in the elimination of iodine from salt, or of vitamin B_1, calcium and other substances from white flour; or to the mass production of new substitute foods, of which margarine is the outstanding example.

The government long ago made it compulsory to reinforce margarine with vitamins A and D, up to the level of good-quality butter. Now they are tackling the more difficult question of bread. They are going to give the public a choice, at the same price, between wholemeal (or more accurately 85-percent whole) "gray" bread, and white bread reinforced with calcium and synthetic vitamin B_1. Both courses have their difficulties. New milling machinery must be installed for producing wholemeal flour (and there is some suspicion that vested interests are trying to prevent wholemeal bread from gaining in popularity); while the plant necessary for synthesizing B_1 on a sufficiently large scale and low price is extremely elaborate. However, the latter should be working by next summer, and wholemeal bread be available in quantity by the following spring.

The problem of poverty is equally urgent; and this can only be tackled by treating the family as the unit for food and other social services. In our industrial democracies, children are the greatest single cause of poverty, and are also the greatest sufferers by poverty. One-sixth of the families of Britain contain half of the children under fifteen; and with our present wage and price levels it is physically impossible for the wife of an unskilled workman with three or more children to keep them from dietary insufficiency. This is well demonstrated by the gloomy facts of Sir John Orr's survey. He estimated that two-fifths to one-half of the whole population of Britain were in some degree malnourished: but this fraction included two-thirds to three-quarters of the nation's children.

The only way out of this impasse is by some form of family-allowance system: and the system which would give the most immediate returns in health and well-being would be one in which the allowances were given in kind, in the shape of free or cheap rations of essential protective foods. Already steps have been taken toward this end by extending the supply of free or cheap milk for schoolchildren and for nursing mothers: two and a half million people are taking advantage of this scheme. But this is not enough, and many people are willing to bet that another year of war and increasing stringency will see the introduction of a comprehensive scheme by which mothers would

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be issued tickets for their children, covering the purchase at much reduced prices of all the most important protective foods available—milk, fresh vegetables and potatoes.

There have even been rumors that a scheme of this sort was prepared in the early days of the war and turned down by the Chamberlain Cabinet. However, both the war situation and the attitude of the government to "social reform" (though actually this term covers various urgent war measures) in wartime, have radically changed. The chief obstacles are the opposition of the trade unions to the principle of family allowances, and the attitude of certain persons in authority, who still persist in regarding any attempt at dietary reform as a scientist's fad, and like to say, "Well, after all, a cut from the joint with potatoes and vegetables is better than any of your vitamin foods." This of course is as superbly unimaginative as Marie Antoinette's remark about cake. First, imagination has not conceived the tragic fact that working-class mothers of large families cannot even dream of daily cuts from joints; and second, it has omitted to remember that meat demands very considerable shipping space, whether directly or indirectly in the form of animal foodstuffs. The chief reason for retaining a fair-sized meat ration is its effect on morale.

There is, I think, no doubt that during the next twelve months Britishers will have to forgo a great deal of their traditional diet (which will not by any means be all loss!) and to reconcile themselves to something much more simple. The present relatively large stock of meat animals in the country should be drastically cut down (by at least a million head), leaving us free to concentrate on backyard pigs and poultry, which can utilize scraps, and on milk cattle. The Scientific Food Advisory Committee, under the chairmanship of Sir William Bragg, has given useful guidance. Of the foods which are readily available (others, alas, like cheese, eggs and tomatoes are not), milk, potatoes, fresh vegetables and oatmeal are the most valuable. Potatoes are perhaps specially important, since they can be grown in large quantities in Britain, and are the best available source of vitamin C—much better, for instance, than apples. (It is only a superstition that all or most of the vitamin is in the peel: but peeling allows vitamins to leak out as well as wasting a great deal of the potato.) In addition, a considerable supply of oranges has been arranged for and fresh cabbage salad (cole slaw) is being recommended, so that there should be no shortage of vitamin C. We have merely got to abandon our new-found fruit-eating habits, and concentrate on potatoes and cabbages.

The Ministry of Food is planning a campaign to double the consumption of these foods in the next few months. Their advertising campaign, by the way, giving new recipes and suggesting new foods, has been a great success: but it does not seem to have penetrated below the lower-middle class—in other words, it has not reached the stratum which most urgently needs it. They are also arranging demonstrations of cookery and special menus in all large towns and cities.

Another change in British habits has been the introduction of communal feeding on a considerable and increasing scale.

Communal feeding is cheaper: mass buying may cut costs by 50 percent; mass cooking and washing-up saves time and energy. It makes life easier for evacués, adults and children, men and girls whose wives and mothers have been evacuated, civil defense workers, and so on. It teaches people to be more sociable.

The London County Council has more than a hundred centers in its Londoners' Meal Service. A special food train tours the subway every night with food for the shelterers. Big blocks of flats and housing estates are starting their own communal meal centers where dinners may be had for sixpence. It looks as though communal feeding—or as I should prefer to call it, sociable eating—has come to stay.

I said at the outset that the chief interest of the British food situation lay in its possibilities. We can now see rather more clearly what these possibilities are. If a scheme of family allowances in kind is introduced, this, with the "fortification" of bread and margarine, will implement the standard of nutritional health made possible by modern scientific discovery. It will also be one of the major steps toward the establishment of a People's Minimum, which in its turn will be the best answer to Hitler's "New Order."

Then we have the encouraging spectacle of the Ministry of Food taking an active and initiatory part in a planned food policy. The inevitable trend of events is for government to abandon its laissez-faire traditions of non-interference in social affairs, to abandon also the compromise attitude of the last generation, in which social services were rather grudgingly provided as palliatives for the weaknesses and undeniable results of a fundamentally individualistic economy, and to regard itself as the major instrument of social service. The Food Ministry has gone further in this direction than almost any other.

We shall also have gone a long way toward remedying the deplorable first effects of technology on diet. Readers of Professor Drummond's and Miss Wilbraham's fascinating work on the history of diet, "The Englishman's Food," will recall how the old prison diet of bread and water, which at least had no grave effects on health in old days, suddenly began to produce serious illness among prisoners with the introduction of white—*i. e.*, devitaminized and demineralized—bread. If we can cling to our gains in the food sphere, alone, the war will have done some real good.

JULIAN HUXLEY

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Science Creates a New World[1]

I HAVE BEEN LOOKING at a miracle, or rather a whole series of them. In some of the chief research laboratories of the United States I have been given a vision of the future, not in abstract terms, but in those of the average man, his home, his city, his health and happiness. The research experts who talked freely with me on the understanding that they would not be quoted by name indulged in no Utopian visions. Everything they described represents solid, existing achievement. All that is needed now is for the world to catch up with the scientists. At this point, of course, tremendous difficulties intervene, difficulties of which they are as well aware as anyone else.

What sort of world lies just ahead, if the things that already exist in the laboratory can be brought into the practical realm of everyday life? Let us begin with the most familiar of all environments—the home. I call to the witness stand one of the leading experts in the science, so new that it hardly has a name as yet, of improved housing.

"Houses today are still built on plans created in the Middle Ages, when rooms had to be heated by separate fireplaces and glass was nonexistent, or so expensive it could only be used in minute quantities. Architecture can and must break away from these obsolete limitations. Today we can afford huge windows and can heat far larger spaces than ever before. I don't suggest that separate rooms should be abolished; people will always want privacy. It is certain, however, that because of inertia and tradition we chop up our housing space into more numerous and smaller units than is necessary or desirable.

"What the architect should do is to consider the house, in the phrase of Le Corbusier, the famous European architect, that is often quoted by Buckminster Fuller in this country, as 'a machine for living.' He should study the habits, personality and possessions of the individuals who are to live there and arrange the house accordingly, with areas devoted to special activities. Thoreau had twenty things which he regarded as essential when he lived at Walden Pond; the average American family today has 9,000. The house of the future should contain adequate storage space for these 9,000 things, a super-filing case, so to speak, where everything is put away systematically and is instantly accessible. This can be done partly by standardized closets, used as the walls between rooms and also serving as the structural supports for upper stories or roof.

"Today we have learned to heat a whole wall, or better yet, a ceiling or a floor, either with a mass of hot-water pipes or with uninsulated fine electric wires laid directly in the plaster. Steel strips, curved into a parabolic or concave shape, can be used to reflect heat from one spot into an entire room or any part of it; they also produce an interesting structural pattern. For that matter, our rigid rectangular room shapes are another hangover from a time when we were limited in materials and technique. There is no good reason why they should be continued except for those who are only happy when following tradition.

"Radiant heat, of the sort just described, is like that of the sun. It warms a room without drying the air as do many present types of heating, which thereby produce vast amounts of colds and sinus trouble in winter. Radiant heating is highly economical; a room when not in use can be kept just above freezing temperature, and the heat snapped on as we now snap on a light, when one enters. It will be comfortably warm in a minute or two. So far as the heating problem is concerned, there is now no longer any reason why our houses should be built in the form of a tall and narrow rectangle, except to please the taste of the prospective tenant. Many architects are turning to low and rambling houses, all on one floor. These have the advantage of providing large, flat areas on roofs and balconies, where open air and sunshine can be enjoyed. The modern architect feels that indoors and outdoors should merge into one another with as little hard and fast line of demarcation as possible.

"Great strides have been made in lighting in recent years and even recent months. The architect today can use germicidal lamps, cool light from fluorescent lamps and polarized light with no glare. He can also use black light—invisible rays which cause fluorescent chemicals in carpets or other substances to glow with beautiful iridescent colors. In motion-picture theatres such carpets are now used to guide patrons safely to their seats while the room is sufficiently dark to make the screen readily visible. Houses with these new types of light can employ glowing masses of color, when desired, as has never been possible before. Incidentally, paint is now available from which its characteristic odor can be permanently removed, and the householder who wishes can even substitute some artificial perfume of his own choice—that of an evergreen forest in winter, or new-mown hay, or whatever he likes.

"One of the new plastic materials, called Lucite, has the amazing quality of being able to make light rays go around a corner. It is thus possible to 'pipe sunlight' from the roof down into any part of the house, though such light of course should not be relied upon as a primary source of illumination in the room but used as decoration."

[1]This is the fourth of a series of articles under the general title "The Men Who Make the Future." They are based on interviews with leading research scientists, who were promised that they would not be quoted by name.—THE EDITORS

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New Products and Techniques.—Lucite, by the way, is proving a tremendous aid in dentistry and abdominal surgical operations. The dentist can use an instrument of Lucite, with a flashlight bulb at one end, and bring cold light into every corner of the patient's mouth. The surgeon finds similar use for a Lucite probe.

The house of the future will be built from standardized, mass-produced parts, assembled in any shape and size that the prospective owner and the architect desire. Such a house will be enormously cheaper than those of today—costing, at a rough guess, one-third as much. It will be built partly of new materials and partly of old ones utilized in new ways. It will have no electric outlets of the present type—you can make an electric connection at any point along the baseboard. At present the only materials turned out by belt-line procedures are roofing, steel sash, steel members for framing, glass and some plywood and plaster-board units. Plywood, a promising new product, is produced by putting enormous pressure on thin sheets of wood with resinous material between. It has the highest strength factor of any known building material, being stronger than solid steel per unit of weight.

A house is also to a certain extent a factory; heat is manufactured and circulated to all the rooms, as well as being concentrated in one spot for cooking; hot and cold water are also circulated; human and other wastes are disposed of. It is not impossible that the "factory unit" in the future will be cast practically in one piece, with great simplification of design and reduction of cost. Already, prefabricated steel houses are on the market, each one of which can be erected by a small crew of men in a single day. They are cheap, proof against fire, earthquake, hurricane and termites, and depreciate slowly.

The plastic mentioned above is only one of the extraordinary variety of synthetic materials that the scientists have lately brought out of their laboratories into the life of man. These synthetics are made from the simplest materials—air, water, coal, limestone; hundreds of them come from combinations of oxygen from the air and byproducts of natural gas. We can now take nitrogen from the air and hydrogen from other chemicals or from water, and make ammonia. It is the basis for many materials, including nitric acid, essential in high explosives.

Everyone knows about Nylon, made from air, water and coal, which is now being used in stockings that are superior in some ways to silk, in toothbrushes whose bristles won't come out, in strings for tennis rackets and many other ways. Synthetics are being used for an extraordinary list of objects formerly made chiefly of wood or metal—automobile dash-boards, radio cases, ash trays, cigarette boxes, lighting fixtures, hardware, clocks. Motor enclosures for airplanes are made of them and complete airplane bodies of plastic have been produced successfully under experimental conditions.

Not long ago I stepped through a door in a New York City office building into a large room. It was as though I had suddenly shrunk until I was an inch tall and had walked into the jewel case of Lorenzo di Medici. The whole room was a mass of objects of all shapes and sizes and every color of the rainbow, ranging from a lipstick holder of gorgeous coral to an armchair that looked as if it were made of blue-green glass. Everything in the room was composed of one sort of plastic or another, materials that did not exist until a few years ago. These plastics are now created on order, to the specifications laid down by industry. Some of them are unbreakable; others will shatter. You can get a plastic which melts at a given temperature or doesn't; which is elastic or rigid; which takes color or is clear, translucent or opaque. Before long, eyeglasses may be pressed from plastic to suit your prescription, at a cost of perhaps fifteen or twenty cents a pair; powerful binoculars or cameras at a dollar or two are not impossible. At present, these plastic lenses scratch rather easily; the scientists hope to overcome this, but even if they don't, it is not a serious fault at such extremely low cost. Within a year or two, automobiles will be on the street with plastic bodies that are scratch and dent proof. You can swing an axe with all your might against one of these bodies and leave no scar.

There are new fabrics superior to anything that has heretofore existed—mothproof rugs, unshrinkable blankets, clothing and draperies woven from glass and therefore fireproof, unfading and practically everlasting. A substance called pliofilm is water-resistant; raincoats are made of it, and a thin layer spread over the inside of a carton, bag or box will permit liquids to be held indefinitely. We shall soon be saving some of our precious tin, urgently needed in our war effort, by the use of this substitute. Artificial musk at a few dollars a pound takes the place of the real product, from the Asiatic musk-deer, at several hundred dollars a pound. Artificial camphor is a satisfactory substitute for the genuine at much less cost. It is reported that the effects of the mysterious South American drug, curare, heretofore the only known treatment for certain rare forms of paralysis, can now be duplicated artificially from alkaloids. And so on.

Much has been heard lately of synthetic rubber, and many of us have been reassured to learn that if shipments of the natural product were cut off, we could in a few months supply our needs in this way. But it is a mistake to suppose that the synthetic is merely a substitute for the real thing. The substitutes have never precisely duplicated the chemical composition of rubber, and the experts see no reason for doing so. There are now half a dozen artificial products, each of which is designed for a special purpose: to conduct electricity or resist it, to withstand water or oil, to be hard or soft. Under no circumstances would the users of these special products ever return to natural rubber.

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The City of the Future. – The scientists have been looking at many other aspects of our civilization—our cities, our highways, the social structure of the community. Elaborate scientific studies have been made, at great expense, over large areas and long periods of time. As a result, the leading experts are agreed upon certain aspects of our life in the future. For the sake of brevity, let me express these in a set of propositions, even though they will sound more dogmatic than they should.

1. Our cities and towns in the future will be planned by governmental authority to make certain that every inhabitant has plenty of light and air, easy transportation, parks and other recreational facilities.

2. It has been discovered that automobile traffic flows precisely as does water, seeking the line of least resistance. Our highways should be entirely rebuilt on the principle of minimum interference with movement. This job for the whole United States would cost only fifteen billion dollars, or about two months of our national income. We should soon earn back the investment by the savings in the time of individuals and the interest on the money tied up in automotive equipment which would be unnecessary if, because of higher speeds, ten trucks, for instance, could do the work now performed by fifteen. Years ago, a careful study indicated that traffic congestion in New York City was costing five million dollars a day, and the figure is probably higher now.

Great numbers of people at the New York World's Fair saw the General Motors "Futurama" designed by Mr. Norman Bel Geddes. What they perhaps did not know was that in its main features Mr. Geddes' vision of the future, with its vast network of super-highways, its spacious, airy cities, its double-decked thoroughfares, was wholly scientific, based on the best current thought of city planners and traffic experts.

3. The cities of the future will be decentralized—a process that is already under way as people move to the suburbs and do more of their buying outside the congested "downtown" areas.

Le Corbusier, the architect already quoted, has worked out an amazing plan for the city of the future, which might be described in layman's terms as "skyscrapers set in parks." Le Corbusier would have a city block about four times as large as the average one of today, with a single building in the middle, a tall, slender shaft, surrounded by trees and grass. In a city consisting of a series of such buildings, each one could be used either for residential or office purposes or for both together. Jacques Ely Kahn, a well known New York architect, has proposed a checkerboard city in which every second block in each direction would consist of moderately tall buildings, with the upper stories set back. The alternate blocks would each consist of a park, with a combined bomb shelter and storage garage underneath. The point to remember about such plans is that, however desirable they might be, they are not likely to be carried out. Cities are not built: they are rebuilt. To buy up the real estate on every second block in New York City for park purposes would itself cost more than eight billion dollars.

What we shall see, the experts are convinced, is a continuation of the process of patch and repair: more elevated automobile highways and tunnels; more great transcontinental express boulevards which bypass the cities altogether; and above all, increased decentralization into a multitude of small self-contained units near to the metropolis, but not so close as to feel its blighting breath. The experts say that no such community should be so big that its inhabitants lose their sense of neighborliness. It should contain every required resource for community activities, including parks, libraries, churches, theatres, art galleries. Nearly all the members of such a community will earn their livings within its borders. The pace of living will on the whole be slower than that of people who now live and work in such examples of megalopolis as New York or Chicago. It is highly important that a small community should stay small; one way of doing this is to have the community own a wide circular belt of land around its outskirts which can be turned into parks or rented (but never sold) to farmers.

The authorities say we are entering a period when parking automobiles in the street will be entirely prohibited. Cars will be parked on the roof (as is now done by some Western department stores) or in the basement (a practice now rapidly being extended all over the country). Parking lots will be constructed by the municipality in convenient locations and parking will be free or will cost only a few cents. In some cases, an ingenious "Ferris wheel" device will be used, with which each car is driven onto a platform of its own and then rotated up into the air and left there until the owner calls for it again. In some cases, the parking lots will be skeleton buildings ten stories high without sidewalls (except a low parapet for security) and without heat. Ramps will lead to and from the upper floors. Such a structure could today be erected in the heart of such a city as New York and could probably earn a profit on parking cars at 25 cents a day.

Communication in the future will of course be even more rapid and universal than it is today. The experts feel that before long, good television sets will be low in price and widely bought. Already, a simple attachment for your radio exists which can print a complete newspaper in your home while you are asleep at night, or give you news bulletins and other material all day long. A machine now in use on a small scale can set type simultaneously in a thousand newspaper offices all over the country and thus speed up the publication of important news. New and greatly superior processes of sending pictures by wire or by radio today make it possible to photograph the pages of a New York news-

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paper, transmit them at the rate of ten minutes to a page to any part of the country and print special editions for every city where the demand justifies the comparatively trifling expense.

In the scientific laboratory of the Columbia Broadcasting System I saw the other day television in full color, the invention of Dr. Peter Goldmark. The colors were vivid and arresting; the superiority over black and white television was enormous. Color television is not yet commercially available; but there is every reason to believe it soon will be. When quantity production is achieved, the added cost over television without color should not be very serious.

Health Is Getting Better. – When we turn from his surroundings to man himself, the future seen by the scientists is equally exciting. First of all, they predict enormously increased health and vigor for almost everyone. There are still some diseases which remain unsolved riddles, chief among them cancer and the common cold; but an amazingly long list of others has yielded or is yielding to the greatly accelerated pace of medical advance. Pneumonia and many of the "coccus" infections have lost most of their terrors because of sulfanilamide and its derivatives. New methods of treatment continue to pour out of research laboratories and hospitals which render more effective the handling of almost every type of disease. In many cases maladies that are incapable of being cured can be made less painful through new techniques such as severing the nerves.

Dental science believes it is just on the verge of abolishing the greater part of all tooth decay. This, it is expected, will be achieved partly through a diet rich in fats and vitamins A, C and D, and low in carbohydrates. In part, it will be attained by chemical means. One of the ureas, called carbamide, is manufactured in the body from proteins and has also been produced synthetically. In the human mouth, an enzyme called "urease" changes carbamide to ammonium carbonate, and this in turn neutralizes certain acids which, left unmolested, cause tooth decay. The urease enzyme is found in certain bacteria normally present in the mouth, or it can be artificially administered with the carbamide. The dental scientists have great hopes that by using carbamide as a toothpaste or mouthwash, the incidence of decay can be greatly reduced.

Even the heretofore stubborn maladies like the common cold and influenza can be brought under partial control. Already the Rockefeller Foundation (working through the Rockefeller Institute) has developed an influenza vaccine that seems extremely hopeful. Another promising line of attack on colds lies through germicidal lamps, which greatly lessen the number of bacteria in the air in the path of their rays. New types of air-conditioning equipment now exist in which the air passes slowly through small ducts exposed to powerful ultraviolet rays from these lamps, and the bacteria count is much lessened, sometimes 90 percent. It is possible to place one of these lamps in a fixture for indirect lighting and, provided there is normal circulation of air, the number of germs can be greatly cut down in an ordinary office or living room. Sterilizing lamps are being installed in hospital operating rooms above the operating table, to reduce the danger of airborne infection. In some private gymnasia, they are used partly for the germicidal effect and partly as sun lamps. In restaurants, they are now used to sterilize eating utensils. With such a system installed in churches, theatres and other public gathering places, and with the air completely changed every few minutes, the danger of infection from the crowd when colds or influenza are prevalent could be much reduced and perhaps made negligible. It might even be safer to go out than to sit unprotected at home.

Scientists are opposed to completely sterile air; but their objection does not apply of course to the removal of ordinary dirt from the atmosphere. Not long ago, in the great research laboratory of the Westinghouse Company in Pittsburgh, I was ushered into a room whose walls were tinted a light color, just off white, and as sparklingly clean as though they had been painted that day. Knowing about Pittsburgh's famous "smog" (combination of smoke and fog), which is still a serious problem even though it has been partially solved in recent years, I said to the expert who was my guide: "I see this room has just been cleaned."

"It hasn't been touched for two years."

This seemed like a miracle, and still does, even though I have learned the explanation. The door of this room is normally kept shut; air enters through a special ventilator in which is installed a "precipitron." In this device, negatively charged electrons move across a small space at right angles to the stream of air entering the room, which is carrying particles of smoke or dust. The electrons unite with the particles and carry them to the positively charged surfaces of a series of plates or collector cells. The precipitron gives substantial relief to most hay-fever victims. It is of great use in rooms where delicate machinery operates, watches are repaired, or printing presses are doing fine work. Since in the average room the air is completely changed every ninety minutes, through leakage, even with the windows closed, it is perhaps not surprising that in household use this device removes about one quart of dust from the air every two weeks.

The scientists believe that already human beings are markedly more healthy than they have been, at any rate, for the past few decades. They look with complete approval on the present tendency to wear light clothing, to take systematic outdoor exercise, to expose much of the skin in summer to the rays of the sun, which are not only germicidal but also help to create precious vitamin D within the body. They rejoice that we are restoring to our foods vitamins and

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mineral salts that have been taken out by the processes of preparing them for the market.

Solving the Social Problems.—At this point, someone may say: "This optimistic report of progress is all very well; but how are these things to be realized in a world where people are proceeding to kill each other off in a series of senseless wars?"

The scientists are not by any means indifferent to these problems. They know, better than the layman, that modern civilization is dying in the totalitarian countries. They are well aware that unless we can overcome the lag between the mind of the technologist and that of some political leaders, the future looks grim.

Yet even on this matter they offer some hope. Enormous strides have been made in recent decades in the understanding of the psychology both of the individual and the crowd. The scientists feel that if their advice were taken even for a short time, many of the situations that now lead to disastrous wars could be prevented. Today they are beginning to understand the sort of mass impulse to be ruled by someone that makes a population accept a dictator—to understand it and to know how to prevent it. They begin to understand, also, the secret springs within the individual which turn him into a Hitler or a Stalin. Among these springs, they believe, are adverse experiences of early childhood and, possibly, malfunctioning of the glands of internal secretion. In both these cases, science can "do something about it."

But beyond even this, the scientists are keenly aware of the immediate dangers in today's world and are eager to do their part. At the recent annual convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, I listened to world-famous scientific leaders as one after another they testified to the role that technology and the scientific discipline must play in reclaiming our civilization. Practical proposals were made for organized effort to keep alive the embers of the scientific spirit in Europe, and to make sure that in America science and democracy go hand in hand.

BRUCE BLIVEN

Opinions of Oliver Allston[1]

MY FRIEND Oliver Allston, who died last year in his early fifties, was a literary man of some distinction. A few of my readers, at least, will remember his name. He had published half a dozen books, collections of critical essays, which had a certain point of view in common, and I am not alone among his friends in feeling that, if he had lived a little longer, he might have made some impression on the mind of his time. Apparently, this was not to be, although I do not think Allston would have cared very much. He used to quote a phrase from the Bhagavad-Gita, "Let the motive for action be in the action itself and not in the event." That a man's opinions might have consequences, that literature itself had consequences of a very important kind, was almost the first of his convictions, but equally that a writer should disregard them. Thus he agreed with Renan's paradox, "To be able to think freely, one must feel that what one writes will have no consequences." Allston liked to think, as he liked to write, and he felt that, in so far as he told the truth, his writings would have effects, and good effects, not because they were his but because they were true. In this he was impersonal and fatalistic. I doubt if he cared a button whether he "impressed" his age or not.

The reader may suppose that, in saying this, I am making exalted claims for Allston. I do not profess to have understood him, nor can I say with assurance that he understood himself. Of this I am certain, however—Allston did not feel he was unique. He followed the lines of a well known type, which has had countless exemplars. This type is composed of those who enjoy the use of their minds, and he said there was no pleasure in thinking or writing if one had ulterior motives. "Those who think 'for effect,' or who write to 'score,'" he notes in one of his journals, "do not know what they are missing." In saying this, he expressed a commonplace of writers and artists; and, in fact, there was nothing out of the way about him except that he was fortunate and happy. So, at least, he felt, as he also felt that his happy fortune was wholly the result of circumstances. He quoted more than once a sentence from the Koran, "Paradise lies under the shadow of swords"; and he underscored, in his copy of Melville's "Pierre," the phrase, "Deprived of joy, I feel I should find cause for deadly feuds with things invisible." That he was happy in any sense seemed to him uncommon, and he felt that his position had its perils in an age that was unfortunate and unhappy. That all the happy men are Pharisees was a fixed idea with his contemporaries, and it sometimes seemed to Allston that the sinners had almost a monopoly of virtue. That, as a happy man, he must be pharisaical seemed to be the logic of the situation.

When Allston died, he left me his books and papers. Among the latter were a set of journals, a dozen volumes bound in stout gray canvas. In these he had formed the habit of writing down the thoughts or impressions of the moment which he said he had

[1] This is the first of a series by Van Wyck Brooks, describing the opinions of "Oliver Allston." Those who know Mr. Brooks's own views will not fail to be struck by the similarity between his beliefs and those of Mr. Allston.—THE EDITORS

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"caught by wing or tail." Forster relates that Dickens began to keep a notebook at forty-three. So it was with Allston, who had made sporadic attempts at journalizing during his earlier life. He acquired the habit at forty-five. That it sharpened his consciousness of the world about him was evident from the first; but he said he wished to understand himself, and he found that keeping a journal was good for this. He followed an old American custom, for Washington Irving and all the Adamses, Hawthorne, Thoreau and Emerson were inveterate journalizers. He noted what D. H. Lawrence said about these classic American writers, that they had reached a pitch of consciousness beyond the "furthest frenzies" of the French. Lawrence did not like this "verge," much as it surprised him; but Allston disliked the opposite even more. He had no love of the self-conscious, and he believed in the unconscious; but, having what he called a daylight mind, he could not like Lawrence's "nocturnal." How could one have enough objective observation? And why was there a necessary conflict between the conscious mind and the unconscious? As long as the conscious mind remained objective, the unconscious flourished all the better. So it seemed to Allston, and, in journalizing, his motives were the same as Thoreau's and Hawthorne's. They were the classical motives of knowing oneself and knowing the world about one. Allston liked to study himself, when more exciting subjects were not at hand, and sometimes to see himself correctly struck him as far from easy. Thus he remarks, in one of the volumes, "It is said to be courageous to be frank about oneself. On the contrary, it only requires talent, but it requires talent of a high order."

When his journal was not available, he sometimes jotted his thoughts on scraps of paper. That he often did so in a state of excitement, I gather from this remark, "It is related of Mendelssohn that one of his pupils used to get him up in the morning by seating himself at the piano, in the room under Mendelssohn's bedroom, and playing an unresolved chord, with his foot on the loud pedal. This was too much for Mendelssohn, who liked to batten under the counterpane. He had to jump out of bed and run downstairs, to resolve the chord. My mind works the same way. I had a beautiful chord to resolve this morning." I have found several envelopes filled with these notes, apparently unrelated to one another, and, glancing them over, with his journals, together with some of his letters, and the pencilings on the margins of his books, I have wondered if they might not interest others. Allston liked to read short essays, letters, maxims, *penseés*. He notes a remark of Francis Grierson, whom he had known in London, "It is impossible for an essay to be too short"; and perhaps there are other readers who share this taste. In printing the present selection, my aim has been to arrange the notes to give Allston's point of view in outline. He had scarcely made this clear in his earlier books. I think he had in mind a longer work in which he hoped to do so, but there are few evidences among his papers that he had taken this in hand. Perhaps he felt as Gibbon felt, about the "Decline and Fall," six years after he had begun to plan it, when he still contemplated it "at an awful distance." His habits of note-taking and procrastination seem to have won the day.

Let me add a few remarks of a personal nature. Allston had traveled in his youth. He had lived for about four years, at various times, in England, France, Germany and elsewhere. In later years, he had taken long journeys through the United States. He was a New Yorker, if not by birth, at least by long inheritance. Both of his grandfathers had been born in New England, but both of them had married New York women. It was an axiom with him that American mothers are always more potent as parents than American fathers; and he instanced this by saying once that the New Englandism of his two grandfathers had been wholly sunk and subjugated in the New Yorkism of his two grandmothers. Born in a suburb of New York, he had continued to live in the metropolitan area, although on one of its remotest fringes. He had spent some years in the city itself, the birthplace of his father, and he wished not to lose his connection with it; but the life he chose was a village life, and he had vehement opinions on the subject of city-living and country-living. "I am full of prejudices," he said, "but they are all made of paper, and anyone can jump through them as easily as a dog jumps through a paper ring at the circus." He flattered his reasonableness in this remark, for he detested the city. "Every day," he writes, "I grow more and more to think of city-people as cheese-mites, as mere infusoria. One cannot know what respect is unless one learns it in the country." He speaks of "literary cocktail-parties for the bolstering of invalid reputations" as the chief preoccupation of the New York writers; and his dislike of "bigness" in all its forms expresses itself in the following note: "I hope to see all the skyscrapers filled with bats. I wish a cloud of demons would fly through the air and gather about the Empire State Building and pluck it out of the ground and carry it off and drop it in the Atlantic near the spot where the Titanic lies. I suggest a possible use for the Normandie and all the other super-ships, to carry off the skyscrapers to anyone who wants them in Europe."

Allston did not write in a whimsical spirit. He thought the world would never know peace until it repudiated the power-feelings and all the power-philosophies. "You don't like noise and bloodshed," he writes to a friend. "No, but you like or admire everything that produces noise and bloodshed. If you worship 'big' things, you will worship 'big' men, who want bigger armies to get bigger nations. The admira-

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tion of super-ships, Zeppelins and skyscrapers—that is where the war-business starts. Or shall we say the war-scuffle that has begun already in every mind that likes competitive football on the mass-production scale." Allston thought Americans loved this material grandeur because human grandeur was lacking in their minds. For the rest, he had New York in mind in writing, "There is such a thing as dying from over-stimulation. Whatever is worth discovering in my own mind only comes to the surface among quiet conditions, in which one thought grows beside another and I have time to compare and reflect."

As a matter of fact, as Allston grew older, he felt that it mattered little where one lived, so long as one kept in touch with certain conditions. This latter feeling determined his other feeling about the "regional" movements, and also about "expatriation," in the special case of Americans, as I shall show. He liked to be alone much of the time, but he knew that most critics had thriven in cities, and he seems to have set this down as a personal trait. Or was it a trait that he thought Americans ought to cultivate, perhaps much more than other people? That they did not know how to be alone was one of his frequent complaints; and he said that, with Americans, solitude too often meant neurosis—"the devil that lies in wait for the improperly employed." As for himself, he remarks, "I like to see a great many people, nor would I be human if I did not like the *digito monstrari*. I like both these things, but I do not love them. What I love is what the mole loves, who carries on his enthralling toils in the dark hallways of a narrow house. Give the mole wings, let him become a bat, and he would still rejoice in the cover of darkness and in the midnight cave." This is a little rhetorical, for he liked a verbal flourish now and then. He said he worked best on dark and rainy days; but, in point of fact, he loved the sunlight and always got up early in the morning. As for country living and country habits, they suited his nervous temperament, for he could not stand late hours or exciting parties, and he found the bourgeois regimen the best for work. Concerning one of these habits, he quoted Professor Fortinbras, "My evening visitors, if they cannot see the clock, should find the time in my face. As soon as it is nine, I begin to curse them with internal execrations that are minute-guns." And yet he agreed with the professor, "The devil take half-hospitalities." Allston, I must add, quoted so much that I said to him once, impatiently, "Your philosophy is entirely made up of quotations." (He had a special notebook in which he kept them.) He answered, "You are right. So it is; and it's a juvenile trait. But let me give you another. I should like to have cut on my tombstone Pope's phrase about Dryden, 'He was not a very genteel man, he was intimate with none but poetical men'." And this, in fact, well described Allston's place among his fellow beings.

A word about Allston's appearance, which corresponded to his occupation. He was "of middle height, inclined to stoutness," which he said was the recipe for critics; for, if one read the lives of the critics, from Lessing to Sainte-Beuve, or from Brandes to Croce, or, for the matter of that, from Lowell to Mencken, one almost always found they were shortish and stocky. In a panic fear of growing fat—as on one occasion when he found that his waist was two inches larger than Daniel Webster's—he sometimes indulged in an orgy of dieting. Once he pinned up on his study wall, as a counsel of perfection, the well known Athenian menu, "Three or four olives, a bit of garlic and the head of a fish." However, he found that his figure, reduced as it might be to the utmost thinness, always reassumed the stocky shape, and he came to look on this as an act of fate. He felt that it expressed an intention of nature, that he had been born to be a critic—he had never wished to be anything else—and that to fight too much with his stoutness and shortness was to quarrel with his destiny in other respects. Shall I speak of his complexion and his features, his whims and his crotchets, sartorial and tonsorial, for example? His love of the "forsythia" moustache? His liking for the "Polish aviator" haircut? His preference for petunias and zinnias in the matter of flowers? It is enough to say that Allston had his share of the usual absurdities of writers.

If I do not dwell on these traits, if I leave the picture somewhat vague, it is because Allston would have preferred it. That he enjoyed his obscurity will be apparent to those who read his notes. I think he looked upon this as a personal foible, but one that was characteristic of his countrypeople. He often said that Americans, who were supposed to love publicity, were actually, in their love of privacy, unique among the peoples of the world. He did not justify this national trait, and he even thought it led to many abuses, but he said that, because of this trait, foreigners never saw America. All that was real in the country was so hidden and inward, as in Emily Dickinson's poems and Ryder's pictures, that the privacy of the Spaniards in their houses, over which the travelers marveled—those who thought they saw the American scene—was almost a circus beside it. I therefore leave Allston in his "cover of darkness," except in so far as he reveals himself. I must, however, add a word of warning. "I like 'bleak thinking'," he said, quoting a phrase of his friend Henry Longan Stuart, "I like bleak thinking, as I like austerity in religion, bare, cold churches, where one feels 'alone with the Alone.' I do not like cozy, sociable churches, neither do I like cozy thinking. I like the kind of thought that cuts to the bone." If he had not achieved this kind of thinking, it was toward this that he was aiming, and he sometimes achieved it in a measure. I cannot ask anyone to read him who does not share this taste.

VAN WYCK BROOKS

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Washington Notes

Cobbler of Köpernick

SURELY one of the most remarkable episodes of the Second World War has been Wendell L. Willkie's English tour. That magnificent last day—the airplane dash to Dublin, tea with Their Majesties back in Britain, dinner with London's intellectuals, the waiting special train—is, when you stop to think about it, a little jewel. But the other days were only less so—Mr. Willkie devising higher war strategy with Mr. Churchill; Mr. Willkie, with furrowed brow and pursed lips, surveying wartime production methods; Mr. Willkie, waving a whitened tin helmet, bringing hope to bombing victims.

To underscore the bizarre quality of the episode, in the midst of Mr. Willkie's tour a group of Western Republican state chairmen met at Omaha to read him out of their party, and were only prevented from doing so by the practical politicians. It is doubtful if Mr. Willkie can swing as many as ten Republican votes in the House. He cannot change a single vote in the Senate. His unquestioned personal following among middle-class voters is now thoroughly disorganized; the concrete political aid that he can render England is insignificant.

The administration is understandably disconcerted by Mr. Willkie's newspaper success. The New Dealers didn't plan it that way; the blame, such as it is, apparently rests with Secretary Hull. At a Gridiron dinner, two months ago, Mr. Hull, then deep in the strategy of the impending lease-lend bill, took pains to seek out Mr. Willkie. Much in the manner of a congressman offering free seeds, Mr. Hull invited Mr. Willkie to call on his services. Later, upon deciding to go to Europe, Mr. Willkie managed to work up a simple request to Mr. Hull for a passport into a weighty conference on American foreign policy.

Mr. Willkie's well publicized conference with Mr. Hull placed the White House in an embarrassing position. The White House group remembers vividly the TVA-Commonwealth and Southern fight; they just don't like Mr. Willkie. But for Mr. Roosevelt to refuse to see Mr. Willkie would seem ungracious. With his supernaturally acute sense of human relations, Mr. Willkie set afloat newspaper stories that the White House had not "really invited" him to call. Eventually he shoehorned an invitation from Mr. Roosevelt.

Thus, although his passport and powers were exactly those that any reader of The New Republic would have, he arrived in England straight from Mr. Roosevelt's desk. In the same way that the famous Herr Voigt was a captain, Mr. Willkie was ambassador extraordinary from America, and holder of the entirely imaginary post of leader of the Loyal Opposition. Administration figures here first showed signs of irritation when Mr. Willkie appeared to be taking over the liaison functions that had been intrusted to Mr. Harry L. Hopkins. There is some reason to think that British officers in Washington, sensing the situation, delicately advised their home government that Mr. Willkie was after all only Mr. Willkie. At any rate, two days after the administration's irritation became public—Mr. Hull's denial that Mr. Willkie had been especially requested to return to testify before the Senate—the King and Queen received Mr. Hopkins, and Mr. Willkie's heralded meeting with the King and Queen was postponed. In their way, the English are also wonderful.

Things change rapidly here, and prophecies are dangerous. But, today, it is almost certainly true that Mr. Willkie will not be offered a post in the defense organization or in the diplomatic service. The administration will ignore him, and so will the Republicans in Congress. That is, unless he thinks up further exploits like his English journey.

When, last October, Mr. Knudsen went privately to Detroit, and enlisted the principal automobile manufacturers for the production of airplanes, many observers—including, I confess, this one—felt that a turning point had been passed in the defense effort. In comparison with the subsequent Reuther plan, Mr. Knudsen's proposals were partial, hesitant. Nevertheless, they seemed like a promising start. One of those who were extremely impressed was President Roosevelt. In a campaign speech, made a few days afterwards at Boston, he boasted of 20,000 additional bombers for England, although, to be strictly fair, Mr. Knudsen had only asked the automobile industry for 12,000.

Reports now say that this program has been quietly whittled down to 3,600—that is, a monthly production of three hundred planes, of which two hundred will be light bombers, a hundred heavy bombers. The source of this report, it should be said, was originally the airplane-company representatives in Washington, eager to spread the word that the automoblie industry can't make airplanes, or even subassemblies. However, the report has not been challenged by the OPM, and the allotments made for the proposed government-owned assembly plants at Omaha, Kansas City, Tulsa and Fort Worth do not indicate that they will have a much greater capacity than three hundred a month.

The most obvious fact about our present airplane-building program is its unintelligibility. The figures presented in the testimony before Congress on the lease-lend bill, and the counter-figures offered by Senator Wheeler, admittedly give no idea of what we can count on during the next year. The airplane companies' propaganda, if highly prejudiced, is at least clear, and, to this observer, startling. They repudiate the whole conception of mass production. They say that, for the approaching attack on England, Germany will probably not have more than 5,000 to 6,000 first-line planes, of which there will not be a thousand of any single model. Just as there is a limit to the number of first-line troops that can be used in a given area, they say, so with airplanes; the need for elaborately hidden air fields, anti-aircraft-artillery protection, relatively safe communication and supply roads, shelter for the very large ground crews—such factors are decisive. On the other hand, the quality of individual planes is all-important. Because the British Spitfires had additional machine guns, and could turn in a slightly smaller space, the Germans lost last September's Battle of Britain, although they had a numerical superiority in airplanes of four to one. What will bring victory is a limited quantity of planes, but planes that are just off the designing board.

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It is easy to see why the airplane companies promote such an analysis; it argues that all airplane orders ought to go to the established airplane manufacturers. But, even if in the most general terms, the administration ought now to tell what its airplane-building program is and why. It is the most important single element in our defense and Britain's resistance; we are entitled to know what is being done.

Washington T. R. B.

They Still Go West

I SUPPOSE now that Western Union has been taken care of in a film called "Western Union," the next turn on the epics-of-enterprise list should definitely be set for Sears Roebuck, which has certainly waited long enough. (Lydia E. Pinkham could not get past the Hays office these days, and what could you do with the Smith Brothers anyway? Just a couple of beards.) So we start when a young Princeton man named Chuck Sears, distinctly scion, dudes it out into frontier territory where they are trying to discover Chicago ahead of the Indians. At the last outpost in the Last Looks Cabaret, he runs afoul of Dusty Roebuck, who is a shooting spitting man for fair, and the most feared and valuable scout in the region through being able to tie five kinds of knot in the moss on the northeast side of a tree. They fight.

A no-decision battle, of course, but it proves that under his washing up before supper every night, the tenderfoot has a heart of gold and ties the knots in his own shoelaces. They leave the Last Looks arm in arm, or probably would have left it, except the cashier strikes them both at once, though in two separate camera takes. Her name is Femail Order and it quickly turns out that her old man owns the joint and the town and part of the United States Senate, in which it is the stated purpose of his life to discover enough of Chicago so that the Indians can be sent back where they're heading for and this union shall not perish from E. Pluribus.

So for the first third of the picture, the boys cook up elaborate devices by which they shall appear simultaneously from different directions in the same place, which is the icebox of the Senator's mansion, where they can't get at the girl because of their innate good breeding and the Senator, who is always there himself, drawing maps of Lake Michigan with a cold leg of turkey in a way that carries them beyond themselves in spite of themselves.

Into this there should be cut several humorous shots of a catalogue copy-reader whose big laugh line is that he cannot stand Chicago because it makes him ill, and whose fear of Indians is so real he still can't buy a paper at a cigar store, and whose name is Montgomery Ward (for laughs). There will be a bad man too, and there will be an elderly kind counselor who tries to impress on these hotheads the advantage of the instalment plan, which will need a credit department but knock them over for something like 12 percent in the end.

That's all. The girl has an idea that the farflung farmer who buys overalls at $2.98 will pounce like a tiger on the catalogue $2.84 special and not notice the ".17 ea." for the two straps as extra items, and as for the $3.02 de-luxe offer "with buttons on fly," oh my. So knowing they could not win her until one or the other had counted all forty-eight states, they set out with hearts of flint and an arrow full of quivers and land up somewhere around Cape Girardeau, which is 150 miles down the heap big river from St. Louis but near enough, because the Chicago boat stops there every Sunday. They are about to, as they say, take Chicago for a loop when one of them stumbles forward to the ground with a warwhoop in his back, which gives the other a chance to swear vengeance and the house-band a chance to come in with a funeral march but a different twist, for through the last chords come the clank-clank of a frontier-picture banjo and a deep steamboat hoot to indicate that the gal was following on the next scheduled arrival, to join with whatever was left and start an institution, preferably mail-order. So the house is established with the name of the valiant dead partner as the other half of the title and the copy-reader running up a catalogue from Art-gum to X-ray, with a two-page color lay-out for Bells, Wedding and very little time for Suits, Masquerade, Indian.

"Western Union" does about that with the dramatic material of stringing its wires through Indian territory, from Omaha to Salt Lake City, with Randolph Scott, Robert Young and Barton McLane as principals, with Virginia Gilmore for love and Slim Summerville for humor, and with others. There is no trace of any coördinating hand in directing, though the fine name of Fritz Lang appears in the credit titles; there is some good Indian warfare and there is some fine camera appreciation of this great countryside (until technicolor arrives either at a set formalization or at the true thing it is trying to paint, it will do little for the unbelievable drama of pictures but suggest Fanny Farmer). The actual business of surveying and setting up poles, of insulators, wire splicing, keys and batteries, is strained carefully out of the romance and humor and plottery of the story—which reduces itself to the same old guff largely because none connected with it thought of it as anything else. There is wagon-training and Indian-shooting enough to keep your eyes occupied, also one of the most terrific bonfires and a gun battle at the end. It is impossible to know what clichés the director may have prevented, but it is enough and too much to see those he left in solemnly acted out before you. As I started to say, this ancient circus has about as much to do with Western Union as it has with R. H. Macy, and you can have either.

In the foreign department, we have the French original of what Hollywood called "Algiers," and made a nice action picture out of. Hollywood was probably wise in buying up and holding off "Pepe le Moko," because the two are so close in script and background that whichever came first would take the edge off the other. (It is clear now that "Algiers" was made from the other even to camera angles.) You will enjoy the French one, I think, for Jean Gabin as Pepe, for the chief of native inspectors and for the many others. I can't tell now whether the action is a little sluggish or only seems so through familiarity, but the effect is the same—a certain lack of intensity by comparison. But the faulty engineering and clipped jargon will serve to improve your ignorance of French, and the story is one of the true naturals for pictures; and when it comes around it will probably be the best thing to see that week.

OTIS FERGUSON

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The Bandwagon

Perhaps we in New Orleans are so busy with our own affairs that we do not have a true estimate of the situation across the Atlantic. After the Carnival season is over, I think we should seriously study the situation. – *General Allison Owen in The New Orleans Times-Picayune.*

The Ministry of Popular Culture was asked today to sue Walt Disney for libel on a charge of distorting the Italian character Pinocchio in a film and portraying the long-nosed fellow "so he easily could be mistaken for an American." – *UP dispatch from Rome in The New York Times.*

As long as government defense-contract specifications include the War Department's present labor-policy clause, the Ford Motor Company will continue to object, I. A. Capizzi, attorney for the company, said today.

The labor clause, Capizzi said, is so all-embracing as to require obedience to all federal, state and municipal labor laws and the company is unwilling to run the risk of cancellation and suit by the government. – *News item in The Detroit News.*

Ad Astra Per Aspera

"The Theory of Flight" will be taught to county-jail inmates under the WPA educational program, it was announced today. – *UP dispatch from Kansas City in The Chicago Daily News.*

The Thoughts of Youth Are Long, Long Thoughts

After umpteen months of involuntary rigid economy I went to the Ritz for lunch the other day—positively not a slice of lemon to be had with the smoked salmon. Makes one think. – *From the letter of a young English architect, printed in The New York Herald Tribune.*

Or Cisterne

You must see as well as hear Willmott Lewis or you lose half the effect. For six months he was on the air, on a coffee program. He was not a success, though his periods were, as always, polished. Even when he has said nothing whatever at very great length, as he often does, you leave him feeling that you have been pausing in an intellectual Sistine Chapel. – *From an article in The Saturday Evening Post.*

Design for Living

210 S. 32d Ave.—Army officer will share room; also girl to share. – *Advertisement in The Omaha World-Herald.*

Our readers are invited to contribute to this column; $1 will be paid for each item used. Address Bandwagon, care of The New Republic. Please enclose the original clipping. – THE EDITORS

Correspondence

Union with Great Britain

SIR: In "The Alternative to Fascism" (December 23), you say: "Let the United States and Great Britain assume responsibility and leadership for the whole world, except that part of it at present under the heel of the totalitarians. Let these two great repositories of democracy pool their leadership in brains, vision and courage. Let them participate jointly in such economic, industrial and cultural activities as may grow out of this common undertaking."

Last June Britain offered, too late, to form a union with France. By the narrow margin of thirteen votes to ten, the offer was rejected by the Reynaud Cabinet just before the collapse of the Republic.

The salient features of the proposed union were common citizenship and a common parliament or representative assembly. Had this union been formed, it is obvious that "joint participation in economic, industrial and cultural activities" would have followed as a matter of course, both during and after the war. Without political union on federal lines it is not clear how such activities on a large scale can ever be organized effectively, democratically and permanently between two or more nations.

As it stands, your article is a declaration of what ought to be done. It is a declaration that an overwhelming majority of Americans would support *if they saw any practical way of translating it into action.* But we are fed up with well meaning declarations which have no practical outcome. We know too well where they lead. From the Covenant of the League (which the United States came within a hair's breadth of joining) down through the Kellogg Pact and an endless succession of disarmament conferences, economic conferences, other conferences and nice-sounding generalizations from Washington, London and Geneva, they led most of the world over the brink of disaster, and America right to it.

The New Republic should urge our government to follow the precedent which Britain gave last June. It should advocate both material aid to Britain now and an American offer of Federal Union to the self-governing members of the British Commonwealth (Canada, the United Kingdom, Ireland, the Union of South Africa, Australia and New Zealand), the offer to be made jointly by the President and Congress "as soon as a substantial majority of American voters, fully understanding that this means war to the finish, have shown by a national referendum that they are ready to support it."

With courageous leadership democracy is invincible. Without it, there are always men like Hitler ready to seize the leadership that other men, men of good will, *could* have had for the asking. An American offer of Federal Union to the British Commonwealth, with provision for admitting other free peoples later and the German people, too, when they have overthrown Hitler, would electrify the world by showing that democracy also has the capacity to achieve a "new order."

New York City HENRY SMITH LEIPER

[The supporters of Federal Union, of whom Mr. Leiper is one, are following ultimate objectives not dissimilar from those The New Republic proposes. Mr. Leiper feels that political coöperation should come first and economic coöperation will naturally follow. To the editors of The New Republic this seems to put the cart before the horse, and to be the same sort of mistake that made a dismal failure of the League of Nations.

Mr. Leiper would postpone his proposal until after a substantial majority of American voters have shown by a national referendum that they are ready to support it. But how long will this take? Is there any evidence that Federal Union is making sufficient progress in this country to justify the belief that it will have a majority in one year, or in five or ten? Will not the war have ended before anything has happened under such a plan?

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The advantage of the New Republic proposal, it seems to us, is that it can start at once, and piecemeal, on a scale that would arouse no alarming doubts. A series of international conferences about commodities could be of enormous value and yet raise few political objections. The New Republic's plans for such conferences, for rationalization of British and American shipping, for systematizing international trade, could begin to go into effect within thirty, sixty or ninety days, and could be a potent factor in helping England to win the war. Our belief is just the contrary of Mr. Leiper's. We feel that if economic arrangements could be brought into existence, the opposition to political arrangements might then be much less; but political arrangements without preliminary economic ones seem to us Utopian. We doubt that they could be created, and we feel that they would probably fail even if they were.—THE EDITORS]

Poet Asking for Trouble

SIR: A poet who elects to reply to his critics is asking for trouble, of course. He cannot, certainly, hope to rival their circulation, and probably not their journalistic skill. And he can be sure that they'll have the last word. Any poet is, in these days, pretty much at the mercy of his reviewers; any inaccuracy, folly or sycophancy on their part most generally goes unchallenged.

A curious tone of exasperation and distrust, it seems to me, has lately come into evidence among these "poetry-loving" circles. Having participated in recent atmospheres which now, in the light of current fashions, appear to have been, progressively, one of naïve ecstasy, one of optimistic experiment and one of political gullibility, we are now presented with a fourth type of critic, jaded, apprehensive, but immature and amateurish to a precisely equal degree; a new type of Gongorism decorated with a breathless but convenient jargon of "cerebral austerities," "difficult disciplines," "examinations of conscience" and all the rest, just as pontifical and empty as the Marxist jargon of "dynamic vitalities" and "social probings" which went before, and governed by this fundamental aim, however verbosely masked: namely, the middle-class desire that poetry should be activated by some lofty moral purpose, should improve and elevate, should be occupied with some deliberate program or other.

Beneath this lurks an understandable and no doubt virtuous motive, but it is not, never has been and never will be the poet's real concern: which is simply, in Mr. Tate's words, to write as good a poem as he can, with materials that interest him. All the debasement of craftmanship, the spurious complexity, the abortive modernism and fancy dullness which now float past us on all sides, spring really from this perennial middle-class yearning to inflate the poet's function, and to transport poetry into spheres where it has no business whatever: spheres where it assumes such quaint grimaces and swollen lines, and where it ends up by mercifully choking to death.

For my own part, I shall publish no further verses in America, where they have met, as far as I have seen, with vituperation. But for the sake of others, might I suggest that your reviews be never, never entrusted to poets, old or young, good, bad or mediocre!

No one, I suppose, need be seriously disturbed by a critic, if he is clever and entertaining (like Mr. Jarrell), even though his deficiency in reading power and critical education might lie apparent in every line. But what is intolerable is that these lacks should be garnished by such high pretentiousness and arrogance. (Again, pardon me, as in your Mr. Jarrell.)

Lisbon, Portugal FREDERIC PROKOSCH

[In this issue, Mr. Jarrell reviews Conrad Aiken and Raymond Holden. In next week's issue, Malcolm Cowley reviews some poetry reviewers, including Mr. Jarrell.—THE EDITORS]

A Boat to Catch

SIR: Here's a grateful vote of thanks for George Soule's "Prologue to Peace" (The New Republic, January 20). One has but to take himself back, in memory, to that Armistice morning in 1918, and reëxamine his depth of feelings at that moment, to instil a check to any unbalanced fervors of war hates. Any man who has known the blessings of freedom, who thinks of war, now, in any other terms than the peace to follow his war advocacy, is doing himself, his loved ones, his country and the world a complete disservice. If we can find the way to make men search their will for peace, a peace proportionate to the price of this war, and proportionate to the intense fervor presently held for war, we may yet justify our democratic heritage of freedom. Nobody questions that this war must be fought through to its proper conclusion. But that conclusion converges to a single point, the Right Peace. . . . this time. May God help us, indeed, if we miss that boat!

East Lynn, Mass. G. EUGENE BERRY

For Military Efficiency

SIR: I am one of the many who recently volunteered for one year of military training under the Selective Service Act, and what else only time will tell. I am writing to express my approval of Dorothy Dunbar Bromley's article "They're in the Army Now," published in the January 6 issue of The New Republic. I am not a very good critic, but I do know that many of the things listed in the article are lacking in the army.

I know that education in what we are training to defend and preserve is lacking, and I think that we would all be willing to exert greater effort in training and become better able to defend our country if we understood what we are training to fight for. Training the mind is as important as training the body, for if a man is willing mentally, then his efficiency increases.

Fort Stevens, Ore. S. N.

From The New Republic Mail Bag

John T. Flynn's letter in the issue of February 3 has brought many more in its wake. Representative of one kind is Frank J. Ryan's, Woodside, Long Island: "You may regard this as a footnote to John T. Flynn's amusing dissertation on the inconsistencies of The New Republic's editors. In 1936 Mr. Flynn supported Norman Thomas, but he supported Wendell Willkie in 1940. Why did he desert the isolationist Mr. Thomas when Mr. Willkie had pledged himself to give all possible assistance to England? But at any rate, he has been elevated to the editorial page of The New York World-Telegram."

Representative of the other kind of comment is Josiah Willard's, New York City: "While I think you are correct in your contention that you and John T. Flynn never saw eye to eye on the New Deal, I believe he has certainly got much the best of the argument on the war issue. The difference between what you said you would do when war came and what you have actually done is almost incredible. There is, of course, no reason why you should not change your mind, but one who has made such a complete *volte-face* as you have should certainly have acquired humility instead of dogmatism and should at least have the decency not to smear and belittle the people who have continued to practise what you preached for so long."

The League for Industrial Democracy is planning a conference on "Defending and Advancing Social Gains" on February 15, at the Hotel Commodore, New York City. Information about it is obtainable from John Dewey, president of the LID, 112 East Nineteenth Street, New York City.

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In Memory of Scott Fitzgerald

F. Scott Fitzgerald, who died on December 21, occupied an extraordinary position in American life, both as a writer and because of the significance he came to have as a spokesman for the post-war young people. For this reason, we are publishing a group of memoirs and tributes by writers of his own generation and of the generation younger than his. Two of them follow, and three others will appear in a subsequent issue. – THE EDITORS

Fitzgerald and the Press

THE NOTICES in the press referring to Scott Fitzgerald's untimely death produce in the reader the same strange feeling that you have, when after talking about some topic for an hour with a man, it suddenly comes over you that neither you nor he has understood a word of what the other was saying. The gentlemen who wrote these pieces obviously know something about writing the English language, and it should follow that they know how to read it. But shouldn't the fact that they have set themselves up to make their living as critics of the work of other men furnish some assurance that they recognize the existence of certain standards in the art of writing? If there are no permanent standards, there is no criticism possible. Don't these gentlemen know that all this gabble about the Younger Generation, proletarian novelists and the twenties and the thirties is just advertising man's bilge?

A well written book is a well written book whether it's written under Louis XIII or Joe Stalin or on the wall of a tomb of an Egyptian Pharaoh. It's the quality of detaching itself from its period while embodying its period that marks a piece of work as good. I would have no quarrel with any critic who examined Scott Fitzgerald's work and declared that in his opinion it did not detach itself from its period. My answer would be that my opinion was different. The strange thing about these pieces that came out about Fitzgerald's death is that the writers seem to feel that they don't need to read his books; all they need for a license to shovel them into the ashcan is to label them as having been written in such and such a period now past. This leads us to the inescapable conclusion that these gentlemen have no other standards than the styles of window-dressing on Fifth Avenue. It means that when they write about literature all they are thinking of is the present rating of a book on the exchange, a matter which has almost nothing to do with its eventual value. For a man who is making his living as a critic to write about Scott Fitzgerald without mentioning "The Great Gatsby" just means that he doesn't know his business. Many people consider "The Great Gatsby" one of the few classic American novels. I do myself. Obviously such a judgment is debatable. But to write about the life of a man as important to American letters as the author of "The Great Gatsby" in terms of last summer's styles in ladies' hats, shows an incomprehension of what it is all about, that, to anyone who cares for the art of writing, is absolutely appalling.

JOHN DOS PASSOS

The Moral of Scott Fitzgerald

F. SCOTT FITZGERALD is dead, aged forty-four. *Requiescat in pace; ora pro nobis.* In the twenties, his heyday, he was a kind of king of our American youth; and as the news of his end appeared in the papers there were strange coincidences along with it. A number of others—a younger writer who was somewhat of his school and, like him, had committed his talent unfortunately to Hollywood, and that writer's pretty, whimsical wife, and another young woman who was a famous horse-trainer, and the young leader of a popular jazz-band—also met sudden deaths that week. I was reminded of the holocausts by which primitive rulers were provided with an escort, servants and pretty women and boon companions, for eternity. The twenties were heaven, so to speak, often enough; might not heaven be like the twenties? If it were, in one or two particulars, Scott Fitzgerald would be sorry; sorry once more.

His health failed, and with a peculiar darkness and deadweight in mind and heart, some five years ago. Then in a wonderful essay entitled "The Crack Up" he took stock of himself, looking twenty years back for what flaws were in him or in the day and age, what early damage had been done, and how. Thanks to that, one can speak of his weaknesses without benefit of gossip, without impertinence. And so I do, asking for charity toward him and clarity about him; and a little on my own mortal account; and for certain innocent immature American writers' benefit.

My theme is as usual personality rather than esthetics; but my sentiment on this occasion is not personal. Aside from our Midwestern birth and years of foreign residence, you could scarcely find two men of the same generation less alike than we two. Neither our virtues nor our vices appeared to overlap at all. I did not have the honor of his particular friendship. I have only one vivid memory of conversation with him, which was on a Mediterranean beach. Across the Bay of Angels and over the big good-for-nothing city of Nice, some of the Alps hung in the air as pearly as onions; and that air and that sea, which has only delicate tides, quivered with warm weather. It was before the publication of "The Sun Also Rises," the summer of 1925 or 1926, and Hemingway was what he wanted to talk to me about. He came abruptly and drew me a little apart from our friends and relations, into the shade of a rock.

Hemingway had published some short stories in the dinky de-luxe way in Paris; and I along with all the literary set had discovered him, which was fun; and when we returned to New York we preached the new style and peculiar feeling of his fiction as if it were evangel. Still, that was too slow a start of a great career to suit Fitzgerald. Obviously Ernest was the one true genius of our decade, he said; and yet he was neglected and misunderstood and, above all, insufficiently remunerated. He thought I would agree that "The Apple of the Eye" and "The Great Gatsby" were rather inflated market values just then. What could I do to help launch Hemingway? Why didn't I write a laudatory essay on him? With this questioning, Fitzger-

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ald now and then impatiently grasped and shook my elbow.

There was something more than ordinary art-admiration about it, but on the other hand it was no mere matter of affection for Hemingway; it was so bold, unabashed, lacking in sense of humor. I have a sharp tongue and my acquaintances often underestimate my good nature; so I was touched and flattered by Fitzgerald's taking so much for granted. It simply had not occurred to him that unfriendliness or pettiness on my part might inhibit my enthusiasm about the art of a new colleague and rival. As a matter of fact, my enthusiasm was not on a par with his; and looking back now, I am glad for my sake that it was not. He not only said but, I believe, honestly felt that Hemingway was inimitably, essentially superior. From the moment Hemingway began to appear in print, perhaps it did not matter what he himself produced or failed to produce. He felt free to write just for profit, and to live for fun, if possible. Hemingway could be entrusted with the graver responsibilities and higher rewards such as glory, immortality. This extreme of admiration—this excuse for a morbid belittlement and abandonment of himself—was bad for Fitzgerald, I imagine. At all events he soon began to waste his energy in various hack-writing.

I was told last year that another talented contemporary of ours had grown so modest in the wage-earning way, fallen so far from his youthful triumph, that he would sign a friend's stories and split the payment. Under the friend's name it would have been hundreds of dollars, and under his, a thousand or thousands. Perhaps this was not true gossip, but it is a good little exemplary tale, and of general application. It gives me goose-flesh. A signature which has been so humiliated is apt never to be the same again, in the signer's own estimation. As a rule the delicate literary brain, the aching creative heart, cannot stand that sort of thing. It is better for a writer even to fancy himself a Messiah, against the day when writing or life goes badly. And there is more to this than the matter of esthetic integrity. For if his opinion of himself is divided by disrespect—sheepish, shameful, cynical—he usually finds his earning capacity as well as his satisfaction falling off. The vast public, which appears to have no taste, somehow senses when it is being scornfully talked down to. The great hacks are innocent, and serenely class themselves with Tolstoy and Dickens. Their getting good enough to compare with P. G. Wodehouse or Zane Grey may depend upon that benign misapprehension.

Probably Fitzgerald never fell into any abuse of his reputation as unwise and unwholesome as the above-mentioned confrères. His standard of living did seem to the rest of us high. Publishers in the twenties made immense advances to novelists who had and could lend prestige; and when in the thirties Fitzgerald's popularity lapsed, movies had begun to be talkies, which opened up a new lucrative field of literary operation. Certainly he did write too much in recent years with his tongue in his cheek; his heart in his boots if not in his pocket. And it was his opinion in 1936 that the competition and popular appeal of the films—"a more glittering, a grosser power," as he put it—had made the God-given form of the novel archaic; a wrong thought indeed for a novelist.

This is not the ideal moment to reread and appraise his collectable works. With the mind at a loss, muffled like a drum—the ego a little inflamed as it always is by presentness of death—we may exaggerate their merit or their shortcomings. I remember thinking, when the early best sellers were published, that his style was a little too free and easy; but I was a fussy stylist in those days. His phrasing was almost always animated and charming; his diction excellent. He wrote very little in slang or what I call baby-talk: the pitfall of many who specialized in American contemporaneity after him. But for other reasons—obscurity of sentiment, facetiousness—a large part of his work may not endure, as readable reading matter for art's sake. It will be precious as documentary evidence, instructive example. That is not, in the way of immortality, what the writer hopes; but it is much more than most writers of fiction achieve.

"This Side of Paradise" haunted the decade like a song, popular but perfect. It hung over an entire youth-movement like a banner, somewhat discolored and wind-worn now; the wind has lapsed out of it. But a book which college boys really read is a rare thing, not to be dismissed idly or in a moment of severe sophistication. Then there were dozens of stories, some delicate and some slap-dash; one very odd, entitled "Head and Shoulders." I love "The Great Gatsby." Its very timeliness, as of 1925, gave it a touch of the old-fashioned a few years later; but I have reread it this week and found it all right; pleasure and compassion on every page. A masterpiece often seems a period-piece for a while; then comes down out of the attic, to function anew and to last. There is a great deal to be said for and against his final novel, "Tender Is the Night." On the whole I am warmly for it. To be sane or insane is a noble issue, and very few novels take what might be called an intelligent interest in it; this does, and gives a fair picture of the entertaining expatriate habit of life besides.

In 1936 in three issues of Esquire he published the autobiographical essay, "The Crack Up," as it were swan-song. I first read it at my barber's, which, I suppose, is according to the editorial devices of that magazine, a medium of advertising for men's ready-made clothing. There is very little in world literature like this piece: Max Jacob's "Défense de Tartufe"; the confidential chapter of "The Seven Pillars of Wisdom," perhaps; Sir Walter Raleigh's verse-epistle before his beheading, in a way. Fitzgerald's theme seems more dreadful, plain petty stroke by stroke; and of course his treatment lacks the good grace and firmness of the old and old-style authors. Indeed it is cheap here and there, but in embarrassment rather than in crudity or lack of courage. Or perhaps Fitzgerald as he wrote was too sensitive to what was to appear along with it in the magazine: the jokes, the Petty girls, the haberdashery. He always suffered from an extreme environmental sense. Still it is fine prose and naturally his timeliest piece today: self-autopsy and funeral sermon. It also, with an innocent air, gravely indicts our native idealism in some respects, our common code, our college education. And in general—for ailing civilization as well as one dead Fitzgerald—this is a day of wrath.

He had made a great recovery from a seemingly mortal physical illness; then found everything dead or deadish in his psyche, his thought all broken, and no appetite for anything on earth. It was not from alcohol, he said, evidently proud of the fact that he had not had any for six months, not even beer. We may be a little doubtful of this protestation; for protestation indeed is a kind of sub-habit of the

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alcoholic. Six months is no time at all, in terms of the things that kill us. Alcohol in fact never exclusively causes anything. Only, just as it will heighten a happy experience, it will deepen a rut or a pit, in the way of fatigue chiefly. Who cares, when a dear one is dying of a chest-cold or an embolism, whether he is a drunkard or a reformed ex-drunkard?—Yes, I know, the dying one himself cares! But when Fitzgerald wrote his essay he still had five years to live, quite a long time. It was not about ill health, and of course he was as sane as an angel. His trouble just then and his subject was only his lassitude of imagination; his nauseated spirit; that self-hypnotic state of not having any will-power; and nothing left of the intellect but inward observation and dislike. Why, he cried, why was I "identified with the objects of my horror and compassion"? He said it was the result of "too much anger and too many tears." That was his snap-judgment; blunt sentimentality of a boy or ex-boy. But since he was a story-teller above all, he did not stop at that; he proceeded to tell things about the past in which the mystery showed extraordinarily.

"The Crack Up" has never been issued in book form; and perhaps because the pretty pictures in Esquire are so exciting to thumb-tack up on the wall, back numbers of it are not easy to come by. So I am tempted to try to summarize it all; but no, it must be published. Especially the first half is written without a fault: brief easy fiery phrases—the thinking that he compared to a "moving about of great secret trunks," and "the heady villainous feeling"—one quick and thorough paragraph after another, with so little shame and so little emphasis that I have wondered if he himself knew how much he was confessing.

He still regretted his bad luck in not getting abroad into the trenches as an army officer in 1918, and even his failure at football in 1913 or 1914. On certain of those unlucky days of his youth he felt as badly as in 1936, and badly in the same way; he makes a point of the similarity. Perhaps the worst of the early crises came in his junior year, when he lost the presidency of one of the Princeton clubs. Immediately afterward, as an act of desperation and consolation, he made love for the first time; and also that year, not until then, he turned to literary art, as the best of a bad bargain. Ominous! Fantastic, too, that a man who is dying or at least done with living—one who has had practically all that the world affords, fame and prosperity, work and play, love and friendship, and lost practically all—should still think seriously of so much fiddledeedee of boyhood! Very noble convictions underlay Fitzgerald's entire life, and he explains them nobly. But when he comes to the disillusionment, that too is couched in alumnal imagery; it is along with "the shoulder-pads worn for one day on the Princeton freshman football field and the overseas cap never worn overseas" that his ideals are relegated to the junk-heap, he says. It is strange and baroque; like those large bunches of battle-trappings which appear decoratively in seventeenth-century architecture, empty helmets and empty cuirasses and firearms laid crossways, sculptured up on the lintels of barracks and on the lids of tombs. Those condemned old European societies which have been too much militarized, too concerned with glory and glorious death, scarcely seem more bizarre than this: a kind of national consciousness revolving to the bitter end around college; and the latter also seems a precarious basis for a nation.

Aside from his literary talent—literary genius, self-taught—I think Fitzgerald must have been the worst educated man in the world. He never knew his own strength; therefore nothing inspired him very definitely to conserve or budget it. When he was a freshman, did the seniors teach him a manly technique of drinking, with the price and penalty of the several degrees of excess of it? If they had, it might never have excited him as a vague, fatal moral issue. The rest of us, his writing friends and rivals, thought that he had the best narrative gift of the century. Did the English department at Princeton try to develop his admiration of that fact about himself, and make him feel the burden and the pleasure of it? Apparently they taught him rather to appreciate this or that other writer, to his own disfavor. Did any worldly-wise critic ever remind him that beyond a certain point, writing for profit becomes unprofitable; bad business as well as bad art? Another thing: my impression is that only as he wrote, or just before writing, "Tender Is the Night," did he discover certain causes and gradations of mental illness which, nowadays, every boy ought to be taught as soon as he has mastered the other facts of life.

Even the army failed to inculcate upon Lieutenant Fitzgerald one principle that a good army man must accept: heroism is a secondary virtue in an army. Lieutenant Fitzgerald had no business pining for the front-line trenches in advance of his superior officers' decision that it was the place for him. The point of soldiering is to kill; not a mere willingness to be killed. This seems important today, as we prepare again for perhaps necessary war, and again too much is made of the spirit of self-sacrifice and embattlement of ideals; and not enough of the mere means of victory. And with reference to literature, too, as Fitzgerald drops out of our insufficient little regiment, we writers particularly blame him for that all-out idealism of his. No matter what he died for—if he died *for* anything—it was in too great a hurry; it was not worth it at his age.

In several of the obituary notices of Fitzgerald I detect one little line of mistaken moralizing, which I think is not uncommon; and his example and his fiction may have done something to propagate it. They seem to associate all rebellious morality somehow with a state of poor health. This is an unfair attack, and on the other hand a too easy alibi. Bad behavior is not always a feeble, pitiful, fateful thing. Malice of mind, strange style, offensive subject matter, do not always derive from morbid psyche or delicate physique. Wickedness is not necessarily weakness; and *vice versa*. For there is will-power in humanity. Its genuine manifestation is only in the long run; but, with knowledge, it can have the last word. Modern psychology does not deny it. Whether one is a moralist or an immoralist—a vengeful daily preacher like Mr. Westbrook Pegler, or an occasional devil's advocate like myself, or the quietest citizen—these little distinctions ought to be kept clear.

Fitzgerald was weak; we have the proof of it now in his demise. Fitzgerald, the outstanding aggressor in the little warfare which divided our middle classes in the twenties—warfare of moral emancipation against moral conceit, flaming youth against old guard—definitely has let his side down. The champion is as dead as a doornail. Self-congratulatory moral persons may crow over him if they wish.

There is bound to be a slight anger at his graveside; curse-words amid our written or spoken obsequies. The

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whole school of writers who went to France has been a bit maligned while the proletarian novelists and the politico-critics have enjoyed the general applause. Some of us are reckless talkers, and no doubt we have maligned each other and each himself as well. It was the beautiful, talented Miss Stein in her Paris salon who first called us "the lost generation." It was Hemingway who took up the theme and made it a popular refrain. The twenties were in fact a time of great prosperity and liberty, a spendthrift and footloose time; and especially in France you got your American money's worth of everything if you were clever. Still I doubt whether, in dissipation and unruly emotion, we strayed much farther out of the way than young Americans ordinarily do, at home as abroad. I think we were somewhat extraordinarily inclined to make youthful rebelliousness, imprudent pursuit of pleasure or ambition, a little easier for our young brothers. Heaven knows how it will be for our sons.

In any case, time is the real moralist; and a great many of the so-called lost are still at hand, active and indeed conspicuous: Bishop and Hemingway and Bromfield and Cummings and V. Thomson and Tate, Gordon and Porter and Flanner and others, the U. S. A.'s odd foreign legion. We were a band of toughs in fact, indestructible, which perhaps is the best thing to be said for us at this point. For the next step is to age well. Relatively speaking, I think we are aging well; giving evidence of toughness in the favorable sense as well: tenacity and hardiness, and a kind of worldly wisdom that does not have to change its platform very often, and skepticism mixed in with our courage to temper it and make it last. Sometimes we are still spoken of as the young or youngish or "younger" writers, but there can be no sense in that, except by lack of competition; every last one of us is forty. That is the right age to give advice to the immature and potential literary generation. For their sake, lest they feel unable to take our word for things, it seems worth while to protest against the strange bad name we have had.

In any case we are the ones who know about Fitzgerald. He was our darling, our genius, our fool. Let the young people consider his untypical case with admiration but great caution; with qualms and a respect for fate, without fatalism. He was young to the bitter end. He lived and he wrote at last like a scapegoat, and now has departed like one. As you might say, he was Gatsby, a greater Gatsby. Why not? Flaubert said, *"Madame Bovary, c'est moi!"* On the day before Christmas, in a sensible bitter obituary, The New York Times quoted a paragraph from "The Crack Up" in which the deceased likened himself to a plate. "Sometimes, though, the cracked plate has to be kept in service as a household necessity. It can never be warmed up on the stove nor shuffled with the other plates in the dishpan; it will not be brought out for company but it will do to hold crackers late at night or to go into the ice-box with the left-overs." A deadly little prose-poem! No doubt the ideals Fitzgerald acquired in college and in the army—and put to the test on Long Island and in the Alpes Maritimes and in Hollywood—always were a bit second-hand, fissured, cracked if you like. But how faithfully he reported both idealization and ordeal; and how his light smooth earthenware style dignifies it!

The style in which others have written of him is different. On the day after Christmas, in his popular column in The New York World-Telegram, Mr. Westbrook Pegler remarked that his death "recalls memories of a queer bunch of undisciplined and self-indulgent brats who were determined not to pull their weight in the boat and wanted the world to drop everything and sit down and bawl with them. A kick in the pants and a clout over the scalp were more like their needing. . . ." With a kind of expert politeness throughout this *in memoriam*, Mr. Pegler avoids commenting upon the dead man himself exactly. His complaint is of anonymous persons: the company Fitzgerald kept, readers who let themselves be influenced by him, and his heroes and heroines: "Sensitive young things about whom he wrote and with whom he ran to fires not only because he could exploit them for profit in print but because he found them congenial. . . ." I suppose Mr. Pegler's column is profitable too; and if I were doing it I should feel easier in my mind, surer of my aim, if I knew and liked my exploitees. Joking aside, certainly this opinion of his does not correspond in the least to my memory of the gay twenties. Certainly if sensitive young men and women of the thirties believe Pegler, they will not admire Fitzgerald or like the rest of us much.

Too bad; there should be peace between the generations now, at least among the literary. Popularity or no popularity, we have none too many helpful friends; and in a time of world war there may be panic and conservatism and absent-mindedness and neglect of literature in general, and those slight acts of obscure vengeance so easy to commit when fellow citizens have begun to fear and imagine and act as a mass. There should not be any quarrel between literature and journalism either. Modernly conceived and well done—literary men sticking to the truth and newspapermen using imagination—they relate to each other very closely, and may sustain and inspire each other back and forth. In a time of solemn subject matter it is more and more needful that they should.

In any case Mr. Pegler's decade is out as well as ours; the rude hard-working thirties as well as the wild twenties. The forties have come. Those of us who have been youthful too long—which, I suppose, is the real point of his criticism—now certainly realize our middle age; no more time to make ready or dawdle, nor energy to waste. That is one universal effect of war on the imagination: time, as a moral factor, instantly changes expression and changes pace. Everyman suddenly has a vision of sudden death.

What is the difference, from the universal angle? Everyone has to die once; no one has to die twice. But now that mortality has become the world's worst worry once more, there is less sophistication of it. Plain as day we see that the bull in the arena is no more fated than the steer in the slaughterhouse. The glamorous gangster's cadaver with bellyful of bullets is no deader than the commonplace little chap overcome by pernicious anemia. Napoleon III at the battle of Sedan, the other battle of Sedan, rouged his cheeks in order not to communicate his illness and fright to his desperate army. An unemployed young actor, a friend of a friend of mine, lately earned a living for a while by rouging cheeks of well-off corpses at a smart mortician's. All this equally—and infinitude of other things under the sun—is jurisdiction of death. The difference between a beautiful death and an ugly death is in the eye of the beholder, the heart of the mourner, the brain of the survivor.

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The fact of Scott Fitzgerald's end is as bad and deplorable as could be; but the moral of it is good enough, and warlike. It is to enliven the rest of the regiment. Mere tightening the belt, stiffening the upper lip, is not all I mean; nor the simple delight of being alive still, the dance on the grave, the dance between holocausts. As we have it—documented and prophesied by his best work, commented upon in the newspaper with other news of the day—it is a deep breath of knowledge, fresh air, and an incitement to particular literary virtues.

For the private life and the public life, literary life and real life, if you view them in this light of death—and now we have it also boding on all the horizon, like fire—are one and the same. Which brings up another point of literary criticism; then I have done. The great thing about Fitzgerald was his candor; verbal courage; simplicity. One little man with eyes really witnessing; objective in all he uttered, even about himself in a subjective slump; arrogant in just one connection, for one purpose only, to make his meaning clear. The thing, I think, that a number of recent critics have most disliked about him is his confessional way, the personal tone, the *tête-à-tête* or man-to-man style, first person singular. He remarked it himself in "The Crack Up": "There are always those to whom all self-revelation is contemptible."

I on the other hand feel a real approval and emulation of just that; and I recommend that all our writers give it serious consideration. It might be the next esthetic issue and new mode of American letters. It is American enough; our greatest fellows, such as Franklin and Audubon and Thoreau and Whitman, were self-expressers in so far as they knew themselves. This is a time of greater knowledege, otherwise worse; an era which has as many evil earmarks as, for example, the Renaissance: awful political genius running amok and clashing, migrations, races whipped together as it were by a titanic egg-beater, impatient sexuality and love of stimulants and cruelty, sacks, burnings and plagues. Fine things eventually may be achieved amid all this, as in that other century. I suggest revelation of man as he appears to himself in his mirror—not as he poses or wishes or idealizes—as one thing to try a revival of, this time. Naked truth about man's nature in unmistakable English.

In the Renaissance they had anatomy: Vesalius in Paris at midnight under the gallows-tree, bitten by the dogs as he disputed with them the hanged cadavers which they wanted to eat and he wanted to cut up. They had anatomy and we have psychology. The throws of dice in our world—at least the several dead-weights with which the dice appear to be loaded against us—are moral matters; and no one ever learns much about all that except in his own person, at any rate in private. In public, in the nation and the inter-nation and the anti-nation, one just suffers the weight of the morality of others like a dumb brute. This has been a dishonest century above all: literature lagging as far behind modern habits as behind modern history; democratic statesmanship all vitiated by good form, understatement, optimism; and the nations which could not afford democracy, finally developing their supremacy all on a basis of the deliberate lie. And now is the end, or another beginning.

Writers in this country still can give their little examples of truth-telling; little exercises for their fellow citizens, to develop their ability to distinguish truth from untruth in other connections when it really is important. The importance arises as desperately in the public interest as in private life. Even light fiction can help a society get together and agree upon its vocabulary; little strokes of the tuning-fork, for harmony's sake. And for clarity's sake, let us often use, and sanction the use of, words of one syllable. The shortest and most potent is the personal pronoun: I. The sanctified priest knows that, he says *credo;* and the trustworthy physician only gives his opinion, not a panacea. The witness in the courtroom does not indulge in the editorial we; the judge and the lawyers will not allow it; and indeed, if the case is important, if there is life or liberty or even a large amount of money at stake, not even supposition or hearsay is admitted as evidence. Our worldwide case is important.

Not only is Anglo-Saxondom all at war with the rest of the world in defense of its accustomed power and prosperity, and of the luxuries of the spirit such as free speech, free publication, free faith—for the time being, the United States is the likeliest place for the preservation of the Mediterranean and French ideal of fine art and writing: which puts a new, peculiar obligation upon us ex-expatriates. The land of the free should become and is becoming a city of refuge; but there is cultural peril even in that. France has merely committed her tradition to our keeping, by default; whereas Germany has exiled to us her most important professors and brilliant writers. Perhaps the latter are bound to introduce into our current literature a little of that mystically philosophic, obscurely scientific mode which somewhat misled or betrayed them as a nation. Therefore we must keep up more strictly and energetically than ever, our native specific skeptical habit of mind; our plainer and therefore safer style.

In any consideration of the gravity of the work of art and letters—and upon any solemn occasion such as the death of a good writer like Scott Fitzgerald—I think of Faust, and that labor he dreamed of when he was blind and dying, keeping the devil waiting. It was the drainage of a stinking sea-marsh and the construction of a strong dyke. Fresh fields amid the eternally besieging sea: room for a million men to live, not in security—Goethe expressly ruled out that hope of which we moderns have been too fond—but free to do the best they could for themselves. Does it seem absurd to compare a deceased best seller with that mythic man: former wholesome Germany's demigod? There must always be some pretentiousness about literature, or else no one would take its pains or endure its disappointments. Throughout this article I have mixed bathos with pathos, joking with tenderness, in order to venture here and there a higher claim for literary art than is customary now. I am in dead earnest. Bad writing is in fact a rank feverish unnecessary slough. Good writing is a dyke, in which there is a leak for every one of our weary hands. And honestly I do see the very devil standing worldwide in the decade to come, bound to get some of us. I realize that I have given an exaggerated impression of Fitzgerald's tragedy in recent years: all the above is based on his confession of 1936, and he was not so nearly finished as he thought. But fear of death is one prophecy that never fails; and now his strength is only in print, and his weakness of no account, except for our instruction.

GLENWAY WESCOTT

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Books in Review

What New Directions?

IF THE LATEST annual volume of "New Directions" [1] seems more important than the four that preceded it, that isn't because the anthology itself has greatly changed. It is bigger than before, but otherwise it remains an organ of the literary avant-garde, a little magazine expanded into several hundred pages and bound in buckram. Its purpose in the beginning, as explained here by the editor and publisher, was "to be an exhibition gallery for new trends and techniques, and to be a haven for writers who wanted to buck the commercial publishing system by being unconventional or original, by being purists or stylists, by being difficult or deep, by being, in short, themselves." It is still such a haven, though some of the writers who take refuge in it are not quite sure whether they are being themselves or Franz Kafka, themselves or Henry Miller, themselves or Hart Crane. Others, however, are now speaking in their own voices, with a pretty clear notion of what they are saying. Meanwhile the social realism that dominated the 1930's is ceasing to be the literary fashion—largely for political reasons—and the avant-garde writers, who for a long time seemed to be in the rear ranks of literature and walking backwards, are approaching the main procession. The result is that "New Directions" is for the first time living up to its own title.

But to find the new directions it represents, we have to dig through a good deal of dull or extraneous material. The book is divided into seven sections, each with a different purpose and level of achievement, and we have to begin by noting them separately. They are in brief:

1. "Young Americans," a section consisting of eight stories and a puppet play. It contains the liveliest writing in the volume—as take the stories by Paul Goodman, Weldon Kees, Alfred Young Fisher, David Kerner—and it gives the clearest picture of the newer tendencies.

2. "The American Scene," consisting of photographs and text by Wright Morris, and other photographs by Walker Evans with text by James Agee. Evans' clean work is by now familiar to most of us. Morris as a photographer is even more impersonal; he likes to do close-ups of weather-beaten buildings, showing the grain of the wood. Each of his camera studies faces a page of text which, though it deals with a wholly different subject, human instead of ligneous, still has something of the same mood. The editor advises us to look at the pictures while having someone else read the text aloud; this, he says, will be a totally new esthetic experience. I did not find it such.

3. "Of Writers and Writing," containing extracts from Katherine Anne Porter's journal and a long, offhandedly brilliant essay by George Orwell, who writes criticism in terms of candid autobiography. This time he is talking about himself and Henry Miller, whom he begins by overpraising. He ends, however, by casting a new light on what is happening in literature today.

4. "New Directions in Design," chiefly devoted to Frank Lloyd Wright, his London lectures and his new home in Arizona. The cult that centers around him is getting to be obsequious and exaggerated. I should suggest that the next piece about him might be written by an average intelligent family condemned to live in one of his beautiful houses.

5. "A Little Anthology of Contemporary Poetry," which is Mr. Laughlin's worst failure as an editor. Elsewhere he chooses material that is interesting for what it tries to do, even if nothing much gets done. This section, however, is for the most part composed of dull and rather shopworn Surrealism. That is a pity, too, because there are young American poets quite as original as the story-tellers in his first section. Either the editor has not found them or else he has not selected their best work.

6. "Chainpoems," ten of them, written collectively by forty-one authors. The theory of a chainpoem is, if you want a sonnet, to begin by making a list of fourteen poets. The first of them writes the first line and sends it along to the second, who writes the second line and sends it along to the third, and so on through the list. John Peale Bishop, who contributes a very good introductory essay to this section, says that he doesn't like chainpoems. Nicolas Calas says that they might be better if each line were written without any knowledge of those that came before, as a pure expression of the collective unconscious.

7. "Values in Surrealism," consisting of an interview with and a manifesto by Nicolas Calas, a Surrealist anthology chosen by Calas with the advice of André Breton, and finally two essays on Surrealism by Herbert J. Muller and Kenneth Burke. The section is carefully edited and should prove quite valuable to students, but its general effect is that of an inquest rather than an explanation. Partly the trouble is that the extracts chosen for the anthology are too short to give a fair picture of the books from which they are taken. Partly it is that even Surrealist poetry cannot be translated into another language without losing its music and most of its magic. But beyond this, one gets the impression from Calas' incidental remarks that French Surrealism had become as bureaucratic and clique-ridden as any political party. It was among the less attractive institutions of the Third Republic.

Considering these seven sections together, what conclusions can we draw from them?

One's first impression on reading the book is that it represents a complete break with the prevailing literary standards of the 1930's. There is no sign here of proletarian literature, except for three short poems by George Kauffman of Berkeley, California, who seems to have fallen into strange company. There is no social realism and very little realism of any sort. Indeed, for a moment we seem to be back in the 1920's—back on the Left Bank, back in the

[1] New Directions in Prose and Poetry, 1940, edited by James Laughlin. Norfolk, Conn.: New Directions. 600 pages, illustrated. $3.50.

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ivory tower, back in the cult of self-expression and the reader be damned, back in the attempt to create a pure art and thoroughly shock and frighten the middle classes while holding fast to middle-class comforts. But that is only a temporary illusion.

Actually "New Directions" is in contrast with the work of both the preceding decades. The typical avant-garde writers of the 1930's were indifferent to and completely ignorant about the world at large. They confined their interests to literature and personal relations, but within this limited sphere they were full of the determination to invent and construct and originate. During the 1930's, the same type of determination was applied to politics. "We are changing the world," the schoolchildren used to sing in Moscow—and poets who were schoolchildren in politics also sang of changing it. But the writers in the 1940 volume of "New Directions" are not bent on changing anything.

They continue to be interested in the fate of society, like the social realists. They believe like them that we are now embarked on a cycle of wars and revolutions. But they feel that these revolutions, instead of leading to a socialist commonwealth, may result in the destruction of our whole civilization. Their songs and their stories are largely concerned with irrational violence—and, as a group, they propose to do absolutely nothing about it. In the whole volume I do not remember reading one statement of determination (except by George Kauffman) or one expression of the desire to participate in social effort. And this attitude of utter will-lessness is assumed not only toward politics but even toward literature, since most of these writers surrender to their own streams of consciousness; instead of constructing, they merely try to express. In the year when Hitler seized the continent of Europe, their refrain was not, "We are changing the world," but rather, "The world is changing, is dying perhaps, and meanwhile here are our dreams."

MALCOLM COWLEY

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Mother Bloor

We Are Many: An Autobiography, by Ella Reeve Bloor. New York: International Publishers. 319 pages. $2.50.

"MOTHER BLOOR" is a representative figure of native American radicalism. She traces her ancestry back to the Revolution, and the years of her own life back to the Civil War. She has moved briefly and energetically through all the "isms" of her time: ethical culture, woman suffrage, prohibition, bimetallism, sex education, utopian settlements, DeLeonism, Debsism—and she comes to rest at last in the bosom of the Communist Party. To it she has dedicated the last two decades, and in its service she employs the still firm and ringing voice, the unwavering faith, the amazing energy that has driven her for three-quarters of a century.

Loving a crowd and a fight, longing to speak and be listened to, unassailed by any doubts in whatever was her credo for the moment, she has ranged up and down our land more times than even she can remember, and has been in the thick of every sensational labor conflict of the past forty years. Such a life should make interesting telling, but the author has not succeeded in telling it. Evocative names besprinkle its pages, but no personage ever comes to life, no experience ever reveals its meaning. All the dully told anecdotes in the end add up to nothing. For all her dynamism, there is no sense of movement; nothing is evaluated, nothing is explained, nothing is illuminated. Union-splitting and opposition to dual unionism, building the AFL and smashing it, exposing John L. Lewis and adulating him, supporting Roosevelt and directing the main fire against him, urging a union of democracies with the Soviet Union against Hitler and defending the Nazi-Soviet pact—these disparate things succeed each other without transition or any sense of the need to select or reconcile them.

Almost unconsciously she achieves such remarkable feats as telling of the Passaic strike without mentioning the name of Albert Weisbord, and makes of Leon Trotsky a "wrecker" as early as 1922, when he pauses in his duties as War Commissar and director of the broken-down railway system to send a "Trotskyite agent" to sabotage the work of her son in an agricultural commune, only to be outwitted and thwarted by the ever watchful Lenin! Yet the book is on the whole as free from genuine malice and knavery as it is from penetration and meaning. As I read it, some words of Bernard Shaw kept suggesting themselves as a motto: "If experience were the best teacher, then the stones of London would be the wisest things in the world." The real story of Ella Reeve Bloor's crowded life has somehow eluded these pages, as has the tragic record of the vicissitudes of American radicalism. For aught one can tell from it, the radical movement has gone continuously onward and upward, with Mother Bloor carrying its flaming standard in unfaltering hands, ever closer to imminent victory.

BERTRAM D. WOLFE

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Index to Music

Grove's Dictionary of Music and Musicians: Supplementary Volume. Edited by H. C. Colles. New York: The Macmillan Company. 688 pages, illustrated. $5.

AMONG ARTICLES on many subjects, this copious volume includes pieces on broadcasting, on Twelve-Note and on Babylonian Music; a catalogue of Liszt's compositions; an account of new discoveries relative to Vivaldi's life; and notices on the careers of contemporary musicologists and composers up to and including David Diamond. Had the title "Supplementary" not been given it, the character of its varied contents alone would reveal the book's intention. It adds new and important information to the now thirteen-year-old third edition of the famous English musical encyclopedia—information which either amplifies past knowledge or has made necessary the inclusion of new articles. There is also a chronicle of recent musical events.

Some of the most illuminating articles are contributed by Egon Wellesz: those for example on eastern church music, the *Ballet de Cour* and modern opera. Disappointing, on the other hand, in Edwin Evans' judgment of Hindemith's recent compositions, is the imperviousness displayed to the fact of their increasing conventionalities. The thoughtful, comprehensive volume, of course, is extremely valuable, even though in spots it smacks of insularity. Wellesz's article on Continental opera, for example, has been supplemented by pages on opera in England, but with none on opera in America. Alan Bush of London, remarkable chiefly for his singular Marxian interpretations of musical history, receives over a column, while the composers Edgar Varèse of New York and Heitor Villa-Lobos of Rio de Janeiro receive but half a column apiece. Still, this occasional insularity is not entirely the fault of the English editor. It was Gustav Reese, the principal American contributor, who found just three times as much to write about Howard Hanson as about Varèse, despite the latter's immense enrichment of the sonorous material.

PAUL ROSENFELD

The Rhetoricians

And in the Human Heart, by Conrad Aiken. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce. 87 pages. $1.50.
The Arrow at the Heel, by Raymond Holden. New York: Henry Holt and Company. 110 pages. $2.

"AND IN THE HUMAN HEART" is a sequence of forty-three Shakespearean sonnets. They are written with impressive fluency and command; their materials and mechanisms are ones Mr. Aiken has used so many times before, under so much more difficult circumstances, that he seems as much at ease as Merlin pulling a quarter from a schoolboy's nose. Merlin is the right comparison, I think; Mr. Aiken has always traded in rhetorical magic, and his incantations have grown more traditional as he has aged. A few months ago, returning from England to The Atlantic Monthly, he began a crusade against contemporary poetry. It was hard not to be impressed with it: anyone would be impressed with a crusader who says that Auden, Tate, Ransom, Warren, MacNeice and Muriel Rukeyser

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all write just alike; and he ended by demanding a romantic revival. A hundred and fifty years of romanticism have culminated in a situation that even the romanticist decides is impossible: so he proposes, as a cure, a return to romanticism. And he lives up to his advice; on the strength of these poems Mr. Aiken can be called, as he would wish to be called, a straight romantic.

What are these sonnets about? Their ostensible subject is a very generalized love-affair; but their real subject is a particular rhetoric Mr. Aiken has been developing for a long time. He is in love with a few dozen words, and their permutations and combinations have assumed for him a weight and urgency that would be quite incomprehensible to his readers, if it were not for the fact that most of these terms are the traditional magic-making words of English romantic poetry. "The Good, the True, the Beautiful/ Those are the things that pay!" wrote Lewis Carroll; add to these Love and Nature—and the more common particulars that represent such abstractions in poetry—and you have, in its rudest beginnings, the machinery of Mr. Aiken's rhetoric. In forty-three sonnets the sun, moon and stars are mentioned more than fifty times: *love*, 50; *flower* and flower-names, 58; *time*, 33—*space* comes close behind; *golden*, 16; *world*, 23; the blackness or darkness of things is spoken of twenty-five times, their brightness or fiery lightness more than a hundred times. Chaos, infinity, eternity, the sea, the snow, fire, ice, leaves, birds, dreams, angels, heaven and hell, the heart, the soul—such favorites as these are more emotional and meaningful for Mr. Aiken, more essential to the poems, than the "subject" that serves as their pretext. He could write fairly pleasing and interesting poetry about any subject whatsoever; deprive him of the use of his favorite words and he would be simply unable to write poetry at all.

The content of Mr. Aiken's best poems has almost disappeared; these are only their emptied and enormously inflated rhetorical shells. To him, now, the world exists as a thesaurus from which to derive the glittering and immaculate counters that arrange themselves, almost automatically, into a poem. Any similarity between the poems and reality is purely coincidental: they are produced by the extravagantly emotional, rhetorical and sentimental manipulation of the beautiful objects of an imaginary universe. But if they are empty, they are still beautifully able. Are there any finger-exercises by Liszt? They would be like these poems. If you have been waiting for a magician's encore in the land of Faëry, here is your chance. Personally, I think that Merlin is stuck in the oak-tree for good; what goes on now goes on only in that best of all possible worlds, one's own head.

In "And in the Human Heart" the rhetoric is the poem; in "The Arrow at the Heel" the rhetoric is, instead, what ruins the poem. Mr. Holden's way of saying anything is so painstakingly, conventionally and determinedly rhetorical that even his most emotional or far-fetched statement sounds positively legal: it is as if one of Millay's or Wylie's poems had been rewritten to serve as the majority opinion of the Supreme Court. Mr. Holden's forms are traditional in the deadest sense of the word; often one can hardly pay attention to the poem for staring at the terrible I AM A SONNET writ large on every feature. The poems are competent, sincere, thoroughly respectable productions; many of the phrases are effective, some of the ideas are interesting; but phrases and ideas survive only as random notes, barely heard over the terrible din of the machinery. The subject is picked and the mills begin to grind; Mr. Holden's mills grind slowly and oh! so small. The reader emerges from them a little wiser and a whole lot sadder: he has had what the advertisements call An Experience. Reading "The Arrow at the Heel" is like attending Dali's lecture from a diving-suit; but Mr. Holden never comes out of the diving-suit. If he only could get free of it somehow—but I suppose he never will. The poem's ruin, here, is the poet's delight; for it is the very machinery that crushes the poem that assures Mr. Holden he has turned out a really competent, finished, professional job.

RANDALL JARRELL

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VANGUARD 424 Madison Avenue New York City

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JOHN DOS PASSOS's new book, "The Ground We Stand On," which deals with the divergence of a specifically American from a late English way of living, will be published by Harcourt, Brace this spring.

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Democratic Defense

A Special Section

What We Must Defend

I would ask no one to defend a democracy which in turn would not defend everyone in the nation against want and privation. The strength of this nation shall not be diluted by the failure of the government to protect the economic well-being of its citizens.—*President Roosevelt's Fireside Chat of December 29, 1940.*

FOR EIGHT YEARS fascism has warred upon the world. Men have been driven by thousands before its advance, to be made outcasts from Europe. Many free nations have passed beneath its sword, their independence crushed, their freedom destroyed, their heroes tortured, their martyrs reviled. Today against the last great nation of Europe fascism is waging war.

A few people in this country still refuse to understand the nature of fascism—that it wants no friends, seeks no compromise, thrives by warfare and strives for world dominion. The majority of our people are not so foolish or so hypocritical. They understand this threat and they have risen to defend America against it.

We believe wholeheartedly in the defense of America. Not the America of today as much as the America which we may reach through our democratic institutions if they survive—an America without slums, without hunger, without oppression, an America in which the security of each citizen is securely founded upon the recognition of his free humanity and upon his assured role in a functioning democratic society.

That future we are determined to defend.

By itself, however, a defense program is no guarantee of security. France had a defense program—so had Chamberlain. Like theirs, our defense program will fail if it is too slow, or if it undermines essential rights, or if it leaves untouched deep contradictions within our democracy.

The dirt farmer in the corn belt, the salesgirl behind the counter, the miner at the coal face, the stoker at sea—all believe in our democracy and demand vigorously that it be defended. Yet their continued support of the present defense program must depend in some degree upon whether for them this program means a better, more secure life, or whether it means the same hunger, and less liberty.

We learned that lesson in 1914-18. At first war meant prosperity for most Americans. Later it meant loss of standards, loss of rights, loss of homes and land, and loss of lives. And when these sacrifices had been made, most Americans grew sick of defense, sick of war, sick of Europe. They pulled out of Europe, and took with them the underpinning of the peace structure they had fought to establish.

Last time we began with the New Freedom. But when the war was over, the New Freedom had gone with the buffalo. We lost our promise, and it took us twelve years and the sufferings of 15,000,000 unemployed to get it back. Today we must defend America not only against what Hitler may do to us, but against what he may make us do to ourselves.

For eight years now we have been engaged in a broad program of defending America by increasing the welfare of our people. That program isn't completed, but it is in danger of being overlooked in the kind of program that some people mean by defense. Today powerful forces are at work trying to turn the present defense program into a program to recapture privilege, to break the unions, to profiteer out of war and to trample on the New Deal. Insufficient forces are at work trying to turn the defense program into a program of the people, to defend the people. It is desperately urgent that we realize where the present defense program is going wrong, and how it may be set right. For the difference between these two types of defense is the difference between victory and defeat for the America in which we believe.



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The Lesson of British Experience

IF WE IN AMERICA are to defend ourselves successfully, we must first learn the lesson of Europe, the lesson of France's collapse and Britain's peril.

That lesson is not one of warfare alone. The battle of Flanders, which lasted for twenty days, and the battle of France, which lasted for thirteen, were only final episodes in a phase of the war which has already been fought and lost. Germany won that phase of the war because the Nazis saw that total warfare demanded the total mobilization of resources. The democracies lost that phase of the war because for eight years they had allowed their resources to remain idle.

When the Nazis seized power in Germany, one-third of the workers were unemployed. Within five years there was a shortage of labor. In Britain, under the National Government, nearly one-third of the workers were unemployed in 1933. But though South Wales was rotting, though the distressed areas were crying for work, the government undertook no works program of any kind. While Hitler acted without regard for human values, the British government showed the same indifference to humanity by doing nothing. The skill, the health and the morale of the people were steadily sapped. Left to themselves, the industrialists adopted their own solutions; they cut capacity, discharged men, held prices high. At Jarrow, a great shipbuilding center and Britain's most famous ghost town, shipyards were bought up and actually destroyed to save profits on the yards which remained. The workers in these yards were called "superfluous scrap." Today Britain is desperate for lack of ships.

Those who want to forget this story want to blind us now. If we want to help England and ourselves we must learn it. The old British government failed to employ its workers because the same class of men who fought the New Deal here prevented a new deal in England. The old British government failed to arm England because they couldn't tell their people that Hitler was a bulwark against Bolshevism, and a potential friend, and at the same time persuade the same people that he was a danger to democracy, against whom England would have to arm rapidly at a great sacrifice. Chamberlain believed the first; Hitler chose to be the second.

The same class which in France, as the Cagoulards, took arms from Hitler to suppress their own people, in England refused to let defense interfere with business as usual. Even after the war began, that was the slogan of a government only months away from Dunkirk. Business as usual brought France to her knees, and brought Britain closer to invasion than she had been for 900 years.

In Germany, when steel capacity ran short and the industrialists refused to build, the government constructed the largest steel plant in the world and operated it. In Britain the monopolists who controlled the arms industries preferred to restrict rather than expand production. Their greatest fear was excess capacity when the arms program was over. Thus they crippled defense. The weakness inherent in monopolistic control of industry was tolerated by the British government until it was almost too late.

In 1936 a White Paper of the British government sadly testified to Britain's failure:

"For the present," it stated, "owing to the demands upon the capacity of industrial output which must necessarily be made in the first instance by the regular army, it is not possible simultaneously to recondition the territorial army."

Against this appalling complacency Churchill thundered and blasted:

"Just think of that!" he cried in the House of Commons. "Why? These two forces put together are only a quarter of a million men, and we are told that our vast, flexible, buoyant, rich, fertile, adaptable British industry is incapable of conducting the equipment of these two comparatively small forces simultaneously. I refuse to believe such a thing!"

It was not necessarily true. Yet the British army, when the test came, was beaten and almost destroyed because a monopolistic industrial system and an ineffective government had failed to give it the equipment it needed.

In aircraft, in machine tools, in steel and in cement we can see the results of this failure.

British aircraft, of course, had almost no capacity when rearmament began. Hitler had constructed huge modern works throughout Germany. The British government drew up thirteen successive timid plans before it conceived of an air force one-quarter as large as Germany's. In 1934 Britain had five more front-line planes than in 1933; in 1935 she had five less. At Munich she had less than 2,000; six months later she had 2,022.

The fault was many-sided. It lay principally in the aircraft industry, which concerned itself first with making huge profits, and refused to take any risks in constructing new plants. A release by Morris Cooke's Employment Section of the National Defense Advisory Commission tells a part of the story: "Particularly pernicious," it says, "was the practice by which the major aircraft factories farmed out only that work on which profit margins were narrow, keeping the lucrative business for themselves. This left no incentive for small companies to expand. Moreover, the orders were not so placed that the parts necessary to complete airplanes were on hand when needed. Bottlenecks ap-

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peared everywhere. Great numbers of planes, badly needed by the RAF, were held up for lack of four or five gadgets. These were often the parts which were easiest to make."

The fault lay also in government, which took two years to work out a scheme for financing the construction of aircraft factories, and two more years to build them. It lay, as in France, in the refusal of the growing automobile industry, with its huge capacity for mass production, to have anything to do with airplanes. The automobile industry not only refused to divert production, but it drew off skilled labor, machine tools and materials which were needed for aircraft. Lord Nuffield, Britain's Ford, went so far as to carry on a private boycott of British rearmament and refused to coöperate until eventually Churchill was forced to take over Nuffield's factories.

In machine tools, the fear of excess capacity by manufacturers again prevented vital expansion. Britain's machine-tool industry, which hardly expanded between 1920 and 1934, was so frightened of excess capacity and lowered profits later on, that, rather than expand itself to meet profitable orders, it asked that the tariff on American machine tools be removed, and American tools bought instead. When American machine tools were needed in America, the arms industries of Britain were kept waiting for months. By 1939 the British arms program was strangled by lack of machine tools.

A third shortage in England arose in the iron and steel industry, due again to the reluctance of the steel companies to build plants when they were needed. The steel industry was given protective tariffs in 1932, with the understanding that it would modernize and improve its plants. The chief result was a systematic destruction of existing "excess capacity," with compensation to the owners of the property that was retired.

The story of the Richard Thomas continuous-strip mill is a clear example of how, when left to itself, business, by its shortsightedness, endangers defense. Sir William Firth, chairman of the Richard Thomas Company, believed that the decline of the British steel industry was due to the failure of the industry to adopt modern methods. He came to America and learned what modern methods of steel rolling were. With the government's blessing, he built in South Wales a modern steel mill, two and a half miles long and nearly a mile wide. Twenty-five thousand workers at the mill turned out steel sheets at 40 percent below existing costs. For his daring and initiative the industry broke him.

"The introduction by Sir William of American methods," said Mr. W. H. Davey, president of a Cleveland Steel Company, ". . . resulted in strong opposition by other Welsh tinplate manufacturers whose conventional hand mills were unable to compete with the more modern machinery. These competitors succeeded in impairing Sir William's line of credit and he was forced to go to the banks for funds to complete his mills." The banker's committee, formed by the Bank of England, on which sat the chairman of the Iron and Steel Institute, got control of the mill. To Davey, Firth wired, in 1939:

"When the banks wound us up in '38, they did so on the excuse of a report made by accountants put in by the banks that we needed £7,000,000 to complete the mill. It was, of course, ridiculous, but we could do nothing, and control passed to the bankers. . . . They have tried to persuade me to resign. I flatly refused, in order to force them to accept responsibility for my dismissal." The bankers dismissed him because he attempted to give the British people more steel for their armaments, and to save them money on that steel.

One other story indicates the danger of monopolist industries' controlling the defense of a nation. The production of cement in Britain was controlled exclusively by two interconnected firms. These firms won a high tariff on imported cement. Then they bought up existing cement plants and scrapped them, restricted production, and raised prices and profits.

One of the most important reasons for Britain's lack of air-raid shelters today is her shortage of cement. Lack of shelters for the sleepless crowds huddled in London subways means squalor and disease.

Even when war was declared, the policy of business as usual remained. Controllers were established for the most important industries. They were, in almost every case, drawn from the largest single firm in the industry, or from the association formed by the industry to restrict production. In every case the controllers, because of their concern with their own interests, restricted expansion of capacity, though expansion was vitally needed.

Against this situation labor and a few progressive journals raged. Ernest Bevin, now Minister of Labor, accused the government of "having treated labor with absolute contempt." The Economist wrote: "When war broke out and it became obvious to all but the blind that maximum production had become the one object that superseded all others, the anti-productive system was carried to its highest point.

"The noble army of controllers was recruited from organized industry. The rings, from being tolerated, became endowed with all the power of the state. . . . The result has been a startling inadequacy of production."

It took great pressure from labor and a great disaster in France to awaken Britain. Labor has now been given important positions in government, and on all boards governing industry; the demand that profits should no longer interfere with production, and that unemployment should no longer be tolerated, became too powerful to be ignored. Yet Britain's task now is harder because she took vital time in learning this lesson.

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We Have Repeated Britain's Mistakes

THE LESSON of Britain and France is the lesson of how industry, left to itself, may permit its fear of expansion to cause disaster. We should have learned that lesson. We haven't. We are today making the same mistakes.

When our defense program began, we faced a situation in America similar to the one Britain faced in 1935. American industry, mother of the giant monopolies, was in no mood to expand. By 1940 it was so saturated with hatred of the New Deal and the government that it was useless to expect from it a far-sighted, coöperative attitude. Further, our War and Navy Departments were as reactionary as those of Britain five years before.

Our Navy Department was best known for its lobbying against the New Deal, for its failure to modernize itself, for its willing dependence on three monopolistic shipyards and for its bitter anti-labor bias, reflected, among other places, in the Maritime Commission.

The chief post in our War Department was regarded as a pause in the upward flight of ambitious American Legion bosses. At the time of the Munich crisis, it was known chiefly for the conflict between its two chiefs, a Kansas politician and an ex-utilities corporation lawyer, both of whom failed in any way to awaken sleeping and decadent army officers, whose social activities and personal well-being conditioned their entire outlook.

To augment the work of the Army and Navy Departments, the President in 1939 established a War Resources Board, composed of business men. During its brief life this board succeeded chiefly in diverting attention from the pressing problems of overhauling the railways, training labor, expanding capacity and preparing basic defense contracts, issues on which New Dealers were demanding action.

This was our condition when we undertook the present defense program. Since May 16, 1940, the President has requested $27,000,000,000 for defense. To assist the War and Navy Departments in administering this program, the President on May 28, 1940, appointed the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense. This was the first test of whether we had learned Europe's lesson.

On paper the Commission was a balanced body. Of the seven divisions, agriculture, labor, consumer protection and price stabilization were placed in the hands of commissioners who had some appreciation of the broadest aspects of defense. These divisions, however, lacked power and driving force, and the remaining three divisions—production, industrial materials and transportation—rapidly came to dominate the Commission. These three were staffed by representatives of the great industrial concerns, and they served as sounding boards for business men bent upon protecting their private economic interests.

During the seven months of the Commission's operation, American democracy suffered major setbacks. Prices were allowed to rise, government contracts were signed without labor provisions, war profiteering was permitted, anti-trust prosecution was discouraged, the restriction of profits on government contracts was removed and the principle was adopted that the government should assume the entire risk of capital investments. The Commission failed to call for expansion of capacity; it accumulated no significant supplies of essential raw materials; and it showed no real understanding of the broad problems of defense.

In assessing the responsibility of the National Defense Advisory Commission for these failures, it is of course necessary to realize that the Commission did not participate directly in the awarding of contracts. The Commission did not undertake procurement, which remained in the control of the War and Navy Departments, and it did not draw any specifications. It did possess sufficient prestige to tackle the obstacles to defense production; what it lacked principally was a comprehension of those obstacles and the drive to overcome even those of which it was aware.

A Record of Failure.—The Commission faced the condition that Britain faced—industrial requirements far in excess of existing capacity. It had to deal with industrialists who believed with the British industrialists that increased capacity would lower profits when the emergency was over. The duty of the Commission was to place against these vested interests the welfare of the entire nation. Instead, the Commission served as an inside pressure group for the interests which were delaying the defense program. Instead of translating the President's total defense and "full aid to Britain" into concrete terms and programs, the Commission met in pleasant love-feasts and spent its time on personnel and minor administrative matters.

An expansion of steel capacity was and continues to be the most urgent defense necessity. Government economists had pointed to the shortage for more than a year. But the special consultant on steel capacity to Commissioner Stettinius was—any reader of Little Red Riding Hood could guess—Walter Tower, successor of Girdler and Weir as president of the Iron and Steel Institute. Tower, in his role of adviser, insisted that capacity was adequate, though the industry even in the last quarter of 1940 was running at near capacity and piling up backlogs.

The Division of Transportation faced a similar issue. A report prepared by experts in the National Resources

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Planning Board showed that the railways, which had broken down in 1917, faced a minimum shortage of more than 100,000 cars by 1942. Such a bottleneck would threaten the entire defense program. This report was not made public by the Commission. It was taken instead to the American Association of Railroads, which prepared a rebuttal brief. Their counter-report, maintaining that all was well and that the railroads would provide, was then released by the NDAC.

Commissioner Knudsen has represented the same interests. He alone has had real power in the Commission; he has failed to use his power and his unlimited prestige to break the bottlenecks that have developed in defense. On technical matters he has shown himself for what he is—a great technical consultant. On broad issues of defense he has taken the advice of men around him whose names read like a roll call of the kings of American industry.

A driving force at the helm of a lagging defense program would have taken hold of basic problems and overcome them. The approach of Knudsen, the business man from Detroit, is basically that of the business man from Birmingham—Chamberlain.

Profit without Risk.—The industrialist-controlled divisions of the Commission did not stop at opposing expansion. They established the principle, important to business profits, that there should be a rapid tax amortization of such capacity as might be built. They further won acceptance of the principle that all risk upon the new capital outlay should be borne by the government. The government was not to own the plant if the Commission had its way. It was not even to finance it, because banks deserved a cut. The government, however, was to pay exorbitant prices swollen by excess profits, and it was to bear any loss that might be incurred. In effect, these three divisions retarded the whole defense effort by their inability to grasp and understand the magnitude of the defense program. They took the course of least resistance and let the army and navy have free rein. They also followed the army and navy policy of "just place contracts and all will be well." They believed that fat orders and a pat on the back would be sufficient. It wasn't in England.

The four remaining divisions of the Commission were largely ineffective. Their principal handicap was lack of power to enforce their recommendations. Significant information was gathered by these divisions, although in the most important case—the Bureau of Research and Statistics—the plan to present an outline of requirements to the Commission such as the British had drawn up was made impossible by the economic illiteracy of the War Department. Significant work in arbitration was accomplished by the Labor Division, and its employment section succeeded in stressing important aspects of British experience. But the Labor Division proved unable to provide a brake to the anti-labor bias of the War Department and the industrialists within the Commission.

A part of the responsibility for the Commission's failure must rest upon journalism. The conservative press of the nation, surprised at the extent to which reaction had regained power, became convinced that it could win the chairmanship for industry. It set out to convince the country that the lack of a single head explained the Commission's failings. In reality, the failure lay principally in the very men whose power the press wished to extend.

The clamor in America for direction in the defense program created a demand for the reorganization of the NDAC. This demand resulted in the appointment on December 28 of a four-man board, known as the Office of Production Management. Knudsen and Hillman are joint directors of the OPM, Stimson and Knox, the Republican Secretaries of the War and Navy Departments, are the remaining members. Beneath the Board there are three subdivisions—production, procurement and priorities. The OPM, unlike the NDAC, handles procurement. The NDAC, which continues in existence, is subordinate to it.

An indication of the OPM's character lies in its origin. The first plan for it was drawn up largely by Fred Eaton and Blackwell Smith, two Wall Street lawyers who served as assistants to Knudsen and Stettinius. All knowledge of the plan was kept from the other commissioners; they first learned of it in the press when it was presented to the President. Knudsen was to be chairman, and Hillman was to hold no position save that of adviser. Only by a last-minute intervention were New Dealers able to delay formation of the OPM for ten days and gain the co-chairmanship for Hillman.

Why the OPM May Fail.—There are four reasons why the OPM may be an even more disastrous failure than the NDAC. In the first place, the executives of the OPM are essentially those who failed with the NDAC. Nelson, who did some good work on the Commission, is now director of the Division of Purchases, which will grow less rather than more important as defense gets past the order stages. John D. Biggers, in the important position of director of the Division of Production, has shown great ability principally in representing the monopolist point of view. Blackwell Smith and other Wall Streeters have increased their stature. Most disastrous of all, the vital Division of Priorities is in the hands of the very men who should have made priorities unnecessary, and who will attempt to make priorities do what should be accomplished with plant expansions, to which they are basically opposed. In industries such as aluminum, to hand over the administration of priorities to men sympathetic with the Aluminum Company of America, which has knifed its competitors and held production

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down, raises the fear that the administration of priorities will be used chiefly to further the Aluminum Company's interests. Priorities can only be justly administered by men who are ready to demand of any industry that it show a plan for increasing capacity before it is permitted to cut civilian consumption.

Second, the OPM may well fail because it has been largely successful in driving the New Deal out of the defense program. Only on the Priorities Board is the New Deal represented. The Commission, over which the New Deal retains some nominal control, is in reality a dead branch awaiting the pruning hook. Most of the Commission's functions have been assumed by the OPM; it is even prohibited from dealing with the War and Navy Departments except through the OPM. The decline of the Commission is presumptive of the loss of influence by Miss Harriet Elliott, Leon Henderson and Chester Davis. Their divisions, if they are not formally disbanded, will slowly atrophy. Yet in these divisions alone was there any conception of a broad program of democratic defense.

In the third place, the OPM has if anything increased the power of the Army and Navy Departments over the defense program. The armed services today share directly in the central executive power, an authority which Bernard Baruch, after his experiences in the last war, was careful to take away from these departments in his proposed War Resources Board. Baruch's caution is understandable. In this defense program, as in 1917-18, the War and Navy Departments have shown themselves incapable of administering the problems of procurement and production.

A fourth reason why the OPM may fail is that labor is inadequately represented. Sidney Hillman is one man against three on the board. He has no staff comparable to those of the other members of the OPM. He has no division comparable to the three divisions through which industry gains representation, and which are augmented by the reactionary staffs of the War and Navy Departments. Hillman's only staff representation on the OPM is in the Priorities Board, which has only advisory power and cannot even give advice until Stettinius asks for it. Hillman must watch the interests of labor and consumers, yet he must never "delay" or "retard" the program by setting up "ideals." His only power lies in his ability to protest to the President; so far that power has yielded no major results.

Basically the OPM represents an attempt by business to seize control of defense. The OPM proves that, far from learning the lesson of Britain, we have not even learned from our own costly experiences of 1917-18. These are mistakes we cannot afford, for we pay for them in lack of planes and lack of ships at a moment when failure implies penalties almost beyond comprehension.

Why We Are Falling Behind

WE HAVE placed our defenses in the hands of men to whom the defense of democracy means the preservation of profits. Later chapters will show how in thus repeating the mistakes of France and England we endanger our security. Immediately, we examine in the next three sections, four reasons why we are not producing armament in sufficient quantity: (1) the predominance of monopoly in American industry; (2) the anti-government bias of the defense administrators; (3) the failure of defense officials to comprehend their problem or to recognize possibilities for its solution; (4) the anti-labor practices of the War Department and the defense hierarchy.

I. The Story of Alcoa

ON JANUARY 30, 1941, the government indicted the Aluminum Company of America—Alcoa—for conspiring with a German monopoly, I. G. Farbenindustrie, to control the production of magnesium. The charge was that Alcoa and the German firm, in 1932, made an agreement which put the control of British magnesium production in German hands, and withheld magnesium from the American market.

Magnesium is vital in armament production. It is even lighter than aluminum and is equally strong. Germany today uses magnesium in her incendiary bombs and in her aircraft. Today her planes are many hundreds of pounds lighter than ours. Germany uses magnesium—we lack it.

We lack magnesium because Alcoa has refused to produce it or to allow others to produce it.

I. G. Farbenindustrie raised German production in 1940 to 50,000 tons. Our production in 1940 was under 5,000. Of this 5,000 tons, 40 percent was used by Alcoa itself for aluminum alloys and a part of the rest went to Germany and Japan. Alcoa held production of magnesium for the American market to almost nothing and refused to license its production by other firms —any more magnesium would have lowered the price of Alcoa's aluminum. Fortunately for America, Alcoa has, through its associate, the Dow Chemical Company, agreed to construct a second magnesium plant in Texas. Our two plants in 1941 may produce as much as 12,000 tons. Attorney General Robert Jackson on January 21 estimated German production for this year at 100,000 tons.

When Walter Reuther proposes that we build 500

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planes a day, the reply of the industrialists is that we haven't enough aluminum. The reason that we have not got enough aluminum is simply that for forty-eight years Alcoa has controlled the entire American production on the basis of high prices and limited output.

We have all the bauxite ore and all the magnesite ore that we need, and we have unlimited sources of cheap hydro-electric power to produce aluminum and magnesium. Private enterprise is anxious to begin production. Yet the NDAC is not only tolerating the existing bottlenecks in aluminum and magnesium but is perpetuating them. Not only has it resisted pressure upon Alcoa to give us the expansion that our security demands, it has ensured that what expansion we get will be almost entirely under Alcoa's control.

Aluminum has cost Alcoa about 11 cents per pound to produce; Alcoa has sold it for between 17 and 35 cents a pound. Even in the depression, Alcoa held the price of aluminum to these levels:

Year	*Cost Per Pound*	*Net Selling Price*	*Net Profit Per Pound*	*Rate of Profit*
1929	11.48c	22.99c	11.51c	100%
1930	11.24c	22.72c	11.48c	102%
1931	11.26c	21.35c	10.09c	90%
1932	11.91c	20.84c	8.93c	75%

This policy has been very profitable for Alcoa. By 1926, an original investment of $100 in Alcoa was worth $8,760. In the twelve years after 1926, five of them depression years, Alcoa's profits averaged 80 percent. In 1929 net profits were $49,000,000. On one grade of fabricated aluminum used by the government, profits were 228 percent on turnover.

High prices, of course, have meant low production. Today, thanks to Alcoa's restriction of production, we have less than one-third of Germany's aluminum capacity. We need at least 800,000,000 pounds of aluminum a year; we can produce no more than 375,000,000 pounds. Even if we allow nothing for civilian consumption or for other military purposes, there would still be enough aluminum to produce only 15,000 planes a year. The President asked for 50,000.

Alcoa, of course, denies that there is any shortage at all. On August 12, 1940, during the closing stages of the government's anti-trust prosecution of Alcoa, I. W. Wilson, vice-president of the company, swore on the witness stand that Alcoa could produce enough aluminum for the needs of our army and navy and have a surplus left over for British orders. Under cross-examination by W. L. Rice, special assistant to the Attorney General, Wilson was forced to retract and take refuge in facetiousness. The following is a part of his testimony:

MR. RICE: A Martin bomber has about eight tons of aluminum in it, or 16,000 pounds, has it not?

MR. WILSON: I would think that it is in that range.

MR. RICE: Mr. Wilson, if 50,000 airplanes were to be manufactured in the course of the next year and each contained 16,000 pounds of aluminum, how much aluminum would be necessary?

MR. WILSON: Well, I think that is a meaningless figure. The arithmetic is 800,000,000 pounds.

Later on the testimony continued:

MR. RICE: The capacity of 375,000,000 pounds which you have today would be less than one-half of 800,000,000 pounds, would it not?

MR. WILSON: Certainly; it is less than a quarter of 1,600,000,000 pounds.

That was Mr. Wilson's appraisal of our defense needs.

Alcoa's response to the defense program was typical of a monopolistic industry. Alcoa went to the NDAC and offered to coöperate—if the Commission would bring pressure upon the Justice Department to call off its two-year-old anti-trust prosecution. This was too much even for the NDAC.

As a further indication of its desire to coöperate in the defense program, Alcoa, as soon as the anti-trust hearings were concluded, cut the supplies of raw aluminum to the Reynolds Metals Company by 40 percent. The Reynolds Metals Company, a potential competitor of Alcoa's, was, and is today, engaged in defense orders. Its deliveries are incompleted because it lacks aluminum.

By December it was no longer possible for Alcoa to conceal its inability to supply even enough aluminum for the present low level of production. The Northrop Aircraft Corporation announced that it had been compelled to reduce its hours of operation by 20 percent because of a shortage of aluminum. The Republic Aircraft Corporation and other firms experienced the same difficulties. Early in January, Senator O'Mahoney, chairman of the TNEC, said: "It is clear that the manufacture of American airplanes needed to fill our own and British orders has been seriously delayed because parts manufacturers have been unable to get a sufficient amount of aluminum to fill their orders."

Surely this crucial bottleneck was one which demanded the immediate intervention of the NDAC. The Commission did intervene—to champion Alcoa's complacent and restrictionist attitude. On no less than four occasions has Commissioner Stettinius in official releases defended Alcoa against the growing demand for expansion.

"Investigations just completed," read a typical Stettinius release, this one on December 29, "disclosed no serious shortages of aluminum supplies for aircraft and other military items now required for national defense." Stettinius went on to rebuke the Northrop Aircraft Corporation, Senator O'Mahoney and the Department of Justice for exposing the shortage. "It is unfortunate," said Mr. Stettinius, "that public anxiety over our national-defense preparations should be based upon reports of shortages which do not exist. Creation of such anxiety, which has no basis in fact, serves no patriotic purpose."

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Fortunately for America, the RFC was unpatriotic enough to finance the construction of a Reynolds Metals Company plant in Alabama with a capacity of 60,000,000 pounds a year. The Defense Commission made it plain that this venture was no part of the defense program, and that it had been undertaken without its assistance. To discourage any other manufacturers who might threaten Alcoa's control of the aluminum industry, a member of Stettinius' staff stated in December: "If any inquiry comes to this division from the RFC or any other federal source as to whether or not we are interested in any further supply of aluminum than that promised by the Aluminum Company, the answer is no."

Mr. Wilson and Commissioner Stettinius are very proud of Alcoa's proposed expansion of capacity. They differ by a modest 130,000,000 pounds on how much the expansion will amount to, but they are proud of it none the less. Both insist that in 1941 and 1942 we shall have ample supplies of aluminum. Stettinius maintains that by July, 1942, we shall have a capacity of 825,000,000 pounds. Wilson's estimate, together with the 60,000,000 allotted under pressure to the Reynolds Metals Company, gives us 695,000,000 pounds. Washington experts insist that we shall need at least 1,000,000,000 pounds by July, 1942, for military consumption alone, and that total production should be about 1,400,000,000 pounds.

An American and a German monopoly have combined to deprive America of magnesium for her military needs. This situation Attorney General Jackson correctly described as "control by the foreign cartel to whose advantage it was to limit American production —the consequences of which we now feel in national defense." The title of the section of Jackson's address in which he included these remarks was significant. It was: "The Economic and Industrial 'Fifth Column.'"

II. The Story of Plant Expansion

WE MUST HAVE new factories if we are to produce the planes, tanks and guns we need for defense. The foundations for those factories should have been poured last July. Today the ground for them remains largely unbroken, not for lack of men, not for lack of capital, but because for months, when the men and the capital were idle, the contracts to finance the plants were held up.

Because the manufacturers were unable or unwilling to finance the plant expansion, it was the task of the NDAC to work out with other governmental agencies a method for financing increased capacity. The RFC was admirably equipped to serve this task. But the Commission was afraid of government and was unwilling to permit government to participate in the defense program either as the financier or the owner of defense plants. This fear delayed the whole defense effort.

Government ownership of plants was expressly provided for by Congress when it empowered the RFC to establish corporations with power to construct factories and to lease them to armaments manufacturers. The Commission, however, refused to act under this grant of power. Instead it threw Congress into a turmoil of debate and kept the manufacturers in idleness for months while it worked out its own tortuous plan.

The first plans for plant expansion came from certain of the manufacturers early in July. They were, of course, out to get as much profit as they could. The Commission was only too eager to aid them. It was proposed that they borrow money from the RFC to build the plants and then add to the price charged the army or navy for the finished product, an amount (over and above the cost of production and a handsome profit) sufficient to repay the loan in five years. Thus, by a transfer of funds from one government agency to another, the manufacturers would become the owners of the plants, debt-free, without incurring a penny of risks.

But it was not enough for the aircraft manufacturers and the Commission that the plants should be given away free; they insisted that the gift must be tax-free as well. This could only be done by depreciating the plant for tax purposes as fast as the loan was paid off. Some way had to be devised, therefore, by which the depreciation could be permitted at a rate several times as fast as that normally allowed. The faithful old holding-company device naturally came to mind, and also a Treasury ruling which permitted a manufacturer who built a plant on leased land to depreciate it over the life of the lease, on the theory that at the end of the lease the title to the plant would pass to the owner of the land. For the dollar-a-year lawyers it was a simple problem. All that had to be done was to set up a subsidiary corporation to own the land, then the subsidiary would lease the land to the manufacturing company, which would own the building and would, therefore, be in a position to claim a rate of depreciation based on the length of the lease.

In the meantime certain members of Congress who remembered the last war and its aftermath had learned of this plan. They did not like the idea of the government giving away plants, and they said so to the Commission. When their protests threatened to become embarrassing, the Commission dropped the plan.

Government lawyers meanwhile had worked out a sane and simple program for financing plant expansion. Under this plan the manufacturer was to construct the plant for the Defense Plant Corporation (a corporation set up by the RFC) under the supervision of the DPC's engineers. The DPC would then own the plant and would lease it to the manufacturer for the period of the emergency. At the end of that time the manufacturer would have the right to buy the plant from the government at cost less depreciation. This

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entailed no tax problem, since the government would own the plant; consequently, there was no cause for delay in Congress.

But the Commission smelled socialism. One contract was quickly concluded under the lease plan. Packard agreed to build Rolls Royce engines, and because it was an automobile firm turning out a non-competitive engine on a temporary basis, no one objected. But from the aircraft industry government was barred. Instead, NDAC lawyers emerged in August with a brand-new idea.

Under this new plan, the manufacturer would build the plant and own it, and the government would agree to reimburse him for its cost over a period of five years. This time, however, the government would not quite give the plant away. If the manufacturer wanted to keep the plant at the end of the five-year period, he would have to pay the government its "fair" value—to be determined by arbitration. This sounded reasonable enough, but the joker came later. In arriving at the "fair" valuation, the arbitrators were to consider solely the value to the particular manufacturer in the light of the anticipated increase in earnings which the manufacturer would receive by adding this plant to his others. Here was a job for the crystal-gazers, and who could be better for the purpose than the manufacturer's own expert witnesses? If a New Jersey corporation decided that it could use its new Ohio plant for only two weeks in the year, it could get the plant on the basis of the profits it would make in those two weeks. If an Ohio manufacturer, able to use the plant the year around, offered ten times as much for it, the War Department was to look modestly away.

To finance the construction of the plants, the manufacturer would take this reimbursement agreement to his bank and borrow the money to build. Here another problem arose. Congress cannot appropriate money for more than each fiscal year. If Congress should fail to appropriate funds from year to year to meet the instalment payments, the banks would be left holding the bag. But the ingenuity of the Commission's lawyers, spurred by their desire to let the banks have their cut in the defense program, was equal to the occasion. A provision was inserted to the effect that if, three months prior to the end of any fiscal year, Congress should have failed to make the necessary appropriations to cover the next year's instalment, the whole amount would immediately become due. The army and navy would thus be required to freeze their appropriations to the extent of the full cost of the plant, and as the interest charged by the banks would be loaded back as an expense item into the price of the product, the army and navy were left in the position where they would have to pay interest on their own idle appropriations.

This plan was still not acceptable. The banks found some holes that needed plugging, and further protest was made that the government's interest was not protected. While the Commission's attorneys revised and rerevised the plan, and Congress debated the five-year amortization legislation, the manufacturers fretted and finally grew desperate. Delay meant increased costs, and increased costs meant decreased profits. Machine tools had to be ordered, labor had to be trained, and if cement foundations for the new plants were not poured before cold weather set in, there would be con-



struction difficulties. The manufacturers began to look around for some other plan of financing. They heard of the plan that had been set up by the Defense Plant Corporation. They looked it over and liked it. With the contracts in their pockets they went to the Commission, certain that at last they could begin to produce. Knudsen refused to clear the contracts. Instead, the dollar-a-year lawyers in the Commission went back to work; in October they emerged again with their same old plan, dressed up in a new way.

The manufacturers did not like it. They were warned to steer clear of the government, but that made them no more anxious to borrow from the banks. In and out of conference, they argued vigorously for the lease plan worked out by the government several months before. Even against the manufacturers, the dollar-a-year men held out. They held up production by insisting on getting something for the manufacturers that the manufacturers themselves did not want. The Commission finally and reluctantly agreed to let the manufacturers take their choice between the two plans.

Wright Aeronautical, North American, Consolidated, Studebaker, Buick and scores of others rushed in to get contracts on the DPC's plan. In a few weeks, the Defense Plant Corporation handled more than $350,000,000 in contracts; the immediate goal is contracts of $1,000,000,000.

Yet for months, while London was bombed and American workers were idle, the expansion of plants was shelved while this fight lasted. Britain's disastrous experience was entirely ignored, and vital time was wasted because a few men were afraid to let the people learn that they were capable of building factories for their own defense.

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III. The Story of the Reuther Plan

PLANES TODAY are the most urgent necessity for our defense program. Production of aircraft is 30 percent behind schedule—in December only 799 military planes were turned out. In four or five years we may have 40,000 or 50,000 planes. But the defense of England requires air weapons in a few months, not years.

The business men in the National Advisory Defense Commission faced this problem and failed to meet it. Labor faced it and found a possible solution. Walter Reuther, a tool-and-die worker and director of the General Motors department of the union, consulted with a group of technical men, tool-and-die makers, pattern-makers and engineers. He made a survey of the automobile industry, and found that:

Fifty percent of the industry's potential capacity lies idle; plants capable of producing 8,000,000 cars a year are turning out 4,000,000.

Men are available to work this idle plant. Altogether there are 100,000 unemployed former auto-workers available for plane production.

These idle men and machines, Reuther showed, could be put into producing aircraft needed for defense. This involved retooling existing machines with tools, dies, jigs and fixtures needed for aircraft-engine production, and using the idle body-parts presses to stamp wings and fuselage. It did not put pressure on the machine-tool industry, however. It actually eased it, for the new tools, jigs, dies and fixtures needed could be made in the automobile industry's own tool-and-die shops. Reuther didn't say that planes would roll off the automobile assembly lines, but he pointed out that the key men for the new assembly plants could be found in the automobile industry. He answered those who argued that his scheme was impracticable by pointing to the Cadillac plant turning out Allison engines, and to Murray Body Company's contract to stamp metal parts and assemble wing sections for Douglas bombers. He argued that within six months Detroit could be turning out 500 planes a day.

The reason that Reuther, not Knudsen, conceived this plan, was that the basis of the scheme lay in the chief weakness of the automobile industry. This industry is highly competitive. The manufacturers keep idle capacity and employ highly seasonal labor because they are afraid of what other manufacturers may do and because they want to hoard their secrets. To ensure secrecy, they leave retooling to the last minute.

The competition among manufacturers is, of course, competition among three companies: Ford, Chrysler and General Motors. Each of these three is afraid that if it undertakes aircraft production the other two, by holding their reserve capacity free, will steal a part of its automobile market. Each, therefore, aims to do as little for defense as possible, and to shift the burden to others. No manufacturer would have proposed, as Reuther then did, that a survey be made of the entire industry and that blueprints of fighters and bombers be broken down and the parts assigned to the plants shown by the survey to be best equipped for the job. His plant might be best suited to turn out aircraft carburetors, but he might be able to make more money on carburetors for his latest-model auto engine.

The automobile manufacturers did not like the Reuther plan. It threatened their position in the industry. It threatened to give labor a greater share in the industry's management; aircraft production be damned. The aircraft producers certainly didn't want it, for it threatened to take the bottom out of their monopoly prices. Their journal, American Aviation, described the plan as "rather a cruel joke."

These groups found their voice in the NDAC.

When Reuther gave the plan to Roosevelt, the President referred it to Knudsen. Knudsen handed it to the War Department, and to his production staff under Deputy Commissioner John D. Biggers. Reuther outlined his plan before the press club and over the radio. The CIO pushed it. To counter the growing pressure, someone in the War Department or the Commission sneaked out an anonymous release to discredit it. Newspapers announced that high defense experts had regretfully rejected the plan as impracticable; there weren't enough machine tools to produce the engines; and if there were enough machine tools, there wasn't enough aluminum; and if there were enough machine tools and aluminum, there wouldn't be enough armaments.

These arguments were a sorry and vicious excuse for official hostility. Reuther had expressly shown that his plan would free machine tools by utilizing existing facilities. If aluminum was lacking—and Stettinius denied it—that was a reason for increasing aluminum production, not for discouraging aircraft production. The plea about lack of armaments was the old defeatist argument that monopolists had used in England until a vigorous administrator, Beaverbrook, had forced production through. As opposed to these hypothetical arguments, British experience had already proved that automobile workers and automobile plants could be used for the production of highly finished aircraft.

It should be emphasized that the Reuther Plan is not a substitute for aircraft expansion. Reuther himself emphasized that it was not. Its importance lies rather in the fact that Reuther has shown that there is now available in Detroit idle capacity and idle skill which the manufacturers are unwilling or unable to bring together, but which labor and government can effectively use and direct. It is doubtful whether the Plan could be put into operation within six months. Perhaps there is not now in existence a type of light bomber or fighter that can be adapted easily to mass production. But it is certain that existing plans for aircraft expansion will not yield aircraft for at least two years in the numbers needed. Meanwhile, any method by which the production of planes can be increased is of crucial importance.

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Capacity and Defense

If we are to defend ourselves, we must increase greatly the production of our armaments. If we are to save American lives we must get our increased production of armaments to Britain before it is too late. Today the United States is contributing less to Britain's war effort than occupied France is giving to Hitler; our output of armaments is too small and too slow because we do not possess the capacity necessary for a greater effort. We have seen how lack of aluminum capacity is holding up the defense program. Aluminum is not the exception; it is nearer to being the rule.

Steel today is the basic material of armaments production, and it is already a bottleneck in the defense program. So far the steel industry has hardly begun to feel the impact of war-material orders. The ground is just being broken for factories to be built of steel. Tanks to be made of steel are still in the designing stage. Orders for armor plate and other heavy equipment have not yet been let. So far, only 32 percent of known shell-steel contracts have been placed.[1] Above all, Britain has not yet turned to American industry as she soon must. British steel-ingot production, which together with French production was once more than Germany's, is today barely one-third as large.[2] Inevitably British steel production will suffer heavily from bombing. Britain's imports from the United States, at present under 10,000,000 tons, must be increased to at least 25,000,000 tons if British arms production is to keep within reach of Germany's. We have hardly warmed up for the real defense effort, and already our steel industry is being heavily taxed to meet the present demands. Most important steel centers are operating at full capacity, while deliveries are falling farther behind every day.

Present capacity of the steel industry is about 83,000,000 short tons of ingots a year. This year, according to NDAC experts, the civilian and military requirements of the United States alone will be 73,000,000 tons. Adding to this our export estimate of 25,000,000 tons we have a total of 98,000,000, or 13,000,000 tons in excess of present capacity. Yet these are no more than minimum estimates. One expert, Dr. Fritz Sternberg, has been quoted in The New Republic as saying that for adequate aid to Great Britain our present exports of steel (to the entire British Empire) should be increased from 8,600,000 tons to at least 30,000,000 tons. This does not include steel for American domestic defense purposes, which has been estimated in some quarters at 20,000,000 tons. American domestic requirements for non-defense purposes have been put at 74,000,000. The National Resources Planning Board, allowing for increased civilian requirements, has calculated that even with an increase of 20 percent in steel capacity, the non-military consumption of steel in the United States must be cut by a possible 17,000,000 tons if Britain's military requirements are to be met. This would involve, as the National Economic and Social Planning Association has pointed out, "terrible dislocation for the civilian industries depending on steel." Far from providing a 20-percent increase in steel capacity, however, the steel corporations now plan to increase capacity by only about 2,000,000 tons.

Their complacence in view of the crisis is indicated by the statement of Mr. Irving S. Olds, chairman of the U. S. Steel Corporation, at a meeting of the directors on January 28, 1941. After announcing net profits for 1940 equivalent to $8.84 a share on the common stock, and greater than in any year since 1930, he declared that the present capacity of the industry is adequate for all war and peacetime uses, placing the need for American defense requirements plus exports to Britain at only 20,000,000 net tons annually, in spite of the estimate of defense experts. If Mr. Olds is right, practically everybody else is wrong; and vice versa.

The shortage in steel is paralleled in other metals. For the first time in twenty years, the navy recently failed to receive a single response to its request for bids in copper. The following estimates of shortages of copper and zinc are based upon copper-refining and zinc-smelting capacity. They are rough estimates, because army requirements of copper and zinc are constantly being revised. They are optimistic estimates because the revision of army requirements is always upwards. These estimates for example are based upon the requirements of an army of 2,000,000 men, whereas today an army of 4,000,000 is more often mentioned.

	Military Requirements (including British)	*Non-military Requirements*	*Total Requirements*	*Estimated Supply*	*Probable Shortage*
		COPPER (in tons)			
1941	400,000	1,150,000	1,550,000	1,450,000	100,000
1942	550,000	1,300,000	1,850,000	1,500,000	350,000
		ZINC (in tons)			
1941	200,000	800,000	1,000,000	840,000	160,000
1942	280,000	920,000	1,200,000	890,000	310,000

These estimates may be questioned, but we have seen none that are more reliable. They are based upon America's present military requirements, not what our military requirements should be. In copper and zinc, as in steel, British purchases have been held down by

[1] National Economic and Social Planning Association: "Wanted —More Steel."

[2] In 1939, Britain and France had together a steel production of 23,000,000 tons to Germany's 22,000,000. Today Germany has control of 40,000,000 tons of steel capacity, as against 15,000,000 for Britain alone. *Ibid.*

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the knowledge of the British Purchasing Commission that no more supplies are available, and this is true also of the War Department's plans.

The monopolists, who control copper production today, argue that we can always turn to Latin American sources of supply. In fact, Latin American producers are in much the same position as our own, and with the increased export demands upon their copper supplies which the embargo upon American exports of copper creates, it is doubtful whether Latin America can supply us with more than a minor part of the copper we need.

Present shortages, however, are not confined to metals. In transportation, an industry basic to defense, a shortage of railway cars was felt as long ago as the autumn of 1939. What that shortage means in terms of a possible breakdown was seen in America in 1917. It is seen in Britain today, where, due to lack of railway cars, there is a coal famine.

Yet not only do the railway companies refuse to build new cars; they are bitterly fighting any increase in water routes, such as the St. Lawrence, which might lighten their load.

Throughout the sections of industry now engaged in defense production, shortages are appearing which threaten the entire defense program. No substantial effort is being taken to overcome these shortages. If no action is taken, the defense program will soon be choked and the industrialists will be held to blame. Yet under the existing favorable terms which the War Department contracts offer, industry could easily replace its outworn capacity with new capacity, and at no expense.

Why is it then that industrialists bitterly oppose expansion? In the first place, conditions of scarcity are favorable to maintenance of profits. There is less risk involved in producing small quantities at a high price than in expanding capacity in order to produce more at a lower price. Even when risk is transferred to the government, there remains a fear that the existence of new capacity will force prices down after the emergency.



Germany gets from factories in the occupied territory alone more airplanes than we are at present sending to England. This chart reproduced, by permission, from "Fivefold Aid to Britain—To Save Her and Keep the United States Out of War," by Dr. Fritz Sternberg (John Day, $1).

Low prices mean more abundant supplies for the community at large, but they may also mean curtailed profits. In addition, the building of new plant, whatever its effect on prices, introduces an element of uncertainty into the existing situation. Uncertainty is the thing above all others that a comfortably established monopolist wants to avoid. If one firm enlarges its capacity, others may follow. Latent competition may become active. The results, although clearly to the advantage of consumers, are unpredictable and undesirable from the monopolist's point of view.

Those who oppose an expansion of capacity, while conceding the need for higher defense production, do so on two grounds. They argue that (1) a labor shortage would void increased capacity; and (2) it is safer to impose a widespread system of priorities.

It is not surprising that complaints of labor shortage are issued by the representatives of business—by the National Association of Manufacturers, the National Industrial Conference Board and lesser members of the great army of apologists. If the labor force is inadequate, industrialists are of course relieved of all responsibility for expanding capacity. But although the NAM and the NICB are used to difficult assignments, they have found this one a challenge to their best acrobatic powers. For current estimates indicate that roughly one-seventh of our working population is without jobs of any kind or is on work-relief rolls. These figures, moreover, do not measure all the manpower that is not utilized. They were compiled primarily to indicate the seriousness of the relief problem, and do not take account, among other things, of part-time employment or of the fact that many men are doing work of a lower grade than that for which they are trained. Making allowances for factors of this kind, government economists estimate that about one-quarter of our available manpower was unused in the latter part of 1940. Even this figure leaves out of account the possibility of an extraordinary increase in the labor force, such as occurred in 1918, when the number employed was some three millions higher than the normal labor supply. Furthermore, it allows for no increases in working hours above forty a week.

Of course there are now local shortages of skilled labor. Meeting these shortages is primarily an administrative problem. Men are available to fill the jobs, but they must be recruited and trained, and industrial processes must be so modified that semi-skilled men can do the work that skilled men have done before. Recent experience in the machine-tool industry presents a striking example of the possibilities for expanding output even though men of the required skills are not readily available. When war broke out in Europe in the fall of 1939, employment in the machine-tool industry was only slightly below the record peak of

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1937. Few men with previous experience in the industry were unemployed, yet the industry was able to obtain enough workers to double production. While production doubled, manhours of employment increased only 79 percent. It was thus apparently possible to increase output per manhour while production



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was reaching record levels and while relatively green hands were being hired. The cry of labor shortage raised by the industry was proved false by its own record.

But this was no accident. The industry was recognized *and admitted* to be a bottleneck early in the program, and pressure for expansion was quickly and vigorously applied by the NDAC, by the War and Navy Departments, by the industry's own customers and by public opinion.

The last line of defense to which opponents of expansion fall back is the priorities system. The industrialists have done more than argue for priorities. Today the business men of the railways, the aluminum, steel and other industries have actually won control of the priorities division of the OPM and are administering the priorities system for the industries in which they are responsible for expansion. The temptation will be for these men to be so vigorous in their capacities as priority administrators that they may rest easy in their capacities as industrialists. A priorities system is in no sense an alternative to expansion of capacity. If it is applied rigorously it means inevitably that dislocation is caused in other industries and that unemployment and loss of living standards result. Steel, for example, enters into almost every industry in America.

Moreover, as the defense program advances, it is not clear that the most drastic priorities would make it possible for us to meet our military needs. Priorities at best put off a crisis. In view of the length of time required to bring new capacity into operation, some priorities may be temporarily needed, but they are in no sense a basic solution.

Some business men have understood the problem of capacity. Outstanding among them is W. L. Batt, Deputy Commissioner of the NDAC, who said: "I have the definite impression that the people of this country do not understand either the size or the pressing urgency of the undertaking. Too many of us are still thinking in terms of 'business as usual,' too many leaders of enterprise are still thinking of their individual competitive position instead of gearing their respective capacities to the united efforts of a whole industry."

Yet for every W. L. Batt and W. Averill Harriman there are a hundred Walter Towers who still maintain that no increase in capacity is required. It is the Towers who control the OPM.

The capacity problem, like the problem of prices and labor relations, is rapidly approaching a crisis. Decisions cannot be postponed much longer. If established firms are unwilling to expand their capacity, the government has no alternative but to build new plant itself. The notion that this plant would remain idle after the emergency is nothing but the defensive pessimism of vested interests.

In his fireside chat of December 29 the President said:

> Our defense efforts must not be blocked by those who fear the future consequences of surplus plant capacity. The possible consequences of failure of our defense efforts now are much more to be feared. And after the present needs of our defense are past, a proper handling of the country's peacetime needs will require all of the new productive capacity—if not still more.

Our needs are obvious and the method for meeting them is obvious. All that remains is for the defense authorities to act.



America's steel capacity is huge, but we are not using it to help Great Britain. To equal what Germany has, our exports should be increased nearly fourfold. This chart is reprinted by permission from "Fivefold Aid to Britain—To Save Her and Keep the United States Out of War," by Dr. Fritz Sternberg (John Day, $1).

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Labor and Defense

LABOR entered the defense program in a burst of confidence. It had the President's word that labor's rights would be defended. On May 26, the President said:

> We must make sure in all that we do, that there be no breakdown or cancellation of any of the great social gains which we have made in these past years. We have carried on an offensive on a broad front against social and economic inequalities and abuses which had made our society weak. That offensive should not now be broken down by the pincers movement of those who would use the present needs of physical military defense to destroy it.

As the summer wore on, labor's confidence waned. Clearly the emergency atmosphere created by the defense program was being used by reactionary forces in an attempt to undermine the labor movement and the New Deal.

In an attempt to stem this anti-labor tide, during the fall the CIO repeatedly requested an executive order denying government contracts to firms held to be violating the labor laws enacted by Congress. These requests were directed particularly against violators of the National Labor Relations Act, since such a provision was already embodied in the Walsh-Healey and Fair Labor Standards Acts. They were repeatedly denied.

Into the confusion created by the contradiction between what the President said and his refusal to implement his words with an executive order came the NDAC's statement of August 31:

> All work carried on as part of the defense program should comply with federal statutory provisions affecting labor wherever such provisions are applicable. This applies to the Walsh-Healey Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the National Labor Relations Act, etc. There should also be compliance with state and local statutes affecting labor relations, hours of work, wages, workmen's compensation, safety, sanitation, etc.

This statement of policy was reaffirmed by the Commission on September 6, and explicitly approved by the President in a message to Congress on September 13. On October 1, Commissioner Hillman summarized the position in these words:

> Labor has a right to require that business men who get government contracts should obey government laws. That is fundamental and is the policy of President Roosevelt and his administration. There can be and will be no compromise on this matter.

Compromised it was, however, within a week. In testimony before the Smith committee investigating the NLRB, Jackson, Hillman, Knox and Patterson all denied that recipients of government contracts were required to obey the National Labor Relations Act. None the less, labor's vote in the election went overwhelmingly to President Roosevelt, and the award on November 6 of a defense contract for more than $122,000,000 to Henry Ford came as a sharp disappointment to the labor movement.

At the time this contract was prepared, Ford was under indictment in six separate cases for violation of the National Labor Relations Act. In reviewing one of these cases the NLRB had found that even murder was not too extreme for the Ford strong-arm gang in fighting unionization. Hillman was kept in ignorance of this contract, and it was followed by a second, for which no justification could be found on grounds of military necessity. This second contract (for midget cars) showed the anti-labor policy of the War Department. The fact that Ford has recently been refused a contract for a third order of trucks, because of his unwillingness to obey all state and national labor laws, certainly does not by itself disprove this attitude of the War Department.

The Vultee Strike. – Equally damaging to labor's confidence in the defense program was the attitude of the government in the Vultee strike. The dispute was accepted as a test of strength by conservative interests throughout the country. Tremendous pressure was executed by other and larger West Coast companies to prevent the Vultee Company from accepting the union's demands. With the future of its entire aircraft organizing drive at stake there was no alternative for the union but to strike.

When the strike was called, the War Department dispatched Major Sidney Simpson as conciliator. Major Simpson immobilized himself in his hotel room; and in the five-day interval from Wednesday, when he was withdrawn from the case, until Monday, when John Steelman of the Labor Department arrived to take his place, no negotiations were possible.

Congressmen and newspapers contrived to interpret the standstill as due to union obduracy. Charges of sabotage and Communist influence were circulated. In Congress the strike leaders were called "rats," "vermin," "scum," "foreign agents that ought to be wiped from the face of the earth." It was during this interval that Attorney General Jackson issued his statement charging that Communists had deliberately prolonged the strike. Jackson's information came to him through the FBI from Captain "Red" Hynes of the Los Angeles Police Department, a notorious union-buster. The Attorney General's statement may charitably be written off as a blunder; but the FBI's reliance on such a source as Red Hynes was certainly not.

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In the eight months of the defense program, labor has suffered tremendous losses. No other group has yet been asked to make any sacrifices at all. This situation of drift in government policy and retreat before the pressure of reactionary interests has until now caused no major loss of labor support for the defense program. It has, however, intensified conditions of tension which must soon come to a head. We are unable to see how a major test of strength between labor and certain industrialist interests can be avoided this spring.

What Labor Wants. – Organized labor, in the first place, is determined to advance its demand for increased wages in industries which are organized, and for recognition where anti-union employers are holding out. Second, labor is determined to resist pressure from industry to abandon its standards of hours and payment for overtime. Third, labor knows it must resist the growing agitation which has been started by industry to ban strikes. On these three fronts, the administration must outline its policies and the people of this country must have sufficient knowledge of the issues involved to be wary of the campaign which the press has already begun to undermine labor's rights.

Labor's demand for increased wages is today expressed in the negotiations which are taking place in many industries. Most important of these are the three defense industries of aircraft, coal and steel. The statement of Glenn Martin, warning of the dangers inherent in labor's desire to profiteer at a time when Martin's aircraft company had earned five million dollars in profits in three months is indicative of the attitude among industrialists which labor must fight.

There is, we believe, a strong general case to be made for an increase in wages at this time. Labor's share in the national income has fallen from 75 percent in 1934 to 61 percent in 1940. Today, when profits are swollen by defense contracts and speculation is taking place, we believe that a rise in labor's share of the national income is urgently required if the distribution of the national income is not to become dangerously top-heavy.

In each of the three industries mentioned above, the present conditions of wages, prices and profits show that labor's demand for increased wages is fully justified.

The Situation in Steel. – Negotiations between U. S. Steel and the SWOC began a few weeks ago. The SWOC is asking for a 10-percent increase in the basic wage rate, and a comparable increase in other rates. These negotiations, directly affecting 270,000 steel workers, will in fact set the wages for the 600,000 workers of the steel industry. That the SWOC's demand is fully justified may be seen from the industry's own statistics. Average hourly earnings of steel workers are now 25 percent above the 1929 level. The hourly output of steel workers, however, is 50 percent above 1929. Comparing the situation today with that of 1937 gives the same picture. Average hourly earnings are practically unchanged according to the American Iron and Steel Institute, while output per man-hour has risen 27 percent. Even an increase of 15 percent in wages would not offset the lowered unit cost of labor since 1937.

In many manufacturing industries, steel among them, there is a large volume of overhead costs which are much the same, whatever the level of output. At very low levels of output receipts will not cover costs, but because of this large, unchanging overhead, receipts rise faster than costs as output expands. In steel it is probably true that as operations advance from 50-percent to 95-percent capacity—the level at which the industry is today—unit labor costs fall by more than 15 percent.

This factor explains why in the third quarter of 1940 profits of thirty-one steel companies amounted to $78,000,000, a figure 42 percent above the highly profitable year of 1937. It explains why U. S. Steel earned $32,000,000 in the last quarter of 1940 and $102,000,000 for the year. There is room for an 11-percent increase in steel wages without any rise in the price of steel. That is a larger increase than the SWOC is requesting.

The Situation in Aircraft. – The CIO is attempting to organize the 250,000 workers of the aircraft industry. The basis of its organizing drive is a demand for a 65-cent-an-hour minimum wage rate as against the present minimum of 50 cents paid by most aircraft companies. This 65-cent minimum compares with an 80-cent minimum in the automobile industry. So far, by relying heavily on new entrants to the labor market, and by mutual agreements not to attract experienced workers from one another, the aircraft companies have been able to insulate themselves against unionization and to pay indefensibly low wages. Their apparent determination to force workers to strike for every wage increase of a few cents an hour is incredible when set against the profit figures for the industry.

ANNUAL RATE OF RETURN ON NET WORTH OF SELECTED AIRCRAFT COMPANIES[1]

(In percent)

	1939	1940			1940
		First quarter	*Second quarter*	*Third quarter*	*First nine Months*
Aviation Corp.[2]	..	..	..	7	1
Curtiss-Wright	15	28	44	24	32
Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc.	21	52	46	113	70
Martin, Glenn, Co.	23	48	47	11	36
N. Amer. Aviation, Inc.	74	22	77	41	47
United Aircraft Corp.	29	29	47	37	38
Wright Aeronautical Corp.	29	39	43	38	40

[1] Net worth is capital and surplus as shown on published balance sheets at end of 1939. All aircraft companies publishing quarterly earnings statements are included.

[2] Deficit for 1939 and first two quarters of 1940.

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The current minimum-wage rate gives an aircraft worker and his family only about $1,300 for a full year. The Department of Labor estimates that a bare subsistence budget for a family of four is $1,360 a year. Clearly, the union demand for a 65-cent minimum in the aircraft industry is fully justified.

The Situation in Coal. – In coal, the third defense industry, negotiations between the operators and the officials of the United Mine Workers will begin on March 15. Six hundred thousand miners will be affected by these negotiations. The UMW will press for a wage increase, and for holidays with pay. The profit situation of the coal industries justifies these demands.

The mine "realization"—the price which the operators receive for their coal—has risen and will rise farther with the fixing by the government of bituminous coal prices at six percent above existing levels. Labor costs have fallen sharply in the coal industry because of the mechanization of the mines, which in 1940 proceeded more rapidly than ever before.

At present it seems certain that the coal operators will resist the union's demand for increased wages, and will, if necessary, force a strike. A coal strike at this time, when there is little coal on the surface, and when coal is a necessity in defense production, would cause the most serious crisis that the defense program has yet faced.

A major trial of strength between labor and conservative interests may come on the issue of longer hours and overtime rates of pay. Already representatives of business in Congress and the press have attacked the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Walsh-Healey Act, claiming that this legislation interferes with national defense by preventing necessary lengthening of working hours. The clamor is based on nothing more than unwillingness of employers to pay the overtime rates required by law. Neither the Walsh-Healey nor the Fair Labor Standards Act actually restricts hours of work. They simply provide that "time and a half" be paid for hours worked in excess of the legal maximum.

One of the standard-bearers in the attack against labor standards is Rear Admiral Spears, Paymaster General of the navy. The admiral wrote in his annual report that the Walsh-Healey public-contracts law "continues to be a disturbing fact in the procurement of some lines of government supplies." This statement, which was based on only the flimsiest arguments, clearly exposes the navy's traditional and implacable opposition to labor legislation. Rebuttals by Mrs. Roosevelt and Public Contracts Administrator Metcalfe Walling remain significantly unanswered.

The Right to Strike. – A final issue on which a decision will be forced this year is labor's right to strike. The attack on the right to strike has not come from those who are concerned with interruptions in defense production. In 1940, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, idle man-days on account of strikes numbered 6,500, compared with 13,000,000 man-days worked. There were about 2,000 man-days worked for each man-day idle. Had 1940 been strikeless, production would have been less than 0.5 percent higher than it actually was.

The attack upon strikes is largely a tactic on the part of employers, to divert attention from the real issues in an industrial dispute, and to bury them in a flood of congressional and press charges that strikes are holding up defense and that unions are unpatriotic. The extent to which this emotion is already inflamed was shown at the time of the Vultee strike, when certain congressmen proposed that penalties as high as life imprisonment be imposed upon those who interfered with defense production. In the California State Legislature it was suggested that any worker involved in a strike should immediately be conscripted.

The right to strike is fundamental to the right to organize. The right of Americans to organize, in unions of their own choosing, is a fundamental right, guaranteed in legislation and recognized by the courts. Over and over Supreme Court Justices have declared that freedom to organize is meaningless without the right to strike. Labor today has asserted that it will not allow that right to be compromised.

From those who wish to bind labor, a proposal has come that the workers, at least in the defense industries, should submit to compulsory arbitration. Such arbitration, as a recent report[1] has shown, has been proved to be a failure in Canada, Australia and France. To take away labor's power to bargain by compulsory arbitration, while allowing industry full bargaining power with government, would be to risk labor's support of the entire defense effort.

Today more than half the industrial workers in the country are organized in unions which are determined to press for labor's legitimate demands during the defense program. They face employers who will resist every demand, and who have been encouraged to take up an anti-labor position by Ford's and Bethlehem's successful defiance of New Deal legislation.

If the government resolves to enforce the Wagner Act, the Walsh-Healey Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act, and recognizes the necessity for a rising wage level, at least until full employment is reached, no dislocation need be caused by industrial strife. But if the government gives way to the pressure of industrialist interests, our defense program will be placed in grave danger.

Labor morale is not unshakable. It can be maintained only through a belief in the democratic nature of the defense effort. If that belief is allowed to die, we shall have lost the entire struggle. We must remember now how plainly Europe has shown us that labor, not industry, is the strength of a democracy.

[1] By the Twentieth Century Fund.

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Prices and Social Policy

PRICES are on the way up. A few have shown substantial increases so far, and others will follow unless something is done to keep them down.

We are frequently warned that we are in for a general price rise of the sort that took place here during the First World War, the sort to which that much abused word "inflation" is applied. The way to avert such a development, we are told, is to put on the brakes immediately—cut non-military expenditures of the federal government, increase taxes drastically and restrict credit.

This advice rests on an incorrect diagnosis. Restrictive measures may be appropriate when productive resources are fully employed and when the competition of consumers for the output of those resources forces prices up. It is true that a few industries have reached or approached the limits of present productive capacity. Generally speaking, however, these are not the consumer's-goods industries. In the satisfaction of the basic consumer needs for food and clothing, our resources permit a tremendous expansion. It would be tragic to cut off this expansion by applying restrictive measures prematurely.

The present situation is quite different from that visualized by the advocates of immediate restriction. While capacity in most areas of the economy is only partially utilized, we are trying in certain sectors to push production to the limits of present capacity and even beyond them. In those sectors shortages or near-shortages of varying degrees of seriousness confront us. It is chiefly in these bottleneck areas that prices have risen or are threatening to rise.

We have already seen that in many industries bottlenecks in production are intimately bound up with monopoly. But there are other industries in which no bottlenecks exist, where monopolistic control will lead to higher prices instead of increased production as demand expands.

When products are subject to monopolistic control, their prices do not go *up* because of the action of impersonal market forces. They are *put* up because somebody decides to raise them. Thus we read in The Wall Street Journal for December 28 that "officials of the U. S. Gypsum Company held a meeting yesterday to decide whether they should act on prices of their wood-fiber boards. No decision was reached."

When demand is rising, there is a strong tendency for every business that can do so to raise its price, even when it could keep prices down and expand output if it chose to do so. The defense program provides an excellent opportunity, particularly for producers of war-essential goods.

When the army began construction of military camps last fall, it rather abruptly entered the markets to purchase large quantities of lumber. The industry buzzed with wild rumors about the size of the government requirements. Prices shot up, Southern pine heading the list with an advance from $20 to $40 per thousand board feet.

The major deficiencies in purchasing were rectified after the initial spurt in prices, but still prices in many localities continued to rise. The Bureau of Labor Statistics index of lumber prices, a nationwide average, which includes all types and grades, reached 118 in January as compared with 95 in July. Even now, although most of the lumber required for army barracks has already been purchased, prices have hardly receded from their highs, a fact which was very forcibly pointed out to the industry by Price Stabilization Commissioner Leon Henderson. It may be significant that the rise in lumber prices on the West Coast was halted when two trade associations there were indicted for anti-trust-law violations.

Lumber provides the most spectacular instance of prices rising with defense needs, but it is by no means the only one. Wool has advanced 25 percent, from $1.00 to $1.25, since June, a rise which may soon be reflected in the price of clothing. Steel scrap, an important raw material in the manufacture of steel, has received considerable attention from NDAC officials. When it reached $24 a ton, compared with $18.25 in August, Mr. Henderson called for a reduction, and the price declined to $22. Copper appeared to be on the way up early in the fall, but a sharp glance from Mr. Henderson, coupled with the fear of supplies from Chile, interrupted the advance when the price had reached 12 cents a pound.

Prices and Monopoly. – More prices will begin to rise as the defense program progresses. A great many of these increases will be associated with monopolistic conditions and some with restricted output. What such price increases mean in the way of profits is obvious. The avoidance of huge profits and the protection of consumers, including the government, require that prices should be prevented from rising except in those cases where it can be shown that higher costs require higher prices if production is to be maintained at the proper level.

The relation of prices to costs, and in particular to wage costs, is coming increasingly to the forefront. It is asserted that if wage rates are increased, prices will have to be raised to take care of the higher costs. A recent editorial in Iron Age states that although the question of wages has "not yet reared its head openly," it must soon be faced. The editorial goes on:

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The question of steel prices is bound up with that of wages. Steel-company managements have stated publicly that there is no occasion for price advances so long as costs do not rise unduly. With Washington exerting constant pressure against higher prices for essential commodities, the steel companies will find themselves in a dilemma if a demand for wage increases should come after prices have been announced for the first quarter at an unchanged level.

Experience in the steel industry itself, as we have shown in the section on labor, illustrates the fallacy of the claim that higher wages necessitate higher prices.

It may be that in some cases higher prices are needed to cover the needs of high-cost producers who must be brought into operation if requirements are to be met. In these cases a price that allows high-cost producers to operate will yield a tremendous amount of gravy to the low-cost members of the industry. The remedy is not to pay them the same price. A high rate of production can be maintained just as effectively if different prices are paid to different producers. The most convenient way of arranging this will vary with the circumstances. Where there are a few producers who are marginal because their transportation costs are high, it may be easiest to subsidize part of those costs. Where the government requires a considerable amount of a commodity, and producers' costs do not tend to cluster at some common level, the government can buy the entire output, paying each producer enough to yield him a "fair return" on his investment, take enough of the commodity to fill its own requirements, and sell the rest to the other consumers.

An integral part of the program of keeping prices down is the breaking up of monopolies and of collective practices. This means that vigorous prosecution of the anti-trust laws must be continued. The defense program must not be used to hobble Thurman Arnold's prosecutions under these laws. The clearest indication that it is likely to be so used is provided by the NDAC's insistence last summer that Mr. Arnold abandon the most important section of his suit against the major oil companies, on the ground that the suit would put oil-company officials in an uncoöperative frame of mind. The anti-trust drive should be regarded as a part of the defense program.

There are some who maintain that nothing should be done to prevent individual prices from rising. The only way to get increased production in a free competitive system, they assert, is by the lure of high profits, and the way to get high enough profits is to allow prices to move freely upward. One of the troubles with this argument is obvious—we do not have a free competitive system. It is in precisely the monopolistic industries where prices are high that producers show the greatest reluctance to expand capacity, largely because of their concern with the post-emergency price structure and their monopoly position. If we allow prices to rise and sit back and wait for expansion, we shall never get it.

Furthermore, where an industry is monopolistically controlled, the setting of a comparatively low price by official action will actually result in a higher output than a hands-off policy. Left to himself, the monopolist could chose between a high price with low output or a lower price and larger sales. If he thinks it will be more profitable for him to set the high price, he will do so. But if the government steps in and deprives him of this alternative, he will be forced to accept the other —a low price and higher output. In such a situation the case for some form of government action would seem clear.

The Only Remedy. – It is suggested by some that prices should be kept down as far as possible, but that the task of keeping them down should be left in the hands of business itself. According to this view, business men will oppose unjustified price increases on grounds of foresight and enlightened self-interest as well as patriotism. To depend entirely on these qualities is to ask too much of business men. During the course of protracted negotiations over the construction of a vital powder plant in 1917, Pierre duPont wrote to a fellow officer of the duPont company, "We cannot assent to allowing our own patriotism to interfere with our duties as trustees [for the stockholders]." This remark is significant, not because it proves anything about Mr. duPont's patriotism, but because it indicates the futility of expecting business men not to play the game of business as hard as they can under the existing rules.

The obvious solution is to change the rules. If we fail to do so, we are only inviting a repetition of the incident narrated by Donald Nelson in a radio speech last fall. The army was about to buy an item for which it had rigid specifications. One foresighted individual cornered the market for this item. "It appeared," Mr. Nelson said, "that the government might be forced to meet his terms. My office, however, in consultation with the army, was able, by a slight change in the specifications and without detriment to the quality of the product, to defeat this attempt to make the government pay more money than it should." Fortunately, the item was one for which the specifications could be changed, but we cannot expect every such situation that arises in the future to yield so readily to Mr. Nelson's skill in purchasing. The power to commandeer, and the willingness to use it, are in the long run the only true remedy.

We need a policy of preventing individual prices from rising except where an increase is necessary. We need action to implement this policy. If we do not take such action promptly, there is a great danger that we shall allow ourselves to be pushed into taking general measures of fiscal and monetary restriction to meet a problem that should be handled by specific action on individual prices.

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Fiscal Policy

NOT SO LONG AGO passionate arguments about "balancing the budget" could be heard from coast to coast. Today that debate is over. Federal expenditures for the year ending June 30, 1942, are officially estimated at $8,175,000,000—without allowing for financial aid to Britain or for probable supplementary defense appropriations. Even Senator Taft would not undertake to balance such a budget.

The volume of defense expenditure is determined by military necessity and our ability to expand production, not by fiscal considerations. Thus the largest item of outlay (62 percent of the total in the 1941-42 budget) is irreducibly fixed. Three major problems remain: the level of non-defense expenditures, the proportion of revenue to be derived from taxation as opposed to borrowing, and the type of taxation.

The principles on which each of these problems should be solved were clearly stated in the President's budget message of January 8.

On non-defense expenditure: "It is our policy to retain the ideals and objectives of our social and economic programs in the face of war changes. . . . We should realize . . . that even with a fully functioning defense effort there will remain special areas of need and that social security, agricultural benefits and work relief contribute to total defense in terms of the health and morale of our people."

The need for social expenditure was emphasized in the section on health, welfare and nutrition. It is equally important to realize that the defense program has not decreased our ability to afford these services. Armament production is limited by the capacity of the armament industries and of those industries that supply materials for armament. It is not affected by expenditures for medical care or relief.

Our food supplies are abundant, and their distribution to the undernourished does not interfere with the output of warships. Schoolteachers cannot be quickly transformed into machinists. Doctors and nurses are not tool-makers. In all the fields of greatest social need our capacities are badly underutilized. Only a perverse emphasis on dollars rather than real wealth would justify curtailing the expenditure that is helping to put these idle resources to work.

On taxation versus borrowing: "Only very drastic and restrictive taxation which curtails consumption would finance defense wholly on a pay-as-you-go basis. I fear that such taxation would interfere with the full use of our productive capacities . . . I am opposed to a tax policy which restricts general consumption as long as unused capacity is available and as long as idle labor can be employed."

Since it would be absurd to restrict consumption at the present stage of our defense program, Federal revenue should be derived largely from funds that would otherwise have been saved rather than spent. For this reason we should still rely to a considerable degree upon borrowing. Taxation of the upper income brackets also has little effect on consumption. The lower on the income scale a tax falls, the greater its proportionate effect on consumption, since the lowest income groups have no savings with which to cushion the impact.

When full employment has been reached, borrowing should play a smaller role in government financing. But this point will not be approached until the national income has risen by about a third of its present level.

On types of taxation: "The additional tax measures should be based on the principle of ability to pay. Because it is the fixed policy of the government that no citizen should make any abnormal net profit out of national defense, I am not satisfied that existing laws are in this respect adequate."

The principle of progression is increasingly important as the total tax burden becomes heavier. Analysis of expenditures at different income levels reveals that the consumption of poorer groups competes much less directly with defense than that of richer groups. For example the percentage (according to a study of the National Resources Planning Board) of total family expenditure accounted for by automobiles increases steadily as income rises—from about two percent for incomes under $500 to twelve percent for those over $20,000. Automobiles contain more steel than any other consumer's goods and their production also involves the use of machine tools. They are therefore, at least potentially, in competition with the defense industries. On the other hand the poorer groups spend a far larger proportion of their incomes in food than wealthier groups do. It is hard to believe that at any stage of national defense curtailment of the food consumption of American families would be justified.

The "fixed policy" that defense shall create no abnormal net profits requires an excess-profits tax several times as drastic as the present confused and half-hearted measure. But it also requires a complete overhauling of our tax structure to close the convenient loopholes through which too many swollen incomes are now able to escape. Tax lawyers too must be asked to make sacrifices in the national interest.

But no bearded formula should be allowed to interfere with the full utilization of our resources. If our people and our mines and fields and factories are at work turning out arms for our defense, food for our nourishment and goods for our enjoyment, we can face the prophets of inflation cheerfully and can even afford to pay them at prevailing rates for their prophecies.

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One-Third of a Nation

AS A NATION we are preoccupied with the threat of totalitarian aggression and with a series of shortages—of planes, ships, guns, tanks and trained men—to meet that threat. But we dare not forget other threats and other shortages. We have yet to deal effectively with malnutrition, illness, slums and insecurity; we are still faced with inadequate medical care, diets and housing. If we felt that these enemies threatened our security as a nation in the years before the present international crisis, there is reason to press the fight against them even more vigorously today. For, as Miss Harriet Elliott has said: "Defense is planes and guns. It is equipping an army to man our military weapons. It is this, and more. It is building the health and physical fitness, the social well-being of all our people, and doing it the democratic way. Hungry people, undernourished people, ill people, do not make for strong defense."

The Background.—Maldistribution of income is the most fundamental fact beneath all these deficiencies. A study published by the National Resources Planning Board reveals that in 1935-36, almost half of all consumer expenditure was made by the richest quarter of the population. This group made 40 percent of all expenditures for food, 54 percent for medical care and 47 percent for housing.

As a result, more than one-third of our population, some 45,000,000 Americans, are living on diets which are below the margin necessary to maintain health and vitality, as defined by the Department of Agriculture. More than 14 percent of our families spend about five cents per person per meal for food. One must stop for more than a minute to visualize the rachitic children and tubercular people behind these bare statements.

The health needs of the American people have been emphasized by the National Health Survey. Preventable contagious and infectious diseases and accidents cause the deaths of nearly 100,000 children under fifteen every year. Thirty percent of our children have defective vision and 66 percent have dental defects. Each year at least 35,000 children are left motherless at birth. Many of these deaths and illnesses could be prevented with proper medical care. In 1936, a quarter of a million mothers had no physician in attendance at the births of their babies. More than 40 percent of the counties are without a registered general hospital.

Further evidence of the seriousness of income maldistribution is given by the fact that in September, 1940, there were an estimated 5,379,000 households dependent upon public assistance in one form or another. These households embraced 15,250,000 people —more than one-ninth of the total population.

The Current Problem.—The defense program must be considered against this background. Far from solving our social and economic problems, defense will in many ways aggravate them.

Perhaps the most serious intensification of our social deficiencies has occurred in connection with population movements. In the first place, we have superimposed on an already bad housing situation all the problems arising from a rapid expansion of defense industries. In certain communities there is terrific overcrowding and rents are being raised rapidly. For example, the National Executive Committee of the USHA reported last July that "in South Bend, Indiana, relief and WPA families have been evicted from their homes to make room for workers in the defense industries and have been returned to the jungles we thought we had cleared away for all time." Unless drastic measures are taken to deal with the problem, we shall soon have conditions similar to those of 1917 and 1918, when two or more workers had to use the same bed in shifts.

To take care of this problem, the NDAC created a Coördinator of Defense Housing. His job is to find out where the defense program will cause housing shortages and see that enough houses are built to meet the shortage, particularly where plant expansion creates pressing needs for new or additional housing facilities. The Coördinator is responsible for the allocation of $150,000,000, which Congress has appropriated for the erection of such housing. In addition, he administers some housing construction for married enlisted men and civilian employees of the army and navy.

Charles F. Palmer, an Atlanta real-estate man, was appointed Housing Coördinator by the Commission on July 21. He has devoted most of his time since then to construction for the army and navy; very little of it to housing for industrial workers in defense industries. Where he has taken any action on industrial housing, his principal concern seems to have been the protection of local real-estate interests. In Quincy, Massachusetts, for example, the tremendous expansion of activity at the Bethlehem Shipbuilding Company's yards created a pressing need for housing. Mr. Palmer decided, in deference to the wishes of Quincy property owners and over the protest of the shipyard workers, to erect the new housing not in Quincy but in South Boston. Palmer has recently been rather inexplicably appointed to the Office of Emergency Management, where he is in complete charge of all defense housing.

Even elementary utilities such as sewage and water supply are inadequate in many expanding defense communities. Their welfare, education and public-health facilities will be strained. Care of the unemployed and needy creates budgetary difficulties and is in many cases

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complicated by settlement regulations. The Tolan Committee, set up by the House of Representatives to investigate the migration problem, noted in its preliminary report that "the trend throughout the country, participated in by state after state, to raise the settlement-law requirements so that longer and longer periods are required before a settlement and the right to public assistance can be gained by a newcomer, and shorter and shorter periods elapse before his absence from a state, has made a former resident there lose his rights." This condition discourages migration, hampers defense production and causes distress and injustice.

Questions affecting the mobility of our population—the opening up of new economic opportunities for the underprivileged and the orderly operation of the labor market—have unfortunately received scant attention from the various defense agencies. To be sure, the NDAC, working through the machinery of the federal-state employment system, has made an effort to match men and jobs. But the effort has been on a day-to-day basis, an attempt merely to meet needs as they arise, with no appreciable long-range plan in mind. Moreover, working through a dually administered system that at best is cumbersome, it is not surprising that the effort has fallen far short of the mark. Such problems as undirected migration, both of the wholly unemployed and partially employed, the restoration of normal economies to the distressed agricultural areas and the industrial "ghost towns," the location of plants in conformity with the population movements of the past decade have largely gone unnoticed. Similarly, little to date has been done to eliminate so-called waste migration—the haphazard and, in most cases, tragic efforts of the unemployed to find work.

The draft has inevitably imposed hardships on many families. But the burden has been needlessly heavy in numerous cases because of bad administration. Mrs. Roosevelt has complained that the policies of local draft boards in granting deferment to men with dependents have not been uniform. Director Clarence Dykstra, in response to similar complaints from a group of college journalists, exhibited an unduly lighthearted attitude. "There will be differences in decisions of local draft boards," he said. "That also is true of court decisions. One of you might go up before a judge for driving thirty-two miles an hour, and get a pretty stiff fine; then a fraternity brother might go up before another judge and get none at all. . . . Besides, I suppose it isn't possible to get 800,000 men into training camps without inflicting some hardships."

Mr. Dykstra's job is to keep the hardships at a minimum. This can be done only if deferments are made fair and uniform in all cases of real dependency. But even with the most enlightened policy on the part of local draft boards, the removal of a million men from civilian life is sure to impose new burdens on our welfare and relief machinery.

It is important that steps be taken to protect the unemployment, old-age and survivors' insurance rights of draftees so that accumulated benefits are not lost as a result of military service. Action is also necessary to facilitate the return of draftees to civilian life after their year of service. Merely asking employers to hold their jobs open is not enough.

The defense program will cause far-reaching changes in our national life. Some communities will grow while others decline, many families will be temporarily broken up, prices and taxes may rise, supplies of some commodities will decrease. We must try to direct some of these changes and to prevent others. But despite our best efforts, new burdens will be created. As the program advances, as a larger and larger proportion of our national income takes the form of armaments, it becomes increasingly important that our less privileged citizens be protected from sacrifices that they are unable to bear. Great Britain has learned this lesson, and her social services have been greatly expanded since the outbreak of war.

How are we to extend this protection—". . . to build the health, and physical fitness, the social well-being of all our people"?

1. WPA appropriations should not be cut. For, as the President said in his budget message: "We must face the fact that even with what we call 'full employment' there will remain a large number of persons who cannot be adjusted to our industrial life. For this group, the government must provide work opportunities."

2. In addition to this, a federal program of general relief is necessary in order to overcome the wide disparity in benefits now existing between states.

3. The coverage of social-security benefits—including aid for the unemployed, the aged, the blind, dependent children and widows—should be extended to groups not now protected.

4. We need to expand the surplus marketing programs of the Department of Agriculture. On November 15, 1940, the Food Stamp Plan was reaching only 2,500,000 people, in comparison with the 45,000,000 who have insufficient diets. The school lunch and the low-cost-milk programs need to be greatly extended. The latter is effective in only five cities.

5. There is a need for an educational program to improve our dietary habits. The usual information media should be supplemented by organized work and personal contacts at the community level.

6. A comprehensive national health program should be undertaken. A program to organize the nation for exercise and sports is good, but not enough. Exercise won't take the place of adequate food and medical care.

7. A housing program is needed, including the construction of sufficient new dwellings to relieve the shortage and controls to keep rents at reasonable levels.

8. The federal government should subsidize state and local aid to transients. As a condition for receiving such grants, the state should be required to enact uniform settlement laws.

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Civil Liberties

WE ARE LIVING in an atmosphere of crisis. This sense of urgency is amply justified by events at home and abroad, but it carries with it grave dangers. For its basis is fear, and fear may easily lead to confusion and a feeling of helplessness. Persecution, intolerance, misplaced zeal and cruelty follow.

There are many things to be afraid of in the world today. But they are real things, to be countered by purposive action. If we are afraid of the Nazi air force, we must build planes. If we are afraid of Representative Cox, we must organize to defeat him. A vague sense of menace and impending disaster has no relation to the facts of our crisis. Hitler does not lurk in dark basements, Goebbels is not under the back stairs.

Vague fears intensify existing insecurities and hatreds, of which, along with our strength and our democracy, we have many. America, we should remember, is the home of lynching. We have more national minorities than any other country. Social competition is intense and, even now, the impact of economic change is only thinly cushioned. To this we have added the effects of a ten-year depression. All these hatreds and all these insecurities are fuel for jingoistic hysteria.

We learned in the World War years how an anti-democratic minority can exploit such an atmosphere for its own purposes. First there came a wave of anti-German feeling, manifesting itself partly in such absurdities as the banning of German music and the elimination of the German language from schools, but also in a great deal of persecution and cruelty. The notion spread that all Germans and suspected Germans were spies and saboteurs. But the definition of sabotage became broader and broader. Employers and their spokesmen were increasingly able to attribute all strikes to subversive agitators and to enlist public support in crushing them. Employers' associations and vigilante groups understand the usefulness of this technique and they therefore attack civil liberties.

Liberal and democratic organizations must understand it too and must fight violations of these fundamental rights even when their own interests are not immediately involved. Communists, those individuals who refuse to salute the flag, and the opponents of conscription may all be classified as hostile to the defense program. It is therefore easy for liberals who feel strongly that Hitler must be defeated to remain comparatively unmoved by such persecutions. Indeed the Department of Justice itself has seemed willing to abandon the spirit of civil rights in its recent dealings with Communist leaders. The arrest of Earl Browder for a technical violation of the passport laws, and the imposition of a heavy jail sentence for this minor crime, were surely not unconnected with his political views. In effect a minority party is being persecuted because its views are unsavory to those in power.

Local Governments and Civil Rights.—The relations between employers and local government are perhaps most clearly revealed in Los Angeles. Stronghold of the open shop, the pride of the National Association of Manufacturers, which characterizes the city as the nation's "white spot" in labor relations, Los Angeles is also the center of our aircraft industry. The recent hearings held there by the La Follette Committee, as well as a series of National Labor Relations Board cases heard a few months ago, reveal a picture of relentless and bitter opposition to trade-union organization and collective bargaining. Heading up the fight is the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, which works through a group of satellite organizations, chiefly the Merchants' and Manufacturers' Association. The aircraft manufacturers, led by Donald Douglas, are banded together under the aegis of the latter organization. Both fact-finding agencies of the federal government demonstrated that Los Angeles employers utilized all the traditional weapons of labor warfare.

These stories suggest that we cannot rely upon the state and local governments to protect our civil rights. Many of them will not care to try—witness Oklahoma, Memphis and Los Angeles. Others will try and fail, for the interests to be fought are strong and well financed. And a great many will do nothing, being either apathetic or too deeply involved in other problems.

But their most disturbing implication is that the federal government is not clearly aware of the dangers. This uneasiness is reinforced by a glance at the uniform state sabotage laws proposed by the Federal-State Conference on Law Enforcement Problems of National Defense. This conference is, to be sure, not an official federal agency, but it was called by the Department of Justice and clearly has the Department's blessing.

Its Model Sabotage Prevention Act imposes very heavy penalties—up to five years in prison plus a $10,000 fine—for acts of sabotage, very broadly defined. Saboteurs, according to this draft, include anyone who "intentionally . . . impairs . . . (or) interferes . . . with . . . property with reasonable grounds to believe that such act will hinder, delay or interfere with" national defense. (Sec. 2) Or anyone who urges another person to perform such an act, even though the other person refuses. (Sec. 4) Or anyone who "intentionally makes or causes to be made or omits to note on inspection any defect in any article with reasonable grounds to believe that such article . . . is intended to

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be used in connection with . . ." national defense or "is one of a number of similar articles . . . some of which are so to be used" (Sec. 3).

These phrases are general enough to include a great many people. In particular, if strictly interpreted they would seem to prohibit all strikes or attempts to strike in defense industries. Such statutes in reactionary hands might easily prove the backbone of a union-breaking campaign.

Recent activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation tend to cast further doubts on the federal government's role as a protector of civil liberties.

The terrorism of the Department of Justice secret police in the post-armistice years, 1919-24, is a matter of public record—in the report to the Senate by Senators Tom Walsh, Norris, Borah and Ashurst; in the 1924 investigation of the Department's lawlessness by Senators Wheeler and Brookhart; in the detailed decision by United States Circuit Judge George Anderson, finding this federal police force guilty of mob vigilantism; in the condemnation, by distinguished law-school teachers and lawyers, headed by Professor (now Supreme Court Justice) Felix Frankfurter, of the Department's detectives for unconstitutional, law-breaking "acts which have caused widespread suffering and unrest, have struck at the foundation of American free institutions, and have brought the name of our country into disrepute"; in the public statement of Mr. (now Chief Justice) Charles E. Hughes that these "violations of personal rights . . . savor of the worst practices of tyranny"; in the request by Dean (now Justice) Harlan F. Stone to a Senate committee for full inquiry into "the violation of constitutional safeguards and statutes by the agents of the Department of Justice"; and in the shocking testimony of eyewitnesses, newspapermen, business men, lawyers and officials of other government agencies.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation.—Shortly after the President's September, 1939, declaration of a limited emergency, this same secret police agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, began to check workers in defense industries for their employers, but never, so far as we can learn, the employers for the workers—despite the intimate financial and corporate tie-up between some of our biggest manufacturing concerns and German, and even Japanese, companies. In strikes at such plants, the FBI has investigated the strikers and their unions, but if it did this to the management or the owners, no one has heard of it. When, at the Vultee aircraft plant, eight weeks of fruitless negotiations for a minimum $25 weekly wage for exhausting assembly-line work were followed by a strike, the FBI promptly determined that it was called in order to serve, not the economic needs of the men, but the ideological needs of communism. A stoppage of only six working days, one of the shortest major strikes in industrial history, was, as we have shown, wrongly characterized by the FBI as having been prolonged by Communist influence.

As soon as the FBI was assigned in September, 1939, to detect criminal violations of the espionage or neutrality laws, it reëstablished its General Intelligence Division of the 1919-1924 period. This division, according to J. Edgar Hoover's testimony before a House subcommittee on the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Bill for 1940, has been engaged in ferreting out the opinions and beliefs of American citizens, whether criminal or not. In connection with this activity—again according to Mr. Hoover's testimony—it has begun the compilation of a card index similar to the one used during the World War years, listing thousands of individuals and groups, labor unions and labor leaders, writers, publishers, speakers and articulate liberals—seemingly anyone and everyone whose thinking is distasteful to the Bureau's detectives. In September, 1939, it sought to induce the police and the sheriffs of all American cities and counties to report to the FBI, in advance, every public meeting to be held anywhere in the United States—so that they all might be subject to this espionage system.

Its preoccupation with political espionage may already have contributed to making the FBI less efficient in tracking down real spies and traitors. As early as 1938, at the trial of the German spy ring, the federal judge lamented the incompetence of the government's detectives in permitting the chief spies to slip out of their sight and out of the country, leaving only four of the supernumeraries to be tried and convicted. Nor has it been more successful in its leading case of alleged treason. Though it publicly announced that it had minute, conclusive evidence to prove in court a plot by seventeen Brooklyn youths to overthrow our government, to blow up bridges, police headquarters and other public works, to seize arsenals and the United States subtreasury, the trial jury acquitted some of the alleged plotters, the federal judge cleared others and the prosecuting authorities freed all the rest.

The FBI, as the federal agency charged with detecting sabotage and spying, is teaching the police of our cities and states its own conception of the part that secret police should play in national defense. It even invited representatives of the detective forces of Latin American countries to come to Washington and learn its methods and practices. This is true at the same time that other branches of our government are trying to enlist the people of all American countries in a common effort to safeguard democratic rights.

Congress has been asked to appropriate for the FBI seven times as much as the detective force used during the World War, although sabotage is now admitted to be negligible. Indeed, the FBI is already spending for what it calls national-defense work almost as much as the entire Department of Justice required in 1918 for all the wartime and civilian activities of all its branches—including the detective service.

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What Must Be Done.—The federal government ever since the Civil War has been the firmest bulwark of civil liberties. When this bulwark has collapsed, as it did during the immediate post-war years, labor-baiting, alien-hating and the persecution of minorities have swept unchecked over the country.

The great influx of refugees from fascism during recent years has made the maintenance of civil liberties even more pressing than during the World War. France and Great Britain dealt both cruelly and stupidly with this problem. The recent registration of aliens, which was in itself probably a wise move, might become an instrument of persecution if administered in such a spirit, especially since the questionnaire required information about political and trade-union affiliation and about the political party that the registrant intends to join in this country. If our civil rights are to survive this emergency, we must take immediate steps to give force, in the federal administrative agencies, to the clear, liberal statements of the Supreme Court.

It is first of all necessary that the FBI be deprived of authority to investigate the non-criminal activities of American citizens. It is gravely to be questioned whether J. Edgar Hoover, in view of his background and experience in the FBI during its blackest period, after the Great War, is the proper person to head this organization. But negative steps are not enough. A vigorous agency, with an ample appropriation, should be set up to search out and prosecute violations of the Civil Rights Acts. The existing Civil Rights Section of the Department of Justice is quite inadequate to the task, being overshadowed and hampered by the FBI.

But above all it is necessary for the democratic majority to realize that the preservation of civil rights is an essential protection against the tyranny of a fascist-minded majority. They must realize it as clearly as does that minority. For it is the majority who are protected by these rights; the majority that is made up of many minorities. This majority must act in its communities, through the press, through its congressmen, through all available channels and through newly created channels, to bring violations to light and violators to punishment.

Our Fight Is Not Lost

IN OUR HASTE to arm England and ourselves, we have forgotten to ask ourselves for what we are arming? We must ask ourselves now: what is it in America that is challenged by fascism that we want to defend?

Certainly it is not our past. That is over. Certainly it is not our present alone, for the *status quo* of the present, with its unemployment and insecurity, is indefensible. It is our future which is challenged, and which alone is worth defending; it is the promise of what we, as a self-governing nation, may do.

For eight years the world has watched in America the struggle of self-governing people to free themselves from poverty and insecurity through their democracy. The advancement of this struggle is our promise. No talk of national unity should blind us to the fact that this struggle was carried on, not by all of our people, but in spite of a part of them. Nor should it conceal the fact that part of our people is attempting to win back, through the defense program, the power that it lost eight years ago.

These few powerful people were always well represented in the War Department, the Navy Department, the army and the navy. They are today far too well represented in the civilian administration of the defense program. From their alliance with their counterparts in industry the present failure of our defense program stems: the failure to expand capacity, the failure to adopt a progressive wage policy, the failure to respect New Deal legislation, the failure to deal intelligently with strikes; above all the failure to use the rich resources of manpower and materials that we possess.

Not only are we failing in these matters. We are allowing dangerous inroads to be made, in the name of defense, upon our civil rights, by forces in and out of the government, which have no respect for civil rights. We are allowing hard-won gains to be compromised which alone are worth defending.

Today one factor in business acceptance of the five-year government lease of plants, is the belief that in five years, when the lease is up, business will be back in control of both Congress and administration and will, therefore, be able to dictate the terms on which it takes over the plants.

We do not want to see New Deal and labor forces begin a defense effort which business is to end. After the last war, American bankers helped to finance Mussolini's rise to power and to equip the armies of Europe to stamp out social revolution in Western Europe and the Soviet Union. A reactionary America, forcing reactionary peace terms on Europe, would be disastrous. Irrespective of the outcome on the battlefield, Hitler would have won the war.

Many people today believe that the New Deal is doomed to go the way of the New Freedom. A part of labor regards this outcome as inevitable; a more important group of conservatives, because they know that it is not inevitable, are working to bring it about.

We do not regard it as being certain. In Britain, when war was declared, a reactionary, pro-fascist group was in control. Labor was unrepresented in government, and was in a minority in Parliament. But the day-to-day events in Britain brought labor to a com-

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manding position in the administration of government, and the determination of wartime and post-war policies.

Labor in America can play, must play the same role. We have shown where the defense program has gone wrong. That analysis indicates what should now be done, to obtain for America a program of democratic defense.

The Outline of a Democratic Defense Program. – A democratic defense program is one in which all the people of a nation take part. They determine the objectives of defense. They are represented in the administration of the defense program, and all of them participate directly in the broad defense effort.

Today, though some objectives have been stated, our program is not administered by the representatives of the people; and nearly 9,000,000 of them are unable to find work of any nature to strengthen America.

We have resources as rich as any hostile nation now; but if we fail to mobilize them promptly, we may face the greatly superior resources of a newly created empire later on. The full utilization of our resources must be the first economic objective of a democratic defense program. Only when all of the resources which we, as a nation, possess are fully and intelligently used shall we begin to be prepared.

Capacity. – Expansion of capacity is our most urgent industrial necessity. Threatening bottlenecks in key sectors of American industry will delay deliveries for many months, and prevent the mobilization of the manpower we possess. In steel, in copper, in machine tools, in aircraft and railway equipment, in magnesium and many other industries expansion must be achieved.

Our military security demands it. In aircraft, expansion is taking place most rapidly, yet it is still so slow that only in 1943 will British and American production begin to equal German production. In other fields we are falling still farther behind.

The lease plan of the Defense Plant Corporation provides, we believe, the basic contract by which expansion must be realized. If industrialists refuse the generous terms which this type of contract offers, government must be prepared to build and operate defense plants outright. In aircraft production, we believe a great deal could be achieved by the construction of a government "yardstick" factory, operated under union conditions and producing at fair prices.

One aspect of capacity is its full utilization, as in the Reuther plan. In some degree we believe this plan can and should be immediately adopted.

Priorities. – The cutting of deliveries in consumption goods is industry's answer to those who demand expansion. We see no answer to the argument for expansion, and certainly none in a widespread priorities system. It would dislocate many industries supplying those which are rationed, or drawing supplies from them. It would prevent the full mobilization of resources from being reached.

Priorities in some cases may be necessary to overcome immediate bottlenecks. We recommend that the condition in which priorities are granted to an industry by the Priorities Board should be the assurance from the industry that expansion of capacity in the industry is already underway. In one field priorities can be applied. The government should immediately declare that there will be no new 1942 automobile models, thereby freeing much needed machine-tool capacity.



Prices. – One of industry's solutions to the problem of expansion is a form of self-imposed priorities—a rise in prices. We have shown how, left to themselves, prices must rise over the next year. Failure to act now means far more drastic action later on. Britain proved that. In Britain no action was taken to prevent food prices from rising. They rose, in consequence, 40 percent between August, 1939, and March, 1940. This year the British government is purchasing Britain's entire farm crop, as a method of controlling food prices.

So far our efforts to hold down prices represent at best a temporary expedient. Commissioner Henderson has complained about unjustified price rises, but he has had no powers to back his complaints with action. Prices may be controlled in three ways: 1. We can enforce fair prices on defense contracts. 2. We can institute direct price control for certain basic commodities. 3. We can vigorously enforce the anti-trust laws.

The first of these methods could be used now by the OPM if the OPM wished to do it. If the OPM fails to perform its primary duty of concluding defense contracts at fair prices, then it needs to be revised.

The second of these methods cannot be carried out at present either by the Consumer Division or the Price Stabilization Division of the National Defense Advisory Commission. It needs new legislation granting power to fix prices of basic raw materials and goods purchased by the OPM and perhaps to control retail prices of foodstuffs and other consumption goods. The enforcement of the price-fixing decisions would be by civil and criminal penalties. Responsibility in the courts would in all cases rest on the seller to justify any increase in prices above the stated maximum price.

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The third method of control lies in the anti-trust laws. So far the Anti-Trust Division has been called off some important prosecutions by the pressure of business interests within the NDAC. In future the Division should actually be greatly expanded to take over its urgent emergency duties. Drastic and swift action is needed if high prices and war profiteering are not to destroy civilian morale.

Labor. – We face three immediate issues concerning labor. On none of these issues has government formulated a policy; the outcome of each depends upon what policy government adopts.

The first issue, of wage increases, is involved in the present negotiations taking place upon wage contracts. Steel, coal, aircraft and other important industries now face vital wage decisions.

In steel we have shown that there is room for an 11-percent increase in wages without an increase in prices. In aircraft we have shown that the present swollen profits can support rapid increases in wage rates. In coal and other heavy industries, recent increases in productivity have opened a profit margin which labor should close, for the nation's good as well as its own.

Labor, it must be realized, need not face sacrifices, and should obtain its share of the increased national income which business now desires to take for itself. Only by labor's receiving a rising share of the national income can we look forward to post-war prosperity through increased consumer demand taking the place of the demand for armament.

The second issue of immediate importance is organization. A union drive is taking place to organize Ford, Little Steel, aircraft and other industries. Because organized labor, as England has proved, is ultimately our best guarantee of democracy, the liberties of each one of us depend largely upon labor's success. There is nothing about this emergency that calls for the freezing of social relations. Business, we have shown, is fighting as hard as it knows how to increase its power. Labor must be allowed freedom to organize, and its organizations must be protected. That means the enforcement of the Wagner Act, the Walsh-Healey Act, the wages-and-hours law, and the enforcement of the principle, already conceded by the War Department, that no government contracts from now on shall be given to the violators of federal laws.

The third issue is strikes. Inevitably we face a move in this country to ban them. It will begin by forbidding strikes in the defense industries and will spread to all industries. The right to strike is inherent in the principle of collective bargaining. That principle today is basic to economic freedom and equality for labor in America. Ours would become forced labor, as it is in Germany, if the principle of collective bargaining were abandoned through suppressing the right to strike.

The move to ban strikes has not yet been resisted by the New Deal. One form which this movement is likely to take is a demand for compulsory arbitration. While the fullest possible negotiations between the opposing parties should be encouraged, compulsory arbitration is an experiment which has failed. It failed in New South Wales, it failed in France, it will fail here if it is applied, and it will leave business and labor smarting.

Where issues arise in defense industries involving recognition, discrimination, company unions and unfair labor practices, the NLRB, which has handled these cases since its inception, should continue to handle them.

Where issues arise involving wage increases or working conditions, and a compromise is sought by government, mediation, not arbitration, should be the method adopted. If the government wishes to go farther than the creation of additional mediation boards in the Department of Labor, and establish mediation boards for states, or industries, we believe that these boards should publish monthly summaries of the wage, price and profit statistics of each industry so that the public may be informed of the true situation in the industry when a strike situation arises.

Inevitably labor will seek increased wages and further organization. Inevitably industry will resist. If government enforces the Wagner Act and recognizes that wage increases may be effected within the present swollen profit margins, there need be no interruptions to defense. If government is weak and gives way to business pressure, then labor unrest and serious trouble are certain. Ultimately we must learn, as Britain has done, that the only way to avoid strikes in our emergency is to give labor full representation in the defense program.

The New Deal. – We said that our promise which alone is worth defending lies in the continuation of the struggle of our people to free themselves from poverty and insecurity through their democracy. Some people no longer believe in that promise. It must be reaffirmed. We have made tremendous progress in these eight years, but many of our achievements are still only beginnings.

Today basic New Deal legislation in the Wagner Act, the wages-and-hours law and the Walsh-Healey Act is under attack. The status of other New Deal programs such as social security, the WPA and unemployment insurance has been made uncertain. These measures need to be strictly enforced, as in the case of labor legislation, and extended, as in the case of social security. Higher and not lower appropriations are needed at this moment.

Other New Deal programs, such as exchange regulation, farm-parity payments, the PWA, public power, are still in their formative stages. Full employment, even when it is reached, will not make them super-

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fluous in any sense. And in still other fields we need to establish New Deal programs where there have been none until now.

We have never had a real federal health program, though such a program is urgently needed. We have never had a federal aid-to-education program. This is certainly needed to widen the consciousness of our people. We have never had an adequate federal housing program. We badly need such a program.

We need to overhaul our federal taxation system. Not only must the inevitable pressure for sales taxes and other taxes on consumption be resisted, but new taxes are a necessity to redistribute income and to prevent war profiteering. Our present system is utterly inadequate to serve this purpose. Our struggle to reach security for our people is not yet over. It is as much a part of our defense today as our armaments.

Civil Rights.—Britain, at war and facing invasion, has, with few exceptions, maintained the civil rights of all her citizens save fascist agents. America, three thousand miles from the battlefront, and in no immediate danger, has already restricted basic civil rights.

The attack on these rights is an attack upon all our citizens. The form of the attack is clear. The right of free speech is denied to Communists and then all progressives and all trade-union organizers are declared to be Communists. The right to strike is banned in defense industries; then all industries are declared to be such. German agents are suppressed; then all anti-war groups are declared to be German agents. Minorities are persecuted, and because we are still a nation of minorities, almost none of us will remain free.

This attack stems from some trade associations, certain elements in Congress and one part of the government. The trade associations, we believe, should be constantly exposed by analysis of the appeasement attitude of these groups. Congress should guard its own lines of defense by forming a more cohesive group of liberals than has been formed so far. The FBI should be expressly restricted in its actions.

We need at once to rescind the executive order of August 17, 1940, making the FBI the clearing house for all complaints about the beliefs of federal employees and persons on relief projects. We ought at once to demand that clearance be required from the NDAC before the FBI is permitted to enter any dispute involving labor relations. The only brake at present applied to the FBI, the Neutrality Laws Unit of the Department of Justice, is largely ineffective. This unit, which was established to combat the activities of undemocratic groups, should fulfill its original function.

The government, we believe, should actively insist upon the maintenance of civil rights by investigating violations as they occur. The present civil-rights drive of the Department of Justice has apparently been intimidated into almost complete inactivity. A new divi-

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sion is needed with sufficient appropriations and powers to combat the inevitable violations of civil rights which accompany times of stress.

The Administration of a Democratic Defense Program.—By their anti-labor, anti-government bias, and their consistent application of a monopolist viewpoint, the administrators of the industrial division of the defense program have, as we have shown, delayed our defense.

The failure of the price-stabilization division to hold down industrial prices and of the consumer division to produce any plans for the control of consumption-goods prices, is due principally to lack of power. In the same way Mr. Hillman's failure so far has been his lack of power.

The failure of the War Department, the Navy Department and the industrial divisions of the NDAC and the OPM is a failure of personnel. The men in control of these bodies are similar to the men who brought France to her knees and England within inches of disaster. If they are incapable of administering the present defense program, these men are certainly incompetent to administer the kind of program we are outlining here. Men drawn from the ranks of labor and the New Deal, who have borne the burden of our struggle so far, are best able to bear it now.

The Executive Order which created the OPM provided also for the creation of a coördinating body to direct the OPM and the entire defense effort. We urge the President to establish this body now and to place on it men of force, broad outlook, experience in public service and proved democratic faith. Administrators such as Mayor LaGuardia, we believe, are necessary to break the present log-jam in defense.

Beneath this new coördinating body, we suggest that the present board of the OPM continue as a production council with the administrator of the coördinating body as chairman. Mr. Hillman would serve on this council as labor commissioner and Mr. Knudsen as production commissioner, thereby avoiding the anomaly of a joint head, one of whose parts is without a body. Parallel to this production council a price-control board should be established with a vigorous administration and broad authority.

The personnel of this board and of the OPM, we believe, must be composed of experts experienced in public service who are concerned with the public good rather than with private profits. Deputy Commissioner Biggers, Commissioner Stettinius, Walter Tower, Blackwell Smith and others do not represent the failure of personalities, but the failure of a class. Until we learn that we have learned nothing.

These suggested administrative changes can be effective only if they are bulwarked by such a system of industrial boards, providing for full labor representation, as CIO President Philip Murray has proposed. Only under such a plan as this can friction within industries be avoided and existing facilities be fully utilized. We believe there is a further place for an interdepartmental committee to control foreign trade and formulate broad wartime and post-war policies.

Freedom Is Our Weapon.—At present we are in danger of losing our fight to build democracy in this country. We are losing because far more forceful groups than a deeply divided labor movement and an unorganized liberal movement are today attempting to control government policy.

For eight years these reactionary groups withheld their support of our government, making it conditional upon full acceptance of their demands. The defense program has strengthened their hands. Today the President in his anxiety to avoid defeat of crucial legislation, may sink into a position of greater and greater reliance upon these groups unless the progressive and truly democratic forces in this country are able to combine their strength and make their full weight felt.

British labor entered its defense effort scorned and almost without political power. Its present improved position was won, not by passivity and resignation, but by constant, well directed activity and organization. This is one lesson that we can learn now.

How we make our force felt depends on specific local issues. All local issues or situations, however, possess common characteristics. In each the methods of expression, the press, the radio, the meeting hall, the representatives in Congress, are the same. These are our resources of democracy, our ultimate source of strength which today must be as fully mobilized as our resources of manpower if we are to survive. As Robert Jackson has said: "*Liberty is not a luxury to be enjoyed, or a theory to be defended; it is a weapon to be used.*"

Every local issue, whether it is a demand for a wage increase which results in a strike, an increase in rents or food and clothing prices, or the suppression of anti-war meetings or other civil rights, today has a significance which far transcends its purely local character. If we can meet threatened rent increases by means of rent committees, violation of liberties by committees to defend civil rights, attacks upon labor by committees to defend labor, then through our action the present faltering program of defense may be transformed into one which is truly democratic. Ultimately, we believe, problems which are national will demand that actions which today are local in scope be woven into a fabric in which progressives throughout the country join together for political action. What form of organization that action should take we do not yet know. We are sure of two things: that democracy in America will survive only as a progressive democracy and that it will be kept progressive and alive only if we as the people claim it to be ours.

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